North Korea prepares second troop wave for Ukraine despite 40% casualty rate

Approximately 1,000 North Korean soldiers killed and over 4,000 additional casualties (injured, missing, captured) among 11,500 deployed troops within weeks of combat.
The soldiers believed they were sent for training, not war.
Two captured North Korean soldiers revealed they had no idea they were being deployed to actual combat in Ukraine.

In the winter of 2025, two authoritarian leaders have found in each other a convenient arrangement: Russia gains disciplined manpower to hold its own borders without weakening its eastern offensive, while North Korea gains something its army has not possessed in over seventy years — the education of real war. That more than four in ten of the first wave of North Korean soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured within weeks has not slowed the machinery of a second deployment, revealing how thoroughly both Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin have subordinated human life to strategic calculation.

  • North Korea is preparing a second wave of soldiers for Russia's war in Ukraine even as the first wave suffered over 40% casualties — roughly 1,000 dead and 4,000 more wounded, missing, or captured within weeks of combat.
  • Captured North Korean soldiers told Ukrainian forces they believed they had been sent for training exercises, not war — they carried false Russian identity papers, spoke no foreign languages, and had never encountered drones before facing them on the battlefield.
  • Putin needs North Korean troops to reclaim Russian territory lost in the Kursk incursion without pulling forces from eastern Ukraine, where he is racing to seize as much ground as possible before any Trump-brokered ceasefire takes shape.
  • Kim Jong-un views the devastating losses as an acceptable tuition fee — his army has not fought a real war since 1953, and Ukraine is offering a brutal but irreplaceable education in modern warfare, drones, and combined-arms tactics.
  • The second deployment signals that for both leaders, the strategic ledger outweighs the human one — and the soldiers will keep coming as long as the war holds value for the men who are not fighting it.

In early 2025, North Korea is quietly preparing to send another wave of soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine — even after the first deployment ended in catastrophe. More than four in ten of the initial 11,500 troops were killed, wounded, captured, or went missing within weeks of reaching the front. Roughly a thousand are confirmed dead. The recruitment machinery is turning again regardless.

The partnership between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin grew from mutual necessity. When Ukrainian forces crossed into Russia's Kursk region last August, they hoped to draw Russian troops away from eastern Ukraine. Instead, they found themselves fighting soldiers from a country eight thousand miles away. North Korean special forces arrived in Vladivostok in October 2024 under the cover of training exercises; ten thousand more followed within weeks, traveling nearly seven thousand kilometers to reach the front lines.

The human cost became visible in January, when Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers who believed they had been sent for training, not combat. They carried false Russian identity papers, spoke no foreign languages, and had never seen a drone before. Disciplined and experienced in garrison life, they were nonetheless unprepared for modern warfare — advancing in large formations on foot, exposed to artillery and unmanned aircraft they did not understand could kill them.

For Putin, the calculus is blunt. Russia is struggling to recruit its own citizens, and the Kursk incursion revealed that its own borders were being defended by barely trained teenage conscripts. North Korean soldiers, however inexperienced in actual combat, are trained and disciplined enough to push Ukrainian forces back from Russian soil without diverting any troops from the eastern offensive. With a potential ceasefire on the horizon, every kilometer of Ukrainian territory held is leverage.

For Kim Jong-un, the logic runs differently. North Korea's massive standing army has not seen real warfare since the Korean War ended in 1953. Ukraine offers something no training exercise can replicate: combat experience with modern weapons, tactics, and technology that is reshaping how nations fight. The casualties are severe, but they appear to be a price he is willing to pay for an education his military cannot get anywhere else.

That a second wave is coming despite the devastation of the first reveals the cold arithmetic both men are running. Neither can afford to step back — Putin because territorial gains are his only negotiating leverage, Kim because the battlefield knowledge his soldiers are acquiring is irreplaceable. The losses will keep mounting, because for the two leaders directing this arrangement, the strategic value has not yet been outweighed by the human cost.

In the winter of 2025, North Korea is quietly preparing to send another contingent of soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine—even though the first wave has already suffered catastrophic losses. More than four in every ten of the initial North Korean troops deployed have been killed, wounded, captured, or gone missing. Roughly a thousand are confirmed dead. Yet the machinery of recruitment and transport is turning again.

The arrangement between Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin emerged from necessity and opportunity. When Ukrainian forces crossed into Russia's Kursk region last August, they hoped to force Moscow to pull troops from eastern Ukraine to defend its own soil. Instead, they found themselves fighting soldiers from a country eight thousand miles away. South Korean intelligence first detected North Korean presence in October 2024, when about fifteen hundred special forces arrived in Vladivostok for what was officially called training. Within weeks, another ten thousand joined them. The journey across Russia to the front lines took them nearly seven thousand kilometers.

By early December, North Korean soldiers were in combat. By mid-January, the casualty toll was staggering—more than forty percent of the deployed force had become casualties within weeks of actual fighting. Ukrainian soldiers who captured two North Koreans in January found men who spoke no foreign languages, carried false Russian identity papers, and believed they had been sent for training exercises, not war. Both had served for years and were disciplined fighters, but they had no experience with modern warfare. They advanced in large formations on foot, easy prey for artillery and drones. They did not understand what drones were or that they could kill.

For Putin, the calculus is straightforward. Russia is struggling to recruit enough of its own citizens despite offering generous salaries and benefits. The Kursk incursion exposed a hard truth: Russia is defending its own borders with barely trained conscripts—teenage boys doing mandatory service—rather than professional soldiers. North Korean troops, however inexperienced in combat, are trained and disciplined. They allow Russia to push Ukrainian forces back from Russian territory without diverting any of its own forces from the offensive in eastern Ukraine. With Donald Trump returning to the White House and the possibility of a ceasefire looming, Putin has an incentive to occupy as much Ukrainian territory as possible before any negotiated settlement. The North Koreans are a tool to that end.

For Kim Jong-un, the logic is different but no less clear. North Korea has maintained a massive standing army since the Korean War ended in 1953, but that army has not seen actual combat in more than seventy years. Soldiers spend their careers patrolling the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Ukraine offers something invaluable: real warfare, fought with modern weapons and tactics, in a conflict that is reshaping how nations fight. The casualties are brutal, but they are a price Kim Jong-un appears willing to pay. Combat experience in Ukraine could give his military an edge in any future conflict he chooses to wage.

The willingness to send a second wave despite the devastation of the first reveals something about both leaders' calculations. Neither can afford to lose this war—Putin because territorial gains are his only leverage in any ceasefire negotiation, Kim Jong-un because the military education his soldiers are receiving is irreplaceable. The North Koreans will keep coming, and the losses will keep mounting, because for both men the strategic value outweighs the human cost.

North Korean soldiers are courageous and determined fighters but with no experience of actual combat, relying on World War II-style tactics like advancing in large groups on foot.
— Ukrainian soldiers' observations
Both captured North Korean soldiers believed they had been sent to Russia to participate in training exercises, not to fight in a war.
— Ukrainian interrogation records, January 2025
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Inventor

Why would Kim Jong-un send more soldiers after losing so many so quickly? That seems irrational.

Model

It's rational if you think long-term. North Korea's army hasn't fought a real war since 1953. Every soldier who survives Ukraine comes home with knowledge that can't be taught in a barracks—how to move under drone fire, how to coordinate with modern weapons, what actual combat feels like.

Inventor

But a thousand dead in weeks. That's not a training exercise.

Model

No, it's not. But for Kim, it's an investment. He's betting that the military advantage he gains is worth the lives spent. And he's probably right—if war comes to the peninsula, his army will be more prepared than it would have been.

Inventor

What about the soldiers themselves? Did they know what they were signing up for?

Model

The two who were captured thought they were going to training. They had no idea they'd be in actual combat. That's the gap between what the leadership tells them and what happens on the ground.

Inventor

And Putin? Why does he need them if he's already got millions of soldiers?

Model

Because he can't get enough of his own people to volunteer or be conscripted. He's using teenagers doing mandatory service to defend Russian territory. The North Koreans are professionals, even if they're inexperienced in modern war. They free up his forces to keep attacking in eastern Ukraine.

Inventor

So both leaders are getting what they want, and the soldiers are paying the price.

Model

Exactly. It's a transaction. The soldiers are the currency.

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