People react to change. An extra 10,000 immigrants in central London might barely register, but 200 new arrivals in a smaller town might be noticed.
A decade after Britain voted to leave the European Union, the communities that backed Brexit most fervently now find themselves at the centre of a quiet paradox: foreign workers have arrived in their midst at a faster relative pace than anywhere else in the country, even as those same communities have slipped further behind on measures of health, housing, and economic security. The Guardian's examination of government payroll data places this contradiction within a longer arc of regional inequality — one that predates the referendum and has been deepened by pandemic, conflict, and industrial decline. What the data ultimately reveals is not a story of Brexit causing ruin, but of vulnerable places remaining vulnerable, their hopes for transformation meeting the stubborn gravity of structural disadvantage.
- Non-UK workers doubled in relative terms across strong Leave-voting areas between 2016 and 2024 — twice the national rate of growth — making migration newly visible in communities with little prior experience of it.
- The psychological weight of that visibility matters: a few hundred new arrivals in a smaller town register far more acutely than tens of thousands in a major city, amplifying a sense of change that statistics alone cannot fully capture.
- At the same time, Leave-voting constituencies have fallen further behind on deprivation rankings — worsening across health outcomes, housing access, crime, and local services — while Remain-voting cities like Bristol and Cambridge have improved on those same measures.
- Makerfield illustrates the sharpest edges of this divergence, slipping 52 places in housing deprivation and 127 places in crime rankings even as its overall position declined only modestly.
- Analysts urge caution against blaming Brexit alone: Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and the long erosion of manufacturing have compounded pre-existing weaknesses in these regions, and research suggests immigration has had limited direct effects on wages or employment for UK-born workers.
- The trajectory points toward a Britain more divided than the referendum promised to heal — with the communities that voted for change finding themselves, a decade on, with more migration and less prosperity than they had hoped.
A decade after the Brexit referendum, a Guardian investigation into government payroll data has uncovered a striking paradox at the heart of post-referendum Britain. The communities that voted most decisively to Leave — hoping, among other things, to reduce immigration — have since experienced faster relative growth in foreign workers than anywhere else in the country.
Between 2016 and the end of 2024, non-UK workers doubled in percentage terms across strong Leave-voting areas, against 40% growth nationally. The shift is partly a function of starting from a lower baseline: in Wigan, for instance, foreign workers made up less than 5% of the payrolled workforce in 2016; by late 2024, that figure had nearly doubled. Remain-voting areas — typically larger cities — still host far more foreign workers in absolute terms, but it is Leave constituencies experiencing the steeper rate of change. As Anand Menon of King's College London observes, people notice change more than they notice scale: a modest influx in a smaller town becomes visible and felt in ways that a far larger wave in a major city does not.
The picture grows more troubling when deprivation is examined alongside migration. The same Leave-voting areas seeing rapid growth in foreign workers have simultaneously fallen further behind on measures of health, housing, crime, and local services. Remain-voting constituencies — Bristol Central, Cambridge, Clapham and Brixton Hill — recorded the largest improvements in deprivation rankings between 2015 and 2025. Leave strongholds like Boston and Skegness, Hartlepool, and North Warwickshire moved in the opposite direction. Makerfield offers the starkest example, dropping 52 places in housing deprivation and 127 places in crime rankings over the same period.
Yet analysts caution against reading this as a simple Brexit dividend turned sour. These regions were already marked by long-running economic weakness before the referendum was called. The decade since has brought Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and the continued erosion of manufacturing — forces that have fallen hardest on less prosperous places. Research suggests immigration has had only limited effects on the wages and employment of UK-born workers. What the data describes, ultimately, is compounding disadvantage: areas that were already struggling have continued to struggle, while more resilient, skills-rich cities have pulled further ahead. The referendum did not create that divide — but a decade on, it has done little to close it.
A decade after the Brexit referendum, the areas that voted most decisively to leave the European Union are experiencing something their residents may not have anticipated: faster growth in foreign workers than anywhere else in the country. A Guardian investigation into government payroll data reveals this paradox at the heart of post-referendum Britain—the very communities that backed Leave to regain control of immigration are now seeing migrant workers arrive and settle at accelerating rates.
The numbers tell a striking story of relative change. Between 2016 and the end of 2024, non-UK workers doubled in percentage terms across strong Leave-voting areas, compared to just 40% growth nationally. This happened largely because these regions started from a lower baseline. In Wigan, a Leave stronghold where a recent byelection took place, foreign workers made up less than 5% of the payrolled workforce in June 2016. By December 2024, that figure had climbed to just under 10%—a doubling in relative terms. Remain-voting areas, typically larger cities, still host far more foreign workers in absolute numbers, but it is the Leave constituencies experiencing the steeper trajectory of change.
The political significance of this shift cannot be separated from its psychology. Anand Menon, director of The UK in a Changing Europe at King's College London, points to a crucial distinction: people notice change more acutely than they notice absolute numbers. An influx of ten thousand migrants in central London barely registers; two hundred new arrivals in a smaller town become visible, discussed, felt. The data suggests that communities less accustomed to migrant workers are now experiencing migration as an increasingly noticeable feature of local working life—precisely the opposite of what many Leave voters hoped to achieve.
Yet the story grows more complex when deprivation is factored in. The same Leave-voting areas that have seen rapid relative growth in foreign workers have simultaneously fallen further behind on measures of economic wellbeing. Between 2015 and 2025, the strongest Remain-voting constituencies—Bristol Central, Cambridge, Clapham and Brixton Hill—experienced the largest improvements in deprivation rankings. Meanwhile, Leave strongholds like Boston and Skegness, Hartlepool, and North Warwickshire saw their relative deprivation worsen. The pattern holds across multiple measures: health outcomes including early death risk and hospital admissions for severe illness, housing accessibility, local services, and crime. Makerfield exemplifies this divergence. While its overall deprivation ranking slipped seven places relative to other constituencies, it plummeted 52 places in housing deprivation and 127 places in crime rankings.
Migration itself has been substantial. After the referendum, foreign arrivals surged across the UK, particularly those on health and care visas, peaking at 944,000 in the year ending March 2023. Net migration has since fallen sharply as visas expire, but the earlier wave left its mark on communities unprepared for such rapid demographic change.
Explaining this divergence requires resisting simple causation. Menon cautions against attributing all decline to Brexit alone. The Leave-voting areas that have fallen behind were already marked by long-running economic weakness before 2016. The past decade has brought Covid-19, the war in Ukraine, and the continued erosion of manufacturing—forces that have hit less prosperous regions hardest. Research suggests immigration has had only limited effects on the wages and employment of UK-born workers. The real story is one of compounding disadvantage: regions that were already struggling have continued to struggle, while more affluent, skilled areas have proven more resilient.
What emerges is a portrait of uneven Britain, where the decade since the referendum has not delivered on the hopes of those who voted Leave. Their communities have not seen fewer foreign workers; they have seen more. They have not grown more prosperous; they have grown relatively poorer. The irony is not lost on observers, but neither is the deeper truth: these areas were vulnerable long before the referendum question was asked.
Notable Quotes
People react to change. An extra 10,000 immigrants in central London might barely register, but 200 new arrivals in a smaller town might be noticed.— Anand Menon, director of The UK in a Changing Europe
It's all too easy to blame Brexit for everything that's gone wrong in the last few years but it's not the whole story. More affluent places with higher skilled workforces were more resilient.— Anand Menon
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would Leave-voting areas see faster growth in foreign workers if that's what they voted against?
Because they started from a much lower baseline. When you have 3% foreign workers and you gain 2%, that's a 67% increase. When you have 20% and gain 2%, that's only 10%. The math of percentages works that way. But there's something deeper—these areas weren't prepared for rapid change.
So it's not that more migrants chose to go there?
Not necessarily. The data shows migration increased everywhere after Brexit, especially health and care workers. But in places where people had rarely seen foreign colleagues, even modest numbers feel like transformation. A town of 50,000 that gains 500 migrant workers experiences that differently than London gaining 50,000.
And these same areas got poorer?
Relatively poorer, yes. While Remain-voting cities improved on health, housing, and crime measures between 2015 and 2025, Leave areas stagnated or declined. But that's not necessarily because of the migrants arriving.
What caused it then?
These regions were already economically fragile. Covid, the Ukraine war, manufacturing decline—these hit them harder because they had less to cushion the blow. More affluent areas with skilled workforces weathered it better.
So Leave voters got both things they didn't want—more immigration and less prosperity?
That's the paradox, yes. But the causation is messier than it appears. The deprivation was already baked in. The migration was a symptom of broader economic patterns, not the cause of decline.
What does this mean going forward?
It suggests that controlling immigration alone won't address what's actually driving these communities' struggles. The real work is economic—investment, opportunity, skills. Without that, resentment about migration will persist, regardless of policy.