Not establishing a governing agreement cannot mean rejecting dialogue
In the hills of Sintra, Portuguese Prime Minister Luís Montenegro drew a careful boundary around his government's future — refusing formal alliance with both the far-right Chega and the Socialist Party, while insisting that rejection of coalition is not rejection of conversation. His strategic motion, bearing over three thousand signatures, charts a course for the next two years that wagers on the enduring value of the political center: neither populism nor stagnation, but the harder, quieter work of case-by-case governance. It is an old democratic gamble — that a minority can lead by remaining open to all while beholden to none.
- Montenegro arrives at his party congress as sole leadership candidate, but the real contest is whether his minority government can survive two years without a formal parliamentary anchor.
- By equating Chega with the Socialist Party as equally unacceptable coalition partners, he risks alienating both flanks simultaneously — a precarious balancing act in a fragmented parliament.
- His motion draws a deliberate distinction between refusing governing pacts and refusing dialogue, offering opposition parties a narrow but real path to cooperation on individual issues.
- The irony he names aloud — that Chega and the Socialists have already voted together against him — becomes the very argument for keeping all doors ajar rather than slamming any shut.
- With the party congress set for June and three thousand signatures already secured, Montenegro is consolidating internal authority even as external parliamentary arithmetic remains unresolved.
On a Monday evening in Sintra, Luís Montenegro unveiled the document that would define his next two years as both Prime Minister and PSD party leader. Titled "Working—Making Portugal Greater" and submitted to party headquarters with more than three thousand signatures, the strategic motion carried a clear central message: no formal governing pact with Chega, and no central bloc with the Socialist Party. He was careful, however, to avoid the language of total exclusion — insisting that refusing a coalition agreement was not the same as refusing dialogue.
Montenegro positioned his government as the steady center between two dangers: the populism and immaturity he attributed to Chega on one side, and the stagnation and state expansion of socialist governance on the other. This framing was both a political philosophy and a practical strategy — by rejecting formal ties to either bloc, he preserved the flexibility to negotiate with each on specific votes, issue by issue, as his minority government required.
He acknowledged the paradox with a touch of irony: the two largest opposition parties had themselves found common cause against him when it suited them. If Chega and the Socialists could cooperate, he reasoned, then maintaining open channels with both remained not just possible but necessary for survival.
The motion served a dual purpose — governing blueprint and leadership campaign statement — as Montenegro stood as the sole candidate for party chief ahead of elections on May 30. The deeper question his strategy leaves open is whether a government can hold its course by saying no to formal commitment while remaining genuinely open to everyone. The next two years will be the answer.
Luís Montenegro stood before his party on Monday evening in Sintra with a carefully drawn line in the sand. The Socialist Democratic Party leader and Prime Minister was unveiling his strategic motion for the next two years—a document that would define both his government's course and his own bid to remain party chief. The motion, titled "Working—Making Portugal Greater," had been submitted that afternoon to PSD headquarters in Lisbon with more than three thousand signatures backing it.
The core message was unambiguous: no formal governing pact with Chega, the far-right party that has grown into a significant parliamentary force, and no central bloc arrangement with the Socialist Party either. Montenegro framed these rejections as equivalent positions, two sides of the same coin. Yet he was careful not to call them "sanitary cordons"—the term that implies total exclusion—because that language, he suggested, was itself absurd when applied to parliamentary democracy.
What made his position more nuanced than a simple shutdown was what came next. Montenegro insisted his strategy did not mean slamming doors. "Not establishing a governing agreement cannot and should not mean rejecting dialogue and political negotiation," he wrote in the motion. He was drawing a distinction between formal coalition and case-by-case cooperation, a distinction that would allow his minority government to survive by negotiating issue by issue with whichever opposition parties might support particular initiatives.
In his year-end assessment, Montenegro positioned the PSD—the anchor party of the broader Democratic Alliance—as the steady center. He contrasted his government's approach against two threats: the "populism and immaturity" of Chega on one flank, and the "stagnation and state expansion" of socialist governance on the other. The PSD, he argued, was governing responsibly without surrendering to either extreme. This framing served a dual purpose: it justified his rejection of formal ties while also suggesting that both opposition blocs remained potential partners on specific votes.
Montenegro acknowledged the political reality he faced. Portuguese voters had given him a mandate to govern without an absolute majority—a constraint that made flexibility essential. He noted, with a touch of irony, that the two largest opposition parties had themselves shown willingness to work together against the government when it suited them. If Chega and the Socialists could find common cause, he reasoned, then dialogue with each remained not just possible but necessary.
The timing of this motion mattered. Montenegro was the sole candidate for party leadership in elections scheduled for May 30, needing only fifteen hundred signatures to run—he had collected three thousand. The party congress would follow in June. His strategic motion was both a governing document and a campaign statement, a way of telling party members and the broader public how he intended to lead.
What remained unresolved was whether this balancing act could hold. Montenegro was betting that he could maintain parliamentary support without formal agreements, that he could negotiate with both major opposition parties while committing to neither. It was a strategy born of necessity, but also one that required constant calibration. The next two years would test whether a government could govern effectively by saying no to everyone while remaining open to everyone.
Citas Notables
Not establishing a governing agreement cannot and should not mean rejecting dialogue and political negotiation— Luís Montenegro, in his strategic motion
The sense of 'no is no' with Chega is the same as 'no to a central bloc' with the PS— Luís Montenegro
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Montenegro need to reject Chega so explicitly? Isn't that already clear from his government's composition?
Because Chega is growing, and the pressure to work with them—or to be seen as working with them—is real. By stating it plainly, he's reassuring his own party and the center-right voters who fear a drift rightward.
But then he says he'll negotiate with them on specific issues. How is that different from a governing pact?
A pact is permanent, structural—you're tied together. Negotiation is transactional. He votes with them on one bill, against them on another. It's messier, but it preserves his independence.
The PS must be furious at being lumped with Chega as equally unacceptable.
That's the point, in a way. He's saying both represent extremes—one of populism, one of stagnation. It positions him as the moderate alternative. Whether the Socialists accept that framing is another question.
Can a minority government actually survive on case-by-case negotiations?
It's fragile, but it's been done. Portugal's done it before. The risk is that one day the math doesn't work and he loses a crucial vote. But it also gives him flexibility—he's not bound to anyone.
What's he really trying to do with this motion?
He's trying to have it both ways: govern without being captured by any opposition party, while keeping all of them available as partners when he needs them. It's a high-wire act.