Trump is asking for help. That puts him in a position he's not used to.
As Donald Trump prepares to meet Xi Jinping in Beijing, the summit's original purpose — resolving a bruising trade war — has been overtaken by a more urgent question: whether China will use its influence over Iran to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, through which half of China's oil flows. The reversal is striking. Washington now needs something from Beijing, and that need reshapes the balance of every conversation on the agenda — from tariffs to Taiwan. In the long arc of great-power rivalry, moments when one side must ask the other for help are rarely without consequence.
- Trump's joint strikes with Israel against Iran in late February upended a summit that was supposed to be about tariffs, forcing both sides to reckon with a Middle East conflict neither fully controls.
- China's alarm over the Strait of Hormuz is less about immediate energy shortages than about a global recession that could hollow out the export economy underpinning its growth.
- Washington is openly asking Beijing to pressure Tehran — a reversal that hands China rare leverage, potentially convertible into concessions on trade tariffs and the stalled $11 billion US arms sale to Taiwan.
- On trade, the most likely outcome is an extension of last October's truce, though Chinese officials warn that another temporary patch only deepens uncertainty for businesses on both sides.
- Taiwan may be where Beijing sees its clearest opening: not a policy reversal, but a rhetorical shift — from the US 'not supporting' to 'opposing' independence — that would quietly redraw the world's language about the island.
Donald Trump was originally scheduled to visit Beijing in March to negotiate tariffs. Then, seven days after the trip was announced, he authorized joint strikes with Israel against Iran — and the summit's entire logic changed.
The meeting, now set for May 13–15, arrives with a different agenda. The trade war that once consumed both governments — tariffs climbing to 145 percent before a truce last October — has been displaced by a more immediate concern: the Strait of Hormuz, through which half of China's crude oil passes. The Iran conflict has disrupted shipping there, and while China is not in immediate crisis, the IMF has warned the broader war could trigger a global recession. With roughly one-fifth of China's GDP tied to exports, a world that stops buying is an existential problem for Beijing.
This is where the dynamic inverts. The United States is now asking China to pressure Iran into a deal. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has called on Beijing to 'step up.' Iran's foreign minister recently met with China's Wang Yi, who pledged support for Iran's sovereignty while calling for a ceasefire. China has pushed Iran toward negotiations before, and Washington knows it. As University of Chicago professor Dali Yang observed, Trump finds himself in the unfamiliar position of asking for help — and that need becomes currency across every other item on the agenda.
On trade, neither side expects a breakthrough. China's trade surplus hit a record $1.2 trillion last year, and the tariff war has settled into something resembling a draw. The likeliest outcome is an extension of the October truce, though Tsinghua University professor Da Wei cautioned that Beijing wants stability, not another temporary postponement that leaves businesses in limbo.
Taiwan is the third front, and the one where Beijing senses real opportunity. Congress approved an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan last year; the State Department has stalled it ahead of the summit, but China wants it cancelled. More achievable — and perhaps more consequential — would be a rhetorical shift: if Trump moved from saying the US 'does not support' Taiwan independence to saying it 'opposes' it, Beijing would consider that a meaningful victory, one that quietly reshapes how the world frames the island's status.
China has noticed that Trump's posture differs from his predecessors — loosened semiconductor restrictions, limited enthusiasm for Taiwan, and a reported instruction to remove language describing China as a threat. Trump has spoken of expecting a 'big, fat hug' from Xi. That warmth, combined with Washington's need for Chinese help on Iran, may be the opening Beijing has been carefully waiting for.
Donald Trump was supposed to arrive in Beijing in March to talk about tariffs. On February 20th, the White House announced the trip. Seven days later, Trump authorized joint strikes with Israel against Iran, and everything shifted.
Now the meeting is happening May 13-15, but China's shopping list has changed. The trade war that dominated planning—with tariffs that once climbed to 145 percent before a truce last October—is no longer the main event. What matters now is the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which half of China's crude oil flows. The Iran conflict has disrupted shipping there, and Beijing is alarmed.
China is not in immediate crisis. Its energy portfolio is diversified, its reserves are substantial. But the International Monetary Fund has warned that the Middle East war could trigger a global recession, and that is the real threat. About one-fifth of China's GDP depends on exports. If the world stops buying, China stops growing. The longer the strait stays closed, the worse it gets. Ali Wyne, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group, put it plainly: no country benefits from this conflict continuing.
This is where the dynamic becomes interesting. The United States is openly asking China to pressure Iran into a deal. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said the administration wants Beijing to "step up." Last week, Iran's foreign minister met with China's Wang Yi in Beijing. According to the Chinese account, Wang called for a ceasefire and pledged support for Iran's sovereignty. China has leverage here—it has pushed Iran toward negotiations before—and now Washington needs it.
Dali Yang, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, noted the reversal: Trump is in the unusual position of asking for help. "That puts him in a position that he's not used to." And that matters, because influence over Iran could become currency in the other fights on the agenda.
On trade, neither side expects a breakthrough. China's trade surplus hit a record $1.2 trillion last year, with the US as its largest customer. The tariff war has been so tit-for-tat—sky-high duties on one side, restrictions on rare earth exports on the other—that Yang described it as sumo wrestling ending in a draw. The most likely outcome is an extension of the October truce, maybe wrapped in language that lets both sides claim victory. But Da Wei, an international relations professor at Tsinghua University, said that is not what Beijing wants. "We want stability and predictability," he said. "We don't want to just review it or postpone it for another year or several months. That would create uncertainty for the business environment."
Taiwan is the third piece, and it is the one where China sees real opportunity. Congress approved an $11 billion arms sale package to Taiwan last year; the State Department has stalled it ahead of this summit, but Beijing wants it killed entirely. Taiwan's legislature just approved a $25 billion defense budget—about two-thirds of what the government originally requested—which will cover US purchases but not domestic weapons production. A State Department spokesperson called further delays "a concession to the Chinese Communist Party." But Beijing knows the president cannot simply cancel congressional decisions. What it can do is push for rhetorical shifts. If Trump moved from saying the US "does not support" Taiwan independence to saying it "opposes" it, that would be a win. It would reshape how the world talks about the island.
Wang Yi told Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Taiwan is "the biggest risk in China-US relations." And Beijing has noticed that Trump's approach differs from his predecessors. He has loosened restrictions on semiconductor sales to China, shown little enthusiasm for Taiwan, reportedly ordered the Pentagon to remove language about China being a threat, and said he expects a "big, fat hug" from Xi. China, Yang said, "very much appreciates the respect that President Trump has shown President Xi." That respect, and Trump's need for Chinese help on Iran, may be the opening Beijing has been waiting for.
Citas Notables
We want stability and predictability. We don't want to just review it or postpone it for another year or several months. That would create uncertainty for the business environment.— Da Wei, professor of international relations at Tsinghua University, on China's trade concerns
Trump is in a situation where he is asking the Chinese president to help. That puts him in a position that he's not used to.— Dali Yang, political science professor at the University of Chicago
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does the Strait of Hormuz matter so much to this meeting? It seems like a Middle East problem.
It is a Middle East problem, but half of China's oil passes through it. When shipping stops, China's energy costs spike and global trade slows. China's economy runs on exports—if the world can't afford to buy, China can't afford to sell.
So China needs the US to fix Iran, but the US needs China to fix Iran. Who has more leverage?
That is the question. Trump is asking for help, which is not his usual position. That reversal gives Beijing something it did not have before—the ability to trade influence over Iran for concessions on trade or Taiwan.
What does Beijing actually want from this summit?
Stability on tariffs, mainly. The trade war has been exhausting. But more than that, Beijing wants to shift how the world talks about Taiwan. If Trump changes even the language—from "does not support" independence to "opposes" it—that is a diplomatic win.
Is a trade deal likely?
No. Both sides are too dug in. The most likely outcome is an extension of the truce they agreed to in October, maybe with some face-saving language. But that leaves Beijing frustrated because it does not solve the underlying uncertainty.
What about the arms sale to Taiwan?
The State Department has stalled it ahead of the summit. Beijing wants it canceled entirely, but it knows Congress controls that decision, not Trump. So Beijing will probably push for rhetorical concessions instead.
Does Trump seem likely to give them?
He has already loosened restrictions on semiconductor sales to China and shown little support for Taiwan. He said he expects a "big hug" from Xi. Beijing thinks this administration is softer than the ones before it.