Taiwan ends up on the table in conversations where Taiwan isn't in the room
In the long arc of great-power diplomacy, small democracies have always risked becoming bargaining chips in rooms they are not invited to enter. This week, Taiwan's 23 million people watch a summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping knowing that their security — embodied in a $14 billion weapons package and decades of American commitment — may be quietly renegotiated in the name of other priorities. The island has survived on a careful balance of deterrence, legal obligation, and political will; it is the last of these that now feels most uncertain. What is being tested is not merely a bilateral relationship, but the reliability of democratic solidarity itself.
- Trump's own words — framing Taiwan's arms sales as something to 'have a conversation about' with Xi — have rattled Taipei in ways that no formal policy shift yet has.
- China enters the summit emboldened, with Xi expected to press Taiwan as a core concession and draw parallels to Trump's apparent flexibility on Ukraine.
- Taiwan's deputy foreign minister put the fear plainly: the island's greatest dread is ending up 'on the table' as a tradeable asset between two men who hold its fate.
- U.S. military stockpiles, already depleted by the Iran conflict, may delay delivery of weapons Taiwan has purchased — leaving a material gap at precisely the wrong moment.
- Taiwan is hedging independently, approving $25 billion in new defense spending and maintaining military channels with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, even as White House priorities shift.
- Analysts are divided between cautious optimism that Trump grasps Taiwan's strategic value and a harder-edged fear that transactional diplomacy will sacrifice long-term security for short-term deals.
Taiwan is watching this week's Trump-Xi summit with the particular dread of a democracy whose fate may be decided in a room where it holds no seat. At the center of its anxiety is a $14 billion weapons package awaiting approval — a concrete symbol of the security commitment that 23 million people depend on. When Trump told reporters he intended to raise the arms sales directly with Xi, treating a decades-old policy as an open negotiation, a chill ran through Taipei.
The fear is not abstract. Analysts and former officials have long worried that Trump's transactional instincts could lead him to offer quiet concessions on Taiwan — shelving an arms package, perhaps, or issuing a symbolic rebuke of Taipei's leadership — in exchange for Chinese cooperation on other priorities. China's Foreign Minister has already told Secretary Rubio that Taiwan represents 'the greatest risk' in the bilateral relationship, and Xi is expected to press his case hard, possibly invoking Trump's apparent flexibility toward Putin's claims on Ukraine as a precedent.
Taiwan's own officials are threading a careful line. Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung expressed confidence in Washington's assurances, while his deputy Francois Wu was more direct: 'What we fear most is that Taiwan ends up on the table.' The island is not waiting passively — its parliament approved $25 billion in new defense spending last week, and military channels with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command remain largely intact. But a deeper problem looms: U.S. munitions stocks, depleted during the Iran conflict, may delay delivery of weapons Taiwan has already purchased, creating a vulnerability that could take years to close.
China continues its military exercises around the island, and while an invasion is not considered imminent, it is no longer unthinkable. What emerges from the coming days of diplomacy will determine whether Taiwan faces that horizon with the full weight of American commitment behind it — or discovers, too late, that the umbrella it relied on was always conditional.
Taiwan is watching this week's summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping with a particular kind of dread—the dread of a small democracy whose fate may be decided in a room where it has no seat. At stake is not just the island's political standing in the eyes of Washington, but also a $14 billion weapons package that has been pending approval. The arms deal represents the kind of concrete, material commitment that Taiwan needs to feel secure. Without it, the island's 23 million people face a widening gap between the military threats arrayed against them and the tools available to respond.
The anxiety in Taipei is not unfounded. Trump has already signaled that he intends to raise the weapons sales directly with Xi, framing it as a negotiation rather than a settled matter of policy. "I'm going to have that conversation," Trump told reporters in the Oval Office. "President Xi would like us not to do it. And I will have that conversation." The statement itself—treating a decades-old commitment as something open for discussion—sent a chill through Taiwan's government. For months, some U.S. officials and analysts have worried that Trump's transactional approach to diplomacy could lead him to offer concessions on Taiwan in exchange for Chinese help on other priorities, particularly the ongoing conflict with Iran.
Under the framework of the "One China" policy, the United States officially recognizes Beijing's position while maintaining unofficial but robust relations with Taiwan. Washington has sold the island more than $11 billion in advanced weaponry just in the past year—one of the highest figures on record—and is legally obligated under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide the means for the island to defend itself. Yet the law offers no guarantee against political will shifting. A former senior U.S. official laid out the scenario that keeps Taiwan's leadership awake: China might extract a concession that looks modest on paper but carries enormous symbolic weight—a public criticism of Taiwan's president, perhaps, or a quiet agreement to shelve the next major arms package. Such a move would send a message to Taipei that the security umbrella it has relied on is conditional after all.
Taiwan's own officials are trying to project calm while preparing for the worst. Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said this week that he maintains confidence in Washington's commitment and that the U.S. has repeatedly assured Taipei that policy toward the island will not change. But he also acknowledged the elephant in the room: "Of course we hope the Trump-Xi summit produces no surprises regarding Taiwan." His deputy was blunter. Francois Wu told Bloomberg in late April: "What we fear most is that Taiwan ends up on the table in conversations between Xi Jinping and President Trump. We are concerned and must prevent that from happening."
China, for its part, is approaching the summit with confidence. Beijing views the months-long conflict between the U.S. and Iran as having strengthened its negotiating position. Xi has long made clear that reunification with Taiwan is a core objective—he has called it "unstoppable" and refused to rule out military force. Multiple sources familiar with planning for the summit expect Xi to press his case directly, possibly drawing a parallel to Trump's apparent receptiveness to Vladimir Putin's claims on Ukraine. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Secretary of State Marco Rubio in late April that Taiwan represents "the greatest risk" in the U.S.-China relationship and urged Washington to "honor its commitments."
Meanwhile, Taiwan is taking steps to reduce its dependence on American goodwill. The opposition-controlled parliament approved an additional $25 billion in defense spending last week, though the figure fell short of the $40 billion the government had initially sought. Taiwan's military maintains regular contact with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command through channels that, according to sources, remain largely intact despite shifting White House priorities. But there is a practical problem looming: U.S. military reserves of critical missiles have been depleted significantly during the Iran conflict, creating what analysts describe as a short-term risk of ammunition shortages in any future conflict. A new analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that remaining U.S. munitions stocks are no longer sufficient to counter an adversary like China, and it will likely take years for inventories to recover to pre-war levels. Taiwan worries that weapons it has already purchased but not yet received could be delayed further as the U.S. rebuilds its own arsenals.
Some analysts remain optimistic. Piero Tozzi, a senior China policy official at the America First Policy Institute, said Trump "understands how important Taiwan is" and called it "really the first line of our defense." But optimism is a luxury Taiwan cannot afford. The island is actively preparing for the possibility of a Chinese invasion, even as it hopes that possibility remains distant. China continues to conduct frequent military exercises around Taiwan, laying groundwork for a move that, while not imminent, is no longer unthinkable. What happens in the coming days between Trump and Xi will shape whether Taiwan faces that threat with the full backing of the world's most powerful military, or whether it must face it alone.
Citações Notáveis
I'm going to have that conversation. President Xi would like us not to do it. And I will have that conversation.— President Trump, on discussing weapons sales with Xi Jinping
What we fear most is that Taiwan ends up on the table in conversations between Xi Jinping and President Trump.— Taiwan Deputy Foreign Minister Francois Wu
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does a weapons sale matter so much if the U.S. has already committed to Taiwan's defense?
Because a commitment on paper and a commitment in practice are different things. The weapons are the tangible proof that America will actually show up. Without them, Taiwan is betting everything on a promise that could evaporate in a negotiation.
What's Trump's actual leverage here? Why would Xi care if the U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan?
Because every weapon Taiwan gets is a weapon that makes invasion harder and costlier. Xi wants reunification—he's said it's unstoppable. But he also wants it to be possible. A well-armed Taiwan becomes a problem. So China will always push back, and Trump seems willing to treat that pushback as the opening move in a deal.
Is Taiwan actually at risk of invasion, or is this theoretical?
It's not imminent, but it's not theoretical either. China runs military exercises around the island constantly. Taiwan is building bunkers, increasing defense budgets, preparing its population. You don't do those things if you think the threat is purely hypothetical.
What does Taiwan actually want from this summit?
Invisibility. They want to not be on the agenda at all. They want Trump and Xi to talk about Iran, trade, whatever—just not Taiwan. Because any conversation about Taiwan where Taiwan isn't in the room is a conversation where Taiwan loses.
Could Trump actually use Taiwan as a bargaining chip?
That's the fear, and it's not paranoid. Trump has shown he's willing to question long-standing alliances and treat security commitments as negotiable. If he thinks helping China on Taiwan gets him something he wants from Xi—help with Iran, a trade deal—he might do it. The question is whether his own officials and Congress will stop him.
What's the worst-case scenario for Taiwan?
Trump publicly agrees to delay or cancel the weapons sale, or makes a statement that undermines Taiwan's political standing. It doesn't have to be a formal betrayal. Just a signal that the U.S. commitment is conditional, not absolute. That alone could shift the entire calculation in Beijing's favor.