The system was built assuming disruptions would be local and temporary.
For decades, Britain's food policy rested on a quiet faith: that open global markets would absorb any disruption, routing abundance from one region to compensate for scarcity in another. That faith is now being tested by converging geopolitical and climatic forces — tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, a looming 'Godzilla' El Niño, and drought-stricken trade routes — that do not respect market logic. As food costs approach 40% above their 2020 levels, the question Britain faces is not whether to intervene, but whether it has waited too long to build the resilience that intervention requires.
- A Treasury request for supermarket price caps has ignited fierce industry backlash, but the real danger lies far beyond any retailer's pricing desk — in chokepoints, droughts, and geopolitical flashpoints reshaping global food flows.
- One-third of global fertiliser trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, the Panama Canal is throttled by multi-year drought, and forecasters are warning of a record El Niño that historically drives food prices up by around 9% — multiple shocks are converging at once.
- Britain is acutely exposed: it imports 60% of its fertiliser, three of its five worst harvests in history have occurred in the last decade, and extreme weather now affects the overwhelming majority of domestic farmers.
- Markets under stress do not self-correct cleanly — shortages invite profiteering, large firms post record profits while households cut back, and the resulting demand collapse can tip entire economies toward stagnation.
- A classified government document has already acknowledged that without major investment in food system resilience, the UK will struggle to maintain food security as global competition for supplies intensifies — yet policy responses remain shallow.
- Analysts and advocates are calling for strategic food reserves, regulated control over essential foods, and sustained long-term investment in domestic farming — structural reforms that price caps alone cannot deliver.
When the Treasury asked British supermarkets to cap price rises on essential foods, the industry's response was swift and indignant. But beneath the theatre of outrage lies a harder problem: Britain's food system is exposed to forces no price cap can reach, and the shocks are already forming on the horizon.
Two crises are converging. The first is geopolitical — roughly one-third of global fertiliser trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and a war involving Iran would threaten that passage directly. The second is climatic. Forecasters are warning of a record-breaking El Niño — described by meteorologists as a 'Godzilla' event — that will disrupt weather patterns across the Pacific and East Asia. Strong El Niño events have historically pushed global food prices up by around 9%; the 2015-16 event alone drove 50 million people into food insecurity across southern and central Africa.
These distant shocks expose a structural flaw in British food policy. The assumption that global markets will always compensate for regional disruptions no longer holds. A Chatham House study identified 14 critical chokepoints in the global food system — the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, Black Sea ports, the Panama Canal, which carries 16% of global grain trade and has been choked by prolonged drought. When multiple failures strike simultaneously, the system has nowhere to turn.
Britain's domestic position offers little buffer. The country imports 60% of its fertiliser and half its fossil gas. Three of the five worst harvests on record have occurred in the last decade, costing farmers £2.3 billion in lost revenues. Eighty-six percent of British farmers report being hit by extreme rainfall in the last five years; 78% by drought. The climate crisis is not approaching — it is already reshaping British agriculture.
A still-classified Defra document on national security risks has reportedly acknowledged that without major improvements to food system resilience, the UK would struggle to maintain food security if geopolitical competition for supplies intensifies. Yet the policy response remains focused on retail price optics rather than structural repair.
What Britain needs, analysts argue, is a rebuilding of the strategic food reserves abandoned in the mid-1990s, tighter regulation of essential foods, and sustained investment in domestic farming — basic income for farmers, incentives for resilient production, and support for a sector now operating in a far more volatile world. Price caps are not a food security strategy. In a world growing steadily less forgiving, the absence of one is a risk Britain can no longer afford.
When the Treasury asked British supermarkets to cap price rises on essential foods this week, the response was swift and theatrical. Supermarket executives declared themselves furious. Former heads of think tanks and retail chains lined up to denounce the very idea of price controls as economically ruinous. But beneath the noise lies a harder truth: Britain's food system is exposed to forces far beyond the reach of any price cap, and the shocks are coming.
The price surge expected over the coming months will land on top of a near-40% increase in food costs since 2020. Two converging crises explain why. The first is geopolitical. Roughly one-third of the world's fertiliser trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and half the global population depends on artificial fertiliser to eat. A war involving Iran threatens that passage. The second is climatic. Forecasters across Europe and North America are warning of a record-breaking El Niño event—meteorologists have called it a "Godzilla" event—that will tear through weather patterns from the Pacific to East Asia, bringing devastating droughts to some regions and catastrophic storms to others. Historically, strong El Niño events push global food prices up by around 9%. The 2015-16 event alone drove 50 million people into food insecurity across southern and central Africa.
Britain's vulnerability to these distant shocks reveals a deeper structural problem. The assumption that has guided food policy for decades—that open global markets will always compensate for disruptions in one region by supplying from another—no longer holds. A 2017 study by Chatham House identified 14 critical chokepoints in the global food system. The Strait of Hormuz is one. The Strait of Malacca, between Malaysia and Sumatra, is another. The Black Sea ports connecting Ukrainian and Russian farmers to world markets are a third. The Panama Canal, which carries 16% of global grain trade, has been choked by a multi-year drought across Central America, forcing prices higher. Meanwhile, 60% of global food production happens in just five countries. When multiple shocks hit simultaneously—as climate instability makes increasingly likely—the system has nowhere to turn.
Britain's own food system is far from immune. The country imports 60% of its fertiliser and 50% of its fossil gas. As global fertiliser and energy prices climb, British farmers face a mounting cost crisis. The domestic picture is already grim. Three of the five worst harvests on record have occurred in the last decade. Last year, the harvest value of wheat, barley, oats, and oilseed rape fell more than one-fifth below the long-term average, costing farmers £828 million in lost revenue. Over the entire decade, those weaker harvests have cost farmers £2.3 billion. Extreme weather is now the norm: 86% of British farmers report being hit by extreme rainfall in the last five years, and 78% by drought. The climate crisis is no longer a future threat—it is reshaping British agriculture now.
When supplies tighten and prices rise, markets do not always function as theory predicts. Shortages emerge. Profiteering follows. Large companies with market power generate record earnings while households cut spending on everything else, squeezing demand, crushing growth, and pushing economies toward stagnation. This is the mechanism by which external shocks become cost-of-living crises.
The government understands this, at least in private. A summary of a still-classified Defra document on national security risks from ecosystem collapse stated bluntly that without major increases in food system resilience, the UK would struggle to maintain food security if geopolitical competition for food intensifies. The document noted that countries best positioned to adapt are those investing in ecosystem protection and resilient food systems.
Price caps alone will not solve this. Neither will tariff reductions on nuts or appeals to supermarkets. Britain needs to rebuild the strategic food reserves it abandoned in the mid-1990s. It needs tighter government control over essential foods and well-designed price regulations. It needs long-term investment in domestic farming—basic income for farmers, incentives for resilient and sustainable production, support for a sector now operating in a far more volatile world. Without these changes, Britain remains dangerously exposed to events entirely beyond its control, in a world growing steadily less forgiving.
Citas Notables
Without significant increases in UK food system and supply chain resilience, it is unlikely the UK would be able to maintain food security if ecosystem collapse drives geopolitical competition for food.— Classified Defra document on national security risks from ecosystem collapse
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does a price cap on food feel so threatening to the people running supermarkets?
Because it forces them to absorb costs they would normally pass to customers. In a tight supply situation, that cuts into margins. But the real issue is that they're treating this as a temporary measure when the underlying problem is structural—the system itself is breaking.
You mention 14 chokepoints in the global food system. How many of those are actually at risk right now?
At least three are under immediate stress: the Strait of Hormuz because of Iran, the Panama Canal because of drought, and the Black Sea because of the ongoing conflict. But the danger isn't just the ones in crisis now. It's that if two or three fail simultaneously, there's no backup. The system was built assuming disruptions would be local and temporary.
The El Niño forecast sounds apocalyptic. How confident are meteorologists about this?
Confident enough that they're using words like "Godzilla." These aren't alarmists. They're looking at ocean temperatures and atmospheric patterns and seeing something genuinely unusual forming. The 2015-16 event pushed 50 million people into food insecurity. If this one is bigger, the scale is hard to imagine.
British farmers have lost £2.3 billion over a decade. Are they leaving the land?
Many are. But it's not just economics—it's exhaustion. Eighty-six percent report extreme rainfall damage in five years. Seventy-eight percent have been hit by drought. You're asking people to farm in conditions that are becoming genuinely unstable, with input costs that keep climbing. The system is grinding them down.
If the government knows all this, why hasn't it acted?
Partly ideology—the belief that markets self-correct. Partly inertia. Partly that admitting the problem means admitting decades of policy were built on a false assumption. But there's also genuine complexity. Rebuilding food resilience takes years and money, and the shocks are arriving now.
What would actually work?
Strategic reserves. Regulation of essential foods. Direct support for farmers to transition to more resilient systems. Investment in domestic production even if it costs more than imports. Basically, treating food security the way you'd treat national defense—as something too important to leave entirely to markets.