When one member breaks away, we cannot reach the agreement
In the spring of 2022, the world's largest economies gathered in Washington and found themselves unable to act as one — not because they lacked conviction, but because their architecture of consensus demanded unanimity, and unanimity was precisely what Russia's allies refused to grant. President Biden's call to expel Russia from the G-20 over its invasion of Ukraine collided with the structural reality that China, Brazil, and South Africa would not agree, leaving the forum paralyzed and the question of collective accountability unanswered. What emerged was not a failure of will so much as a revelation of how multilateral institutions, built for cooperation, become instruments of obstruction when a member chooses disruption over dialogue.
- Russia's invasion of Ukraine has cracked open a fault line inside the G-20 that no walkout or condemnation can close — expulsion requires consensus, and consensus is exactly what Russia's defenders are withholding.
- U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Canadian Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland walked out of a G-20 session in protest, a dramatic gesture that changed nothing on the ground.
- Russia then blocked the IMF's key advisory committee from issuing a communique condemning the invasion, turning a procedural norm into a weapon and leaving the overwhelming majority of members voiceless.
- China, Brazil, and South Africa are holding the line for engagement over punishment — arguing that isolation hardens conflict rather than resolving it, even as critics say their logic shields an aggressor.
- Experts warn that a U.S. boycott of the November Bali summit would hand China greater influence and accelerate the very institutional collapse that would serve Moscow's interests most.
- The G-20's Bali summit looms as the real reckoning — with no clear path to expulsion, no confirmed U.S. attendance, and a forum increasingly unable to fulfill its core purpose.
When global finance leaders gathered in Washington in the spring of 2022 for IMF and World Bank meetings, the fracture at the heart of the international order became impossible to ignore. President Biden had called for Russia's expulsion from the G-20 — but unlike 2014, when Russia was swiftly removed from the smaller G-8, this time the math did not work. The G-20 operates by consensus, and China, Brazil, and South Africa had already signaled they would not agree to Russia's removal.
The dysfunction was immediate and visible. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Canadian Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland walked out when Russia's representative began speaking — a pointed protest that nonetheless changed nothing. The more consequential blow came when Russia blocked the IMF's advisory committee from issuing a communique condemning the invasion. Spain's economy minister, chairing the committee, described the breakdown simply: one country's refusal made consensus impossible, even as the overwhelming majority sought to condemn the war.
IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva declined to call for Russia's expulsion, acknowledging the invasion's gravity while insisting on the necessity of continued cooperation. It was a careful position, but it exposed the bind facing every institution in the room: expelling Russia risked fracturing the forum further, while keeping it in allowed Moscow to paralyze proceedings at will.
The countries defending Russia's seat offered a consistent argument — engagement over isolation, dialogue over punishment. South Africa blamed NATO for the conflict. Brazil said exclusion would not bring a ceasefire closer. China stated flatly that no country had the right to expel another member. Meanwhile, analysts noted that Russia had strategic reasons to stay beyond mere legitimacy: by showing up and blocking consensus, it could sow division among Western allies and, if the U.S. walked away in protest, leave a vacuum for China to fill.
The real test was set for November, when G-20 leaders were to meet in Bali. Biden had called for expulsion but the White House had not confirmed whether he would attend if Russia remained at the table. The World Bank had halted all programs in Russia; the IMF had not loaned to it in decades. Yet the diplomatic architecture held — not out of approval, but because enough major powers had decided that the cost of breaking it exceeded the cost of enduring it.
In the spring of 2022, as global finance leaders gathered in Washington for meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, a familiar fracture in the international order became impossible to ignore. President Biden had called for Russia to be expelled from the Group of 20, the forum where the world's largest economies attempt to coordinate on trade, finance, and security. But eight years after Russia's first invasion of Ukraine, when Western nations had swiftly booted it from the Group of Eight—which then simply became the Group of Seven and stayed that way—the calculus had shifted. This time, expulsion would not happen.
The reason was structural and unforgiving: the G-20 operates by consensus. Every member must agree to remove another. And several major economies had already made clear they would not. China, Brazil, and South Africa each signaled they would defend Russia's seat. The group itself spans twenty members—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union—a coalition too diverse and too fractured to act as one.
The dysfunction surfaced immediately. When Russia's representative began speaking at a G-20 meeting on Wednesday, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Canadian Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland walked out in protest, along with other officials. Freeland later posted on social media that Russia's invasion was a grave threat to the global economy and should disqualify it from participation. But the walkout changed nothing. The real damage came when Russia blocked the IMF's key advisory committee from issuing a communique condemning the invasion. Nadia Calvino, Spain's economy minister and chair of that committee, described the breakdown plainly: the group had traditionally worked by consensus, and when one member refused to cooperate, consensus became impossible. The overwhelming majority wanted to condemn Russia. One country prevented it.
IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, when pressed on whether Russia should be expelled, declined to call for its removal. She acknowledged the "unsettling facts" of the invasion but pivoted to the necessity of continued cooperation on problems no single nation could solve alone. It was a careful dodge, but it revealed the bind: even those who opposed Russia's presence recognized that expelling it might fracture the institution further.
The countries defending Russia's membership offered their own logic. South Africa's spokesman Clayson Monyela argued that expulsion would only isolate Russia and make constructive engagement harder. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa had blamed NATO for the war itself. Brazil's Foreign Minister Carlos França said excluding Russia would not help solve the immediate crisis—the need for ceasefire and negotiation. China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated flatly that Russia remained an important member and that no country had the right to expel another. The message from these nations was consistent: engagement over isolation, dialogue over punishment.
But there was another layer to Russia's calculus for staying. Experts noted that Russia had much to gain from the discord itself. By showing up and blocking consensus, it could paralyze the G-20 and sow division among Western allies. Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that a U.S. boycott would be a strategic mistake—it would leave a vacuum for China to control. Adam Lipsky of the Atlantic Council's GeoEconomics Center put it more sharply: Russia's presence was potentially derailing the entire organization, giving Moscow more leverage than it deserved. If the United States walked away, the G-20 would collapse, and that collapse would serve Russian interests.
The real test would come in November, when G-20 leaders were scheduled to gather in Bali, Indonesia. Biden had called for Russia's expulsion, but the White House had not said whether he would attend if Russia participated. The World Bank had already halted all programs in Russia and Belarus after the February invasion and approved no new investments in Russia since 2014. The IMF had not loaned to Russia in decades. Yet the diplomatic architecture that bound these nations together remained intact, held together by the requirement that everyone agree, and by the fact that enough major powers had decided that Russia's seat was worth keeping.
Notable Quotes
Russia's war against Ukraine has made it impossible to come to a consensus on a communique.— Nadia Calvino, Spain's economy minister and IMF advisory committee chair
To expel Russia would only isolate it and make it more difficult to achieve constructive engagement.— Clayson Monyela, spokesman for South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would Russia want to stay in a room where it's clearly unwelcome?
Because the room itself becomes a weapon. Russia can block decisions, prevent consensus, disrupt the work of the institution. It gains leverage through chaos.
But doesn't that damage Russia's own interests? Wouldn't it be better to cooperate?
In the short term, Russia is isolated and under sanctions. Cooperation isn't really on the table. What it can do is make sure the West can't coordinate effectively either.
So China and Brazil and South Africa are helping Russia by refusing to expel it?
Not intentionally. They're arguing for engagement over isolation, which is a reasonable position in theory. But in practice, it means Russia gets to stay and disrupt.
What happens if Biden just boycotts the November summit?
Then the G-20 effectively falls apart. And that's actually worse for the U.S. than having Russia there, because China fills the void. The U.S. loses influence by leaving.
So the West is trapped.
Not trapped exactly. But constrained. The consensus rule that was meant to bind the world together now prevents the world from acting against one of its members.
Is this the future of these institutions?
It's the question they're all facing now. When consensus becomes a veto, when major powers disagree fundamentally, what does the institution actually do?