Shocks through the system sent officials scrambling for new markets
In the shadow of civil war, Sudan's gold has found new hands to hold it — Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and Ethiopia stepping in where the UAE once stood dominant. A diplomatic rupture in 2025, born of accusations that Abu Dhabi was arming a paramilitary faction, severed what had been a near-total export dependency and forced Khartoum's military government to hastily rewire its most vital trade relationship. The numbers shifted, the revenues contracted, and yet the deeper question — how much gold moves unseen, funding the very conflict that has made Sudan the world's gravest humanitarian emergency — remains unanswered.
- Sudan's gold exports to the UAE collapsed 63% in a single year after Khartoum accused Abu Dhabi of backing the RSF paramilitary, severing diplomatic ties and closing UAE ports to Sudanese cargo.
- The loss of a market that once absorbed 99% of Sudan's gold exports stripped more than $600 million in revenue from a single trade relationship, deepening economic strain on a government already fighting for survival.
- Officials in Port Sudan scrambled to find buyers almost immediately, and within months Egypt had become a $517 million alternative — a twenty-fold surge — while Oman, Qatar, and Ethiopia absorbed additional shipments.
- Rising global gold prices softened the blow, keeping total export revenues roughly stable even as volumes fell, offering a narrow financial reprieve amid an otherwise deteriorating economic picture.
- The official trade data conceals as much as it reveals — the RSF and informal small-scale miners operate vast shadow networks of unrecorded gold sales, leaving the true scale of Sudan's gold economy, and who profits from it, deeply obscured.
Sudan's gold exports to the UAE fell off a cliff in 2025 — dropping 63 percent to just 8.2 metric tons — after the military government in Khartoum severed diplomatic ties with Abu Dhabi, accusing it of backing the Rapid Support Forces in the country's grinding civil war. The UAE denied the allegations, but the rupture was real: by August, Sudanese cargo ships were being turned away from UAE ports, disrupting not just gold but fuel shipments from Red Sea terminals.
The UAE had previously absorbed 99 percent of Sudan's gold exports. Losing that market sent shocks through the system and triggered a frantic search for alternatives. Egypt emerged as the primary new buyer, importing 4.9 tons worth $517 million — roughly twenty times its previous intake. Oman, Qatar, and Ethiopia also stepped in, each expanding purchases sharply. Sudan's export officials in Port Sudan moved quickly, and the redirection happened fast enough to prevent total collapse.
The financial damage was real but partially cushioned. Sudan's total gold export volume fell from 22.9 to 14.7 tons, yet rising gold prices kept overall revenues roughly comparable across both years. Still, the UAE market alone — which had generated $1.5 billion in 2024 — yielded only $865 million in 2025, a loss of more than $600 million from a single relationship.
Beneath the official figures lies a murkier reality. Sudan's state gold producer acknowledges that informal and illicit trade — much of it run by small-scale miners outside any regulatory framework — goes entirely uncounted. UN experts have accused the RSF of financing its military campaign through unrecorded gold sales, a charge the group denies. The true scale of Sudan's gold economy remains unknown.
All of this unfolds against the backdrop of a civil war that has killed tens of thousands and produced what the UN calls the world's largest humanitarian crisis. Gold has become both a casualty of the conflict and, potentially, a source of fuel for it — and redirecting exports to new buyers, however necessary, has done nothing to address the catastrophe beneath.
Sudan's gold shipments to the United Arab Emirates collapsed last year, a dramatic reversal that tells the story of a fractured alliance and a nation scrambling to find new buyers for one of its most valuable exports. In 2025, the North African country sent just 8.2 metric tons of gold to the UAE—a 63 percent drop from the 22.2 tons it had shipped the year before, according to data the Sudanese central bank shared with Bloomberg. The shift is stark enough on its own, but the numbers reveal something more: the UAE's share of Sudan's total gold exports plummeted from 99 percent to 56 percent in a single year.
The rupture stems from a diplomatic break that widened into something far more consequential. Sudan's military-backed government formally severed ties with Abu Dhabi in May of last year, accusing the UAE of backing the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary faction locked in a grinding civil war with the army for control of the country. The UAE has consistently denied the allegations, insisting it supports neither side in the conflict. Yet the damage to the relationship was already done. By August, Sudanese cargo ships began encountering obstacles when trying to enter UAE ports—a development that rippled through the economy, affecting not just gold but fuel shipments from Sudan's Red Sea terminals as well.
What happened next was a scramble for alternatives. Egypt emerged as the primary beneficiary, receiving 4.9 tons of Sudanese gold in 2025 worth $517 million—roughly twenty times what it had imported the year before. Oman doubled its purchases to 0.7 tons valued at $77 million. Qatar more than doubled its intake, importing 382 kilograms worth $41 million. Even Ethiopia, which had previously bought no Sudanese gold, suddenly received 294 kilograms worth $31 million. The redirection happened quickly enough that it sent what one analyst called "shocks through the system." Suliman Baldo, executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a Sudanese-run think tank monitoring economic developments, noted that officials in Port Sudan began actively hunting for new markets the moment the UAE doors began closing.
The financial impact is substantial but complicated by the mechanics of commodity pricing. Sudan officially exported 14.7 tons of gold in 2025, down from 22.9 tons in 2024. Yet because gold prices rose during that period, the total export revenue for both years came out roughly similar—a small mercy in an otherwise grim economic picture. The UAE shipments alone, which had generated $1.5 billion in 2024, brought in only $865 million last year. That's a loss of more than $600 million in a single market.
But the official figures tell only part of the story. Sudan's state gold producer has acknowledged that the numbers don't capture the vast informal and illicit gold trade operating in the country, much of it controlled by small-scale miners working outside any regulatory framework. The Rapid Support Forces themselves have been accused by United Nations experts of financing their military campaign through unrecorded gold sales—charges the group denies. How much gold is actually moving through these shadow channels remains unknown, making it impossible to calculate the true scale of Sudan's gold economy or how the diplomatic rupture has affected it.
The conflict itself has become the backdrop to all of this. The civil war that erupted in April 2023 has claimed tens of thousands of lives and created what the United Nations describes as the world's largest humanitarian crisis. Gold, paradoxically, has become both a casualty of the fighting and a potential source of fuel for it. The redirection of exports to new buyers may have kept some revenue flowing into state coffers, but it has done nothing to address the underlying catastrophe unfolding on the ground.
Citações Notáveis
The diplomatic rupture sent shocks through the system in Sudan, prompting officials in Port Sudan to begin exploring alternative markets.— Suliman Baldo, executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did the UAE relationship matter so much to Sudan's gold trade in the first place?
The UAE became Sudan's dominant buyer almost by default—it was the easiest, most reliable market when the civil war started in 2023. Ninety-nine percent of exports went there. That kind of concentration is dangerous. When the relationship broke, there was nowhere else to go.
The government accused the UAE of backing the RSF. Do we know if that's true?
The UAE denies it flatly, says it supports neither side. But the accusation was serious enough that Sudan cut diplomatic ties. Whether it's true or not, the government clearly believed it—or needed to act as if it did.
Egypt suddenly became a major buyer. Why Egypt?
Geography and proximity, mostly. Egypt shares a border with Sudan. When the UAE closed its doors, Port Sudan could redirect shipments west instead of east. It's faster, cheaper, less risky. Egypt was the obvious alternative.
The numbers show official exports dropped, but you mentioned illicit gold trade. How much are we talking about?
Nobody knows. The state gold producer admits the official figures don't account for it. Small-scale miners operate completely off the books. The RSF is also accused of selling gold informally to fund operations. It could be massive—it could dwarf the official trade.
So the diplomatic rupture might not have actually reduced Sudan's gold revenue as much as these numbers suggest?
Exactly. The official exports fell 63 percent, but a huge amount of gold is moving through channels we can't see. The real economic impact is invisible.
What does this mean for Sudan's ability to fund the war?
If the RSF is using informal gold sales to finance its campaign, and if the government is losing access to formal export revenue, both sides have incentive to push more gold into the shadow economy. The conflict and the gold trade are becoming inseparable.