Every person would receive a personal pension account tied to their national ID number, established automatically at birth.
En un país donde la vejez ha sido durante mucho tiempo una lotería determinada por el sistema al que uno pertenecía, el Congreso peruano abrió esta semana el debate sobre una reconfiguración profunda de la seguridad en el retiro. La propuesta del Sistema Integrado Universal de Pensiones busca unir lo fragmentado: lo público y lo privado, la solidaridad colectiva y el ahorro individual, el ciudadano recién nacido y el trabajador a punto de jubilarse. Es un intento de convertir la protección en la vejez en un derecho universal, no en un privilegio del sistema correcto.
- Cuatro sistemas de pensiones separados —con reglas, protecciones y destinos distintos— han dejado a millones de peruanos desprotegidos o atrapados en estructuras que no se adaptan a su realidad laboral.
- La propuesta sacude el statu quo al exigir contribuciones obligatorias a los empleadores por primera vez y al vincular el ahorro previsional al impuesto al consumo, convirtiendo cada compra cotidiana en un aporte al retiro.
- La tensión central del diseño es política y técnica a la vez: fusionar la lógica redistributiva del Estado con la eficiencia esperada de gestores privados seleccionados en licitación internacional.
- Cada peruano tendría una cuenta de pensión desde el nacimiento, con capital semilla depositado por el Estado, pero los detalles críticos —tasas de aportación, garantías mínimas, transferencia de fondos— aún no están escritos.
- El destino de la reforma depende de si el Congreso aprueba el marco y de si la nueva autoridad reguladora autónoma, la ASIP, logra traducir la ambición del diseño en reglas que funcionen en la práctica.
El Congreso peruano inició esta semana el debate sobre el Sistema Integrado Universal de Pensiones (SIUP), una propuesta que fusionaría los cuatro esquemas previsionales existentes —el privado, el público, Pensión 65 y el programa Contigo— en un único marco que cubriría a todos los ciudadanos desde el nacimiento.
El diseño descansa en tres pilares: una red de seguridad no contributiva para adultos mayores, contribuciones obligatorias de trabajadores y empleadores, y ahorro voluntario. Los trabajadores dependientes aportarían entre el 4 y el 13 por ciento de su salario; los empleadores, entre el 1 y el 5 por ciento. El Estado introduciría además un mecanismo inédito: una fracción del impuesto al consumo se destinaría a financiar cuentas de retiro, permitiendo que el gasto diario se convierta en ahorro previsional.
Cada persona recibiría una cuenta personal vinculada a su DNI, abierta automáticamente al nacer, con un capital semilla depositado por el Estado en los primeros 60 días. Esa cuenta tendría dos subdivisiones: un Fondo de Riesgo Compartido, de gestión pública y con mecanismos redistributivos, y un Fondo de Riesgo Individual, administrado por gestores privados —peruanos o extranjeros— seleccionados mediante licitación internacional y remunerados según su desempeño.
Quienes ya participan en los sistemas actuales transitarían sin penalización: los afiliados a las AFP conservarían sus saldos acumulados, y los del sistema público recibirían un bono de reconocimiento por los años ya aportados. Al cumplir 65 años con al menos 240 contribuciones, cualquier persona accedería a una pensión mínima garantizada.
La supervisión recaería en una nueva entidad autónoma, la Autoridad del Sistema Integrado de Pensiones (ASIP), con independencia funcional, técnica y financiera. Si el Congreso aprueba el marco, los detalles regulatorios —tasas exactas, garantías mínimas, mecanismos de transferencia— aún deberán escribirse.
Peru's Congress opened debate this week on a sweeping redesign of how the country manages retirement security. The proposal, called the Unified Universal Pension System (SIUP), would merge four separate schemes—the private pension system, the public system, the elderly assistance program Pensión 65, and a smaller program called Contigo—into a single framework that would cover every citizen from birth.
The architecture is built on three pillars. The first is non-contributory: a universal safety net for the elderly, already embodied in Pensión 65. The second is mandatory contributions from workers and employers. The third is voluntary savings. What distinguishes this proposal from Peru's current fragmented system is the attempt to blend public and private management, shared risk and individual accounts, in ways that have not been tried before in the country.
The contribution structure shifts responsibility. Dependent workers would contribute between 4 and 13 percent of their salary, while employers would chip in between 1 and 5 percent. Self-employed workers would contribute based on their declared income to tax authorities. Microenterprise and small-business workers would operate under a separate, more flexible regime. The state would also introduce a novel mechanism: contributions funded partly by a percentage of consumption tax revenue, allowing people to build retirement savings through everyday spending.
Every person would receive a personal pension account tied to their national ID number, established automatically at birth. The state would deposit an initial seed capital into each newborn's account within 60 days of enrollment. This account would have two subdivisions. One portion would flow into a Shared Risk Fund, managed by a public pension agency and designed with built-in redistribution—money flows from those with more to those with less, creating a safety net within the system itself. The other portion would go into an Individual Risk Fund, managed by private fund managers selected through international competitive bidding. Those managers could be Peruvian or foreign, and their fees would be tied to how well their investments performed.
Current participants in the existing systems would transition without penalty. Private pension system members would move their accumulated balances into the new system intact. Public system members would receive a recognition bond compensating them for years already contributed. At retirement, anyone reaching 65 with at least 240 contributions would receive a guaranteed minimum pension. Those who fell short could receive proportional payments or, if they preferred, withdraw their full balance.
Oversight would rest with a new autonomous agency, the Integrated Pension System Authority (ASIP), given functional, economic, technical, financial, and administrative independence to manage the system's day-to-day operations. Tax authorities would handle collection of contributions. The proposal also extended health insurance options to self-employed workers joining the system, allowing them to choose between two public health programs with state-subsidized copayments.
The 16-point framework represents an attempt to solve a persistent problem: Peru's pension landscape has long been fragmented, with workers scattered across competing systems, some public and some private, each with different rules and protections. The new design tries to unify them while preserving elements of both—public solidarity and private efficiency. Whether Congress will pass it, and how it will function once implemented, depends on regulatory details still to be written.
Citas Notables
The mechanism redistributive and solidary of the Shared Risk Fund will be established by regulation of the law.— Multiparty congressional commission proposal
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Peru need to merge these four separate pension systems now? What broke?
Nothing broke catastrophically, but the fragmentation itself is the problem. Workers are scattered across competing systems with different rules, different protections, different outcomes. A private pension member and a public system member doing the same job get different retirement security. The proposal tries to create one coherent framework.
The shared-risk fund sounds like it redistributes money from richer to poorer retirees. How does that work in practice?
The mechanism isn't spelled out yet—that's in the regulations to come. But the idea is that some portion of everyone's contributions goes into a pool with built-in solidarity. It's not pure individual accounts where you only get what you put in. There's a collective cushion.
What happens to someone who's been paying into the private system for 20 years? Do they lose anything?
No. They move their entire accumulated balance into the new system with no haircut. That was a key negotiating point—you don't punish people for having already chosen the private route.
The state deposits seed capital into every newborn's account. Where does that money come from?
The proposal doesn't specify the amount, but it comes from the state budget. It's a way of giving every child a head start on retirement savings before they even enter the workforce.
Private fund managers will be selected through international auctions. Why not just use the public pension agency for everything?
The proposal assumes competition drives better returns. Private managers, competing for contracts, have incentive to perform. But they're not left unsupervised—they manage only the individual risk portion, and their fees depend on how well they actually invest the money.
What's the catch for employers? They have to contribute now?
Yes, between 1 and 5 percent of payroll. That's a new cost for businesses. Whether that gets passed to workers through lower wages, or absorbed as a business expense, is an open question.