Europe needs to strengthen its own capabilities while the U.S. maintains its presence
At the NATO summit in Ankara, Latvia's foreign minister drew a line that the alliance has long struggled to articulate clearly: the tools Russia deploys in the gray zone between peace and war — cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, weaponized migration — do not trigger collective defense mechanisms, and so the first burden of response falls on each nation's own institutions. This is not a confession of weakness but a structural reality, one that demands a different kind of strength: coordinated intelligence, shared situational awareness, and the patient work of building resilience before a crisis demands it. The question NATO faces is whether democracies, built on openness, can defend themselves against threats designed to exploit that very quality.
- Russia has mastered the art of pressure without provocation — deploying cyberattacks, disinformation, corruption, and weaponized migration flows in combinations that are real in effect but elusive in attribution.
- One of Moscow's sharpest current operations targets Western public opinion directly, seeding the argument that aid to Ukraine drains domestic budgets — turning fiscal anxiety into foreign policy erosion.
- Because hybrid threats fall below the threshold of armed attack, NATO's collective defense machinery cannot be the first to move, leaving individual member states and their security services to absorb the initial blow.
- Latvia, on the eastern front line, is calling for allied border guards to deploy alongside its own — not to take over, but to share the experience of hybrid pressure and carry that knowledge home.
- Europe's defense spending has shifted dramatically since 2020, with European members and Canada shouldering far more of the collective burden — a sign of growing strategic independence, not American retreat.
At the NATO summit in Ankara, Latvia's foreign minister offered a clarification that cuts to the heart of how the alliance must now think about Russian pressure: hybrid threats are not military invasions, and so NATO itself cannot be the first responder. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, corruption schemes, and the deliberate weaponization of migration flows all fall to individual member states and their security services to address — at least initially.
What makes Russia's approach so effective is precisely its ambiguity. A cyberattack on a power grid is not a declaration of war. A disinformation campaign does not cross the threshold of armed attack. Yet the cumulative effect is destabilizing by design. The minister pointed to one particularly corrosive example: Russian information operations are actively working to convince Western publics that money sent to Ukraine should instead fund domestic priorities like pensions — turning fiscal anxiety into a weapon against allied foreign policy.
NATO's role, she emphasized, is not passivity but coordination. When member states share intelligence rapidly, align their security services, and respond from a common operational picture, the collective effect is far greater than any single nation acting alone. The alliance multiplies resilience even when it cannot lead the charge.
Latvia knows this reality firsthand. Russia has been pushing illegal migration flows across its eastern border as a form of reconnaissance — probing the state's capacity to absorb pressure. In response, Latvia has called for allied border guards to deploy to the frontier, not to take over, but to observe and build shared experience.
The minister also noted a significant shift in the alliance's balance: where non-European members once funded roughly eighty percent of NATO's collective defense, European nations and Canada have substantially increased their contributions. This growing European capacity, she was careful to say, complements rather than replaces American commitment — making the alliance more resilient by making it less dependent on any single power.
At the NATO summit in Ankara, Latvia's foreign minister laid out a distinction that has become central to how the alliance thinks about Russian pressure: hybrid threats are not the same as tanks rolling across a border, and therefore NATO itself cannot be the first responder. The responsibility, she explained, falls to individual member states and their security services—at least initially.
Hybrid threats, as she defined them, encompass a sprawling toolkit. Cyberattacks that cripple infrastructure. Information campaigns designed to fracture public opinion. Sabotage operations targeting critical systems. Corruption schemes that compromise officials. Attempts to destabilize society from within. And the deliberate weaponization of migration flows as a form of coercion. Russia, the minister noted, has become proficient at deploying all of these simultaneously, creating a kind of ambient pressure that is difficult to attribute to any single actor and therefore difficult to trigger Article 5.
What makes this approach effective, from Moscow's perspective, is that it operates in the gray zone between peace and war. A cyberattack on a power grid is not a military invasion. A disinformation campaign is not a declaration of hostilities. Yet the cumulative effect can be destabilizing—and that is precisely the point. The minister highlighted one particularly insidious example: Russian information operations are actively working to erode public support for Ukraine by seeding the argument that money sent to Kyiv should instead go toward domestic priorities like pensions. The goal is to turn Western publics against their own governments' foreign policy through a kind of fiscal guilt.
Because these threats do not cross the threshold of armed attack, NATO as an institution cannot mobilize its collective defense machinery in response. But that does not mean the alliance is passive. The minister emphasized that what matters is coordination—the rapid exchange of intelligence between member states, the alignment of security services, the involvement of law enforcement and armed forces and civilian agencies all working from the same operational picture. When allies understand a threat in the same way and respond in concert, the effect is multiplied.
Latvia itself sits on the front line of this hybrid warfare. The eastern border has become a testing ground. Russia has been pushing flows of illegal migrants across the frontier, the minister explained, as a way to probe how effectively Latvia's border defenses function and whether the state apparatus can absorb and manage the pressure. It is a form of reconnaissance disguised as a humanitarian crisis. To build resilience and share the burden, Latvia has called for more border guards from allied nations to deploy to the frontier—not to take over the work, but to observe, to understand the reality on the ground, and to gain practical experience that they can carry back to their own countries.
The minister also addressed a broader shift in the alliance's strategic posture. In 2020, roughly eighty percent of NATO's collective defense spending came from non-European members, primarily the United States. That ratio has changed substantially. European countries and Canada have significantly increased their defense budgets and military capabilities in recent years. This does not signal American withdrawal from the continent, she was careful to note. Rather, it reflects a recognition that Europe must build greater capacity to defend itself while the United States maintains its presence and commitment. The two efforts are complementary, not competitive. As the responsibility for European security gradually shifts more toward European states themselves, the alliance is becoming less dependent on any single power and more resilient as a whole.
The Ankara summit continues with Ukraine support, alliance defense strengthening, and the full spectrum of emerging threats on the agenda. The conversation about hybrid warfare is likely to deepen as member states grapple with how to defend against attacks that are real but difficult to name, coordinated but hard to attribute, and designed to exploit the very openness and freedom that NATO exists to protect.
Citas Notables
Russian hostile information operations are aimed at reducing support for Ukraine and attempting to cast doubt on it, with claims being spread about why money should go to pensions instead.— Latvia's Foreign Minister
We would like to see more border guards from allied countries at our border so they can see the situation with their own eyes and gain the necessary experience.— Latvia's Foreign Minister
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When you say hybrid threats don't trigger Article 5, what does that actually mean for a country like Latvia that's experiencing them right now?
It means NATO as a collective body doesn't automatically mobilize. There's no unified military response because the attack isn't military in the traditional sense. But it doesn't mean Latvia is alone—it means the response has to come first from Latvia's own security apparatus, with allies providing intelligence and support.
So if Russia floods the border with migrants, or launches a cyberattack on power infrastructure, Latvia just handles it?
Yes, but not in isolation. The key is that allies need to see it the same way and act in coordination. If Latvia identifies a threat, it shares that intelligence immediately. Other NATO countries' security services, law enforcement, even armed forces can assist. But the legal and operational responsibility sits with the state being attacked.
That sounds like it could be slow. What if the attack is moving faster than bureaucracy?
That's the real tension. Which is why the minister emphasized that what matters is pre-existing relationships between security services, shared protocols, and the ability to move information instantly. You can't build that infrastructure in a crisis. It has to exist beforehand.
She mentioned wanting more allied border guards at Latvia's frontier. Isn't that just theater?
Not quite. It's about building institutional knowledge and trust. When a German or Polish border guard sees firsthand how Russia uses migration as pressure, they understand it viscerally. They go home and explain it to their own government in a way a briefing paper never could. It's about making the threat real across the alliance.
And the defense spending shift she described—Europe spending more—does that actually change anything?
It changes the dependency structure. If Europe can defend itself more independently, Russia can't assume it can divide the alliance by threatening to withdraw American support. It also means Europe isn't waiting for permission to act. That's a fundamental shift in how the alliance operates.