Workers might simply hide their earnings instead of paying contributions
Perú ha dado un paso histórico al extender la obligación previsional a sus trabajadores independientes, una población que históricamente ha quedado al margen de las redes de protección social. A partir de 2028, la Ley N.º 32123 exigirá aportes del 2% mensual al sistema de pensiones, con SUNAT como ente fiscalizador. La medida encarna una tensión antigua entre el ideal de seguridad en la vejez y la realidad de una economía donde la informalidad no es excepción, sino condición estructural. El verdadero examen no será la promulgación de la norma, sino si el Estado peruano posee la voluntad y la capacidad para hacerla cumplir sin empujar a más trabajadores hacia las sombras.
- Millones de trabajadores independientes peruanos, muchos de ellos operando en la informalidad, se enfrentan por primera vez a una obligación previsional que el Estado aún no sabe cómo fiscalizar a esa escala.
- SUNAT tiene herramientas digitales como el sistema SOL para rastrear recibos electrónicos, pero las sanciones concretas, los montos de las multas y los procedimientos de cobranza todavía no han sido publicados.
- El incentivo perverso es claro: ante la obligación de aportar, muchos trabajadores podrían subdeclarar ingresos en sus recibos, agravando la informalidad que la reforma pretende reducir.
- Expertos advierten que la ley podría desincentivar el empleo formal al encarecer el trabajo independiente con recibos, empujando a más personas a operar sin documentación ni protección social.
- El reloj corre hacia 2028 con una arquitectura legal incompleta: la norma existe, pero el andamiaje sancionatorio y la capacidad operativa de SUNAT para monitorear a millones de individuos aún están por construirse.
Desde 2028, los trabajadores independientes del Perú deberán aportar obligatoriamente al sistema de pensiones. El gobierno publicó el reglamento de la Ley N.º 32123 el 5 de septiembre, estableciendo que quienes emitan recibos por honorarios o gestionen pequeñas operaciones propias deberán destinar el 2% de sus ingresos mensuales a su jubilación durante los primeros dos años. Quienes no elijan entre el sistema privado AFP o el público ONP serán afiliados automáticamente a un fondo privado. SUNAT tendrá facultades sancionadoras tanto sobre los contratantes como sobre los propios trabajadores que incumplan.
En la práctica, la fiscalización recaerá sobre el sistema de recibos electrónicos SOL, plataforma que ya permite a SUNAT identificar ingresos de independientes. Sin embargo, Omar Larios, docente de contabilidad de la UPC, señaló una brecha crítica: la autoridad tributaria aún no ha publicado los montos de las multas ni los procedimientos sancionatorios. La norma existe, pero su músculo coercitivo todavía no.
El desafío de fondo es de escala. Fiscalizar a miles de empresas formales es una tarea manejable; hacerlo con millones de trabajadores dispersos en la economía informal es un problema de otra magnitud. Y la reforma lleva consigo un incentivo contraproducente: ante la obligación de aportar, muchos trabajadores podrían optar por subdeclarar ingresos en sus recibos, reduciendo así su base de contribución. Larios advirtió que esto podría desalentar el empleo formal, que ofrece vacaciones, gratificaciones y seguridad social, empujando a más personas hacia la informalidad.
La reforma tiene un propósito legítimo: garantizar que los trabajadores independientes lleguen a la vejez con algún respaldo económico. Pero entre la intención y la ejecución existe una brecha considerable. Sin reglas sancionatorias claras, sin recursos suficientes y sin una estrategia para alcanzar a quienes deliberadamente operan fuera del registro formal, la ley corre el riesgo de convertirse en letra muerta o, peor aún, en un factor que profundice la informalidad que busca combatir.
Starting in 2028, Peru's independent workers will face a new reality: mandatory contributions to the national pension system. The government published the regulations for Law 32123 on September 5th, and the rules are clear—those who work for themselves, whether issuing receipts for services or running small operations, must begin setting aside money for retirement. For the first two years, the deduction will be modest: just 2 percent of monthly income. But the obligation itself marks a fundamental shift in how Peru treats its self-employed population.
The mechanics are straightforward on paper. Independent workers will need to issue formal receipts documenting their monthly earnings, making it possible to calculate and deduct their pension contributions. Those who don't choose between Peru's two pension systems—the private AFP or the public ONP—will be automatically enrolled in a private pension fund. The tax authority, SUNAT, gains enforcement power: it can penalize both employers who hire independent contractors and the workers themselves if contributions go unpaid. The responsibility falls on whoever issues the receipt to ensure the money gets set aside.
But implementation is where the complications emerge. Omar Larios, an accounting professor at UPC, explained that SUNAT will rely on its electronic receipt system, SOL, to identify who is earning income and who might be dodging contributions. The agency already has visibility into independent workers' earnings through this platform. Yet Larios flagged a critical gap: SUNAT has not yet published the specific penalties, the amounts of fines, or the detailed enforcement procedures. When the law takes effect, those rules will need to exist—but they don't yet.
The real challenge lies in scale. Peru has millions of independent workers, many operating in the informal economy. SUNAT can relatively easily monitor the thousands of formal companies operating in the country. Extending that same scrutiny to millions of individuals scattered across the informal sector presents a different problem entirely. The tax authority will need to build capacity it may not currently possess.
There's also a perverse incentive baked into the reform. Workers facing mandatory contributions might respond by underreporting their income on official receipts, claiming lower monthly earnings to reduce the amount they must contribute. This could accelerate Peru's already significant informal labor problem. Larios warned that the law, as written, could actually discourage formal employment—the kind that comes with paid vacation, bonuses, social security coverage, and other protections. If independent work becomes more expensive due to mandatory deductions, some workers may simply retreat further into the shadows, reporting even less income or abandoning formal receipts altogether.
The pension reform reflects a genuine policy goal: ensuring that Peru's self-employed population has retirement security rather than facing old age without savings. But the gap between intention and enforcement is substantial. SUNAT will need clear rules, adequate resources, and a way to monitor millions of people whose economic activity is often deliberately obscured. Without those pieces in place, the law risks becoming either a dead letter—ignored by most independent workers—or a tool that pushes more people toward informality, the opposite of what the government intends.
Citações Notáveis
The obligation of contributions could be a factor that worsens labor informality in Peru, as workers might underreport income to reduce monthly deductions.— Omar Larios, accounting professor at UPC
SUNAT can already presume and sustain that a person had income through electronic receipts and has the power to audit anyone issuing receipts for services.— Omar Larios
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
So independent workers in Peru have been able to avoid pension contributions until now?
Essentially, yes. They could issue receipts for their work without setting aside anything for retirement. The new law changes that starting in 2028.
And SUNAT will just know who's earning money through this SOL system?
They already do. Every electronic receipt gets recorded there. The question is whether they can actually enforce contributions across millions of people, not just the thousands of formal companies they're used to monitoring.
What happens if someone just doesn't pay?
That's still unclear. SUNAT can penalize them, but the specific fines and procedures haven't been published yet. The law exists; the enforcement rules don't.
Would workers actually benefit from being forced to save?
In theory, yes—they'd have retirement security. But Larios suggests the opposite might happen. Workers could start reporting lower incomes to reduce contributions, pushing more people into informality.
So the law could make the informal economy worse?
That's the risk. If formal independent work becomes more expensive, some people will simply hide their earnings instead. You end up with less tax revenue and less pension contributions, not more.
Is SUNAT ready for this?
No one seems to think so. Monitoring millions of scattered workers is fundamentally different from auditing companies. They'll need new systems, new staff, new rules—none of which exist yet.