India trying to play both sides risks the SCO becoming theater
After seven years of absence shaped by blood spilled in the Himalayas and years of diplomatic frost, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Tianjin to meet Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 25th summit — a gathering whose timing is inseparable from Washington's punishing tariffs on Indian exports. The visit signals not a rupture with the West, but the ancient logic of nations seeking balance when pressure arrives from one direction. In the grammar of geopolitics, Modi's footsteps on Chinese soil are a sentence still being written.
- Washington's 50% tariffs on Indian goods — retaliation for New Delhi's Russian oil purchases — have cracked the foundation of the US-India partnership and pushed India toward the very bloc America fears.
- Modi's arrival in Tianjin is the most visible act yet in a quiet India-China thaw that began after five years of frozen relations following deadly 2020 Himalayan border clashes.
- The SCO summit brings together a bloc covering 40% of humanity, yet its internal fractures — especially India and Pakistan's bitter dispute over how to define cross-border terrorism — threaten to swallow any show of unity.
- Modi's dual membership in the Quad and the SCO forces a question analysts are watching closely: can India genuinely straddle both worlds, or is this summit the moment the balancing act begins to tip?
Narendra Modi landed in Tianjin on Saturday evening for his first visit to China in seven years — a crossing that would have seemed impossible not long ago. He had come for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 25th summit, and the timing carried unmistakable weight. The world was watching how India would position itself as its trade war with Washington deepened.
The India-China relationship had been frozen since 2020, when border clashes in the Himalayas killed more than 70 soldiers on both sides. But something had shifted. A quiet meeting between Modi and Xi in Russia the previous October, the resumption of visas for Chinese citizens, and ongoing negotiations to restore border trade and direct flights all pointed toward a thaw. Analysts described Modi's arrival as the culmination of five years of tension finally giving way.
The catalyst was partly American. Washington had imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian exports in retaliation for India's purchases of Russian oil — a decision New Delhi refused to reverse, framing it as sovereign energy policy. With that pressure mounting, the embrace of Beijing and Moscow through the SCO looked less like a pivot away from the West and more like a rational hedge. Modi's schedule included separate meetings with both Xi Jinping and Putin, his first encounter with the Russian president since the tariffs took effect.
The summit itself would not be without friction. India planned to push for language condemning cross-border terrorism — a pointed reference to Pakistan, a fellow SCO member with whom India had exchanged attacks the previous spring. A similar dispute had already derailed a joint statement at an SCO defense ministers' meeting in June. The same battle loomed again in Tianjin.
For observers, Modi's presence posed a deeper question about India's strategic soul. Could New Delhi genuinely hold membership in both the Quad — its alliance with the US, Japan, and Australia — and the SCO, or would the weight of competing pressures eventually force a choice? Modi's arrival was itself a kind of answer, but its full meaning would only emerge in the days ahead.
Narendra Modi stepped off his plane in Tianjin on Saturday evening, landing at 6 p.m. local time after a journey that would have been unthinkable just months earlier. It was his first visit to China in seven years—a crossing that carries weight in the grammar of international relations, where absence itself becomes a statement. He had come for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 25th summit, which would begin the following day, and the timing mattered. The world was watching how India would position itself as Washington and New Delhi spiraled into a trade war.
The relationship between India and China had been frozen since 2020, when border clashes in the Himalayas killed more than 70 soldiers on both sides. That conflict had calcified into years of diplomatic distance. But something had shifted. In October of the previous year, Modi and Xi Jinping had met in Russia, a quiet signal that the two nations might be ready to thaw. By July, India had resumed issuing visas to Chinese citizens for the first time since the clash. Negotiations were underway to reopen border trade and restore direct flights. Praveen Donthi, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, described Modi's arrival as marking "the culmination of India and China's reunion after five years of tension." But there was more to it than nostalgia or the passage of time.
The United States had imposed a 50 percent tariff on Indian exports, a punitive measure that took effect in phases throughout August. Washington justified it as retaliation for India's purchases of Russian oil since the invasion of Ukraine—a decision that had infuriated the White House. The tariffs were biting into India's economy, and New Delhi faced pressure from all sides. Yet the government had refused to back down, framing its energy policy as a sovereign choice. In this moment of American pressure, the embrace of Beijing and Moscow through the SCO suddenly looked less like a betrayal of the West and more like a rational hedge. Donthi noted that "the deterioration of relations between the United States and India through the trade war has given an additional push to New Delhi and Beijing to repair their relationship."
Modi's schedule included separate meetings with both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin—the first time he would see Putin since the tariffs landed. The Kremlin had confirmed the Monday meeting. These encounters would unfold within the architecture of the SCO, an organization that included China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—a bloc representing roughly 40 percent of the world's population. Unlike NATO, the SCO had no mutual defense clause. It presented itself as a forum for political, economic, and security cooperation, though its actual coherence remained contested.
India planned to push for a condemnation of "cross-border terrorism" at the summit—language that was really about Pakistan, a fellow member with whom India had exchanged attacks the previous spring. This had been a source of friction before. In June, a meeting of SCO defense ministers in Qingdao had ended without a joint statement because of disagreements over how to define and address terrorism. India had rejected the final text, accusing Pakistan of weaponizing the term. The same battle would likely resurface in Tianjin.
Einar Tangen, president of Asia Narratives, saw in Modi's visit a test of India's larger strategic orientation. "A clear signal from New Delhi, leaning toward Asian multilateralism or betting on balance with Washington, will define the trajectory of the SCO," he told reporters. He warned that if India tried to play both sides—maintaining its membership in the Quad alliance with the United States, Japan, and Australia while deepening ties with the SCO—the organization risked becoming "a stage for strategic theater rather than a vehicle for transformation." The question was whether India could genuinely straddle these worlds, or whether the weight of American pressure and Chinese ambition would eventually force a choice. Modi's presence in Tianjin was itself an answer of sorts, but the full meaning would emerge only in the days ahead.
Citações Notáveis
The deterioration of relations between the United States and India through the trade war has given an additional push to New Delhi and Beijing to repair their relationship.— Praveen Donthi, International Crisis Group analyst
A clear signal from New Delhi, leaning toward Asian multilateralism or betting on balance with Washington, will define the trajectory of the SCO.— Einar Tangen, Asia Narratives president
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Modi's visit matter now, after seven years of silence between India and China?
Because the silence was never really about the two countries—it was about the border clash in 2020 that killed soldiers on both sides. That trauma had to heal first. But what's changed is the external pressure. America's tariffs on Indian oil purchases have made Beijing and Moscow look less like enemies and more like necessary partners.
So this is about the tariffs pushing India away from the US?
Not away, exactly. It's more complicated. India is trying to stay in both rooms at once—it's part of the Quad with America and Japan, but it's also in the SCO with China and Russia. The tariffs are just making that balancing act harder and more urgent.
Can India actually pull that off, or will it have to choose?
That's the real question. An analyst I read said if India plays both sides too obviously, the SCO becomes just theater. But if India leans too hard toward China and Russia, it risks the relationship with Washington. Modi's meetings this week will signal which direction he's leaning.
What about Pakistan? I noticed India wants to push something about terrorism at the summit.
Yes—India wants the SCO to condemn cross-border terrorism, which is really about Pakistan. But Pakistan is also in the SCO, so it's a built-in conflict. The last defense ministers' meeting ended with no joint statement because they couldn't agree on how to even define terrorism. That fight is coming back to Tianjin.
So the summit could fracture?
It could. The SCO has no teeth like NATO does—no mutual defense clause. It's supposed to be about cooperation, but it's really a forum where these tensions play out. India's role will be crucial in whether it becomes something real or just a stage where countries perform their interests.