institutional channels are not functioning, and people no longer believe
Party leadership endorses Humala's military expertise on security matters despite his 2005 conviction for leading an armed uprising that killed four police officers. The party frames the 2005 Andahuaylas incident as a political event reflecting democratic decline, while acknowledging the deaths caused institutional distrust.
- Four police officers killed in the January 2005 Andahuaylas police station takeover led by Antauro Humala's supporters
- Juntos por el Perú won 12% in the first round of the 2026 election
- The party proposes referendums on Peru's economic constitution and a constituent assembly
- Ernesto Zunini is both general secretary of Juntos por el Perú and a deputy candidate
Juntos por el Perú's secretary general defends convicted military figure Antauro Humala's credibility on border security, while the party's presidential candidate attempts to distance himself from the controversial figure.
Ernesto Zunini, the general secretary of Juntos por el Perú, sat down this week to defend a choice that has become a liability for his party's presidential candidate. The subject was Antauro Humala, a military figure convicted for leading an armed takeover of a police station in Andahuaylas in January 2005—an event that left four police officers dead. Zunini argued, with careful precision, that Humala possessed legitimate credentials to speak about Peru's border security, regardless of the controversy surrounding him.
The timing of this defense matters. Roberto Sánchez, Juntos por el Perú's presidential candidate, has been working to create distance between himself and Humala, sensing the political danger. Yet Zunini's comments suggest the party is not entirely willing to abandon the relationship. In an interview with El Comercio's video podcast "Mirada de fondo," Zunini acknowledged that rumors had circulated about Humala becoming interior minister—a claim he flatly rejected. Instead, he framed the issue narrowly: Humala, as a military officer trained at Peru's Chorrillos Military Academy, possessed what Zunini called "a qualified opinion" on matters of national security and border defense. The party would listen to his proposals, Zunini said.
But Zunini did not shy away from the weight of what happened in Andahuaylas. He called the 2005 incident "a political fact"—a phrase that attempted to contextualize rather than excuse it. He described it as a rebellion that revealed something troubling about Peru's democracy: that institutional channels had failed so completely that citizens no longer trusted the executive, Congress, or the judiciary. The deaths of the four officers and civilians caught in such confrontations, he said, caused the party pain. Yet even as he acknowledged this suffering, he seemed to suggest that the uprising itself was symptomatic of a deeper institutional crisis.
This framing allowed Zunini to hold two positions simultaneously: to recognize the gravity of the deaths while treating the rebellion as evidence of democratic dysfunction rather than simple criminality. He questioned why Peru had not yet called a national referendum to address the crisis of confidence in its institutions. "Will this crisis be resolved without consulting the people?" he asked.
Zunini outlined what his party would put to a referendum if given the chance: the economic chapters of Peru's constitution and the question of whether to convene a constituent assembly. He was candid about the risks. If Peruvians voted to keep the current economic model, Juntos por el Perú would have to accept that outcome. The party had learned from history, he suggested—specifically from the 2011 election, when former president Ollanta Humala (no relation to Antauro) won the second round but then abandoned key campaign promises about renegotiating contracts and recovering state debts. Zunini said his party would not repeat that pattern. Any commitments made would be binding, he insisted, and the party would not sign a roadmap only to discard it once in power.
On the question of Peru's contract law—the legal mechanisms that shield certain private agreements from state intervention—Zunini said Juntos por el Perú planned to challenge those protections, but selectively. The party was not interested in reopening every contract. Rather, it would target those agreements that prevented the state from defending the public interest, and those linked to corruption: highway concessions, the southern gas pipeline, and the Olmos irrigation project. The implication was clear: the party saw these contracts as symptoms of a state captured by private interests.
As the interview concluded, Zunini previewed that Sánchez would announce new technical advisors to strengthen the campaign. The party was preparing for a long fight, one that would require both defending unconventional allies and proposing radical institutional change. Whether voters would accept that bargain remained to be seen.
Citações Notáveis
He has a qualified opinion to speak about the country's border security, and we will listen to his proposals.— Ernesto Zunini, general secretary of Juntos por el Perú, on Antauro Humala
The Andahuaylas incident is a political fact that demonstrates our democracy is languishing. It was a rebellion.— Ernesto Zunini
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Zunini feel compelled to defend Humala's credibility on security matters when it clearly creates political problems for Sánchez?
Because the party sees Humala as representing something real—a military perspective on border and national security that they believe has value, separate from the 2005 incident. It's a way of saying: we can acknowledge what happened and still think he has something worth hearing.
But doesn't calling the Andahuaylas takeover "a political fact" rather than a crime minimize the deaths of four police officers?
It's a reframing, yes. Zunini is trying to locate the incident within a larger story about institutional failure. He's not denying the deaths—he says they cause pain—but he's arguing they're a symptom, not an aberration. That's a political move, not a moral one.
What does Zunini mean when he says institutional channels "are not functioning"?
He means people have stopped believing in the executive, Congress, and courts. When those institutions lose legitimacy, people take matters into their own hands. That's what happened in 2005. So for Zunini, the real problem isn't Humala—it's that Peru's democracy has become so hollow that armed rebellion starts to look like a rational response.
Is the party actually planning to overturn Peru's economic model?
Not exactly. Zunini is saying they'd put it to a referendum and accept whatever the people decide. But yes, they want to challenge the contract law that shields private agreements from state scrutiny. They see those contracts as evidence of a captured state.
Why the specific reference to Ollanta Humala's broken promises in 2011?
Because Zunini is trying to convince voters that Juntos por el Perú is different—that they won't win on one platform and govern on another. It's a credibility play. But it also reveals how much Peru's left is haunted by that moment when a leftist president abandoned his base.