Wait long enough, and the United States would need Saudi Arabia again.
In mid-July 2022, President Biden traveled to Israel and Saudi Arabia carrying the weight of three entangled crises — a nuclear Iran, a global oil shortage, and a fractured alliance with a kingdom he had once vowed to punish. The journey forced a reckoning between the moral clarity of democratic ideals and the stubborn arithmetic of geopolitical necessity. It was, at its core, a portrait of American power in a moment of acknowledged limits — a superpower not retreating, but recalibrating, in a region that refuses to be left behind.
- Iran's nuclear program is advancing toward weapons-grade enrichment while eighteen months of diplomatic effort to revive the 2015 deal have produced nothing.
- Global oil markets, already strained by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are pushing Biden toward a Saudi crown prince the CIA believes ordered the murder of a journalist on American soil.
- Biden's own past rhetoric — his promise to make Saudi Arabia a 'pariah' — has become a political liability he must now publicly rationalize rather than quietly abandon.
- A quietly signed 5G memorandum of understanding with Riyadh reveals the trip's deeper purpose: countering Chinese regional influence even as Biden had pledged to step back from the Middle East.
- American intelligence disclosures about Iran supplying weapons to Russia signal that the Ukraine war and Middle East diplomacy are no longer separate theaters — they are converging.
President Biden departed for Israel and Saudi Arabia in mid-July carrying three interlocking problems and, by most accounts, limited leverage to solve any of them. The trip was meant to slow Iran's nuclear program, coax more Saudi oil into global markets, and repair a relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — the same man Biden had promised to hold accountable for the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
The Iran nuclear negotiations had stalled entirely. Talks meant to roll back Tehran's near-weapons-grade enrichment had gone nowhere, leaving Biden to arrive in the region without a diplomatic breakthrough to offer. On oil, officials were careful to avoid announcing any explicit Saudi production increase — the optics were too fraught — but a quiet agreement was widely expected within weeks.
The harder problem was one of Biden's own making. He had built his presidency around a moral framework pitting democracy against autocracy, yet his Washington Post op-ed the weekend before departure framed the Saudi visit as pragmatic realism: a need to 'reorient — but not rupture' the relationship. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, he argued, made Saudi energy resources too important to forgo. It was, in effect, an admission that the crown prince had simply waited Biden out.
Beneath the immediate crises lay a larger strategic tension. Biden had entered office determined to pivot American attention toward China, yet the trip itself was partly designed to contain Chinese influence — a quietly signed 5G agreement with Riyadh was crafted explicitly to exclude Huawei. The Middle East, it turned out, could not be de-emphasized by declaration alone.
The war in Ukraine shadowed every conversation. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan revealed, days before departure, that American intelligence had concluded Iran was preparing to supply military aid to Russia — a disclosure timed to send a warning to both Tehran and Moscow, and perhaps to nudge Israel away from its studied neutrality on the conflict. Biden was returning to a region he knew intimately, but where the ground had shifted, and where every party — from Tehran to Riyadh to Beijing — understood the limits of what he could deliver.
President Biden boarded Air Force One on a Tuesday in mid-July bound for Israel and Saudi Arabia, carrying with him three interlocking problems and precious little leverage to solve them. The four-day trip was meant to address an Iranian nuclear program accelerating toward weapons-grade fuel, to coax more oil from Saudi wells into global markets, and to reset a relationship with a crown prince the CIA believed had ordered the killing of a Washington Post journalist on American soil. Each objective was politically treacherous. Each one exposed the limits of American power in a region where Biden had spent decades building expertise but from which he had deliberately tried to step back.
The president's eighteen-month effort to resurrect the 2015 Iran nuclear deal had stalled completely. Negotiations that were supposed to force Tehran to ship out most of its near-weapons-grade enriched uranium had gone nowhere. On the Saudi front, officials were careful not to announce any explicit production increase—the optics of rewarding Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for his return to diplomatic respectability were too damaging—but everyone understood that an agreement would materialize within weeks. The harder problem was the one Biden had created for himself. Less than two years earlier, he had promised to make Saudi Arabia a pariah state, a response to the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the dissident journalist. Now he was walking into a room with the man the intelligence community believed had ordered it.
Biden had framed his presidency as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, a moral clarity that had animated his foreign policy rhetoric. But he was justifying the Saudi visit as an exercise in realism. In a Washington Post opinion piece published the weekend before departure, he wrote that his aim was to "reorient—but not rupture" the relationship. Saudi Arabia's energy resources, he argued, were vital to offsetting the global supply disruptions caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It was an acknowledgment, however reluctant, that Crown Prince Mohammed's calculation had been correct: wait long enough, and the United States would need Saudi Arabia again.
Beneath the immediate crises lay a larger strategic recalibration. Biden had come into office determined to de-emphasize the Middle East, to redirect American attention toward China, which he saw as the true peer competitor that Washington had neglected for two decades while entangled in regional conflicts. Yet the trip itself was partly about containing Chinese influence in the region. The week before Biden's departure, Riyadh and Washington had quietly signed a memorandum of understanding to build a next-generation 5G network in Saudi Arabia, designed explicitly to exclude Huawei, China's telecommunications champion. The Middle East, it turned out, could not be de-emphasized so easily.
The war in Ukraine cast a shadow over everything. Biden's aides had been irritated in the spring when Israel's government took a largely neutral stance on the conflict. On the Monday before departure, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan disclosed for the first time that American intelligence had concluded Iran was preparing to provide military aid to Russia. Sullivan's stated purpose was to warn both Tehran and Moscow that the United States was watching. But the timing suggested another message: when Biden arrived in Israel, he would be greeted with a demonstration of new laser weapons technology, a signal to the Israeli government about the importance of more forcefully supporting Ukraine.
It was a trip designed to manage contradictions rather than resolve them. Biden and Yair Lapid, the caretaker prime minister who would serve as his host, could at least agree on the threat posed by Iran and the need to confront it. But behind the scenes, they were already maneuvering over how to handle the next critical phase of Iran's nuclear development. The president was returning to a region he knew intimately but where the ground had shifted beneath him. He had less power to shape events than he wanted, and everyone involved—from Tehran to Riyadh to Beijing—knew it.
Citações Notáveis
My aim was to reorient—but not rupture—the relationship.— President Biden, in a Washington Post opinion piece
Saudi energy resources are vital for mitigating the impact on global supplies of Russia's war in Ukraine.— President Biden
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Biden need Saudi oil so badly right now? Isn't the U.S. energy independent?
Not quite. The global market is interconnected. When Russia's invasion disrupted supplies, oil prices spiked everywhere, including at American pumps. Biden needs Saudi production to increase to bring those prices down before the midterm elections. It's about domestic politics as much as geopolitics.
But he called them a pariah. How does he walk that back without looking like he's abandoned his principles?
He doesn't, really. He calls it realism instead. He's betting that voters care more about gas prices than about consistency on human rights. It's a gamble, and his own party is going to make him pay for those photos with the crown prince.
What about the Iran nuclear deal? Why did those negotiations fail?
The deal required Iran to ship out most of its enriched uranium. But Iran kept enriching more, and the U.S. couldn't convince them to stop. Without leverage—without a credible threat or an incentive Iran actually wanted—the talks just died. Now Biden's hoping a show of force in Israel might change Tehran's calculation.
Is this trip really about the Middle East, or is it about China?
Both. Biden wants to reduce American focus on the region, but he can't afford to let China fill the vacuum. That 5G deal with Saudi Arabia? That's about keeping Huawei out. The Middle East matters less to Biden than it did to his predecessors, but it matters enough that he can't ignore it.
What does Israel get out of this visit?
A demonstration that the U.S. still has its back against Iran. And maybe a subtle push to take a harder line on Ukraine. Biden's annoyed that Israel has been neutral on Russia. He's using this trip to remind them that American support comes with expectations.