Weapons that don't work are just a reason to fight
Caught between the threat of Israeli military force and the intractability of an armed proxy on its own soil, Lebanon finds itself navigating one of the oldest dilemmas of small nations: how to reclaim sovereignty when a more powerful patron has embedded itself too deeply to be easily removed. Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji's public disclosure of Israeli military warnings is itself a diplomatic act — an appeal to international attention at a moment when a year-old ceasefire has quietly collapsed into frozen, unresolved tension. The deeper question Lebanon is asking is not merely whether war can be avoided, but whether a state can govern itself when another state's militia holds weapons within its borders.
- Lebanon's foreign minister has gone public with warnings from Arab and international partners that Israel is preparing a major military operation against Hezbollah — a disclosure that signals how close the situation may be to breaking open.
- The November 2024 ceasefire, which required Hezbollah to disarm and Israeli forces to withdraw, has effectively collapsed: neither condition has been met, and Israeli strikes on Lebanese territory continue.
- Beirut is racing through diplomatic channels to extract guarantees that Lebanese state institutions would be spared in any Israeli offensive, while simultaneously pressing Hezbollah to voluntarily surrender weapons it has shown it cannot effectively use.
- Iran looms over every calculation — Rajji called Tehran's regional influence 'very negative' and a 'source of instability,' framing the disarmament question as inseparable from the question of Iranian interference in Lebanese sovereignty.
- A tentative diplomatic opening emerged when Iran's foreign minister agreed to travel to Beirut for talks, but the gesture underscores fragility more than progress — time, multiple parties are signaling, is running out.
Lebanon's Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji stepped into public view this week carrying an uncomfortable message: Arab states and international partners had warned Beirut that Israel was preparing a significant military operation against Hezbollah. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Rajji described his government's frantic diplomatic effort to prevent that operation from materializing — including seeking assurances that Lebanese state institutions would not become targets if conflict resumed.
The underlying crisis is a ceasefire that never fully took hold. When Israel and Hezbollah agreed to halt fighting in November 2024, the terms required Hezbollah to disarm and the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume full territorial control as Israeli troops withdrew. More than a year later, Hezbollah retains its arsenal, Israeli soldiers remain on Lebanese soil, and Israeli strikes continue. What was meant to be a resolution has become a frozen standoff, and the freeze is now cracking.
Rajji's government is attempting to thread an almost impossible needle — persuading Hezbollah to voluntarily give up weapons the minister himself argued have proven militarily useless, while simultaneously conducting what he carefully described not as negotiations but as armistice-restoration talks with Israel. His framing was pointed: if Hezbollah's arsenal failed to meaningfully support Gaza or defend Lebanon over the past two years, what purpose does it serve?
The structural obstacle, Rajji made clear, is Iran. He described Tehran's influence in Lebanon as 'very negative' and called it a source of regional instability, signaling that his pro-Western government would engage with Iran only if it ceased funding Hezbollah and withdrew from Lebanese internal affairs. Hezbollah is not simply a domestic militia — it is sustained by Iranian money, weapons, and strategic direction, making disarmament as much a question of geopolitics as of Lebanese governance.
A small diplomatic signal emerged when Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi agreed to travel to Beirut after Rajji declined to go to Tehran. The gesture suggested some willingness to engage, but the warnings of an Israeli offensive hanging over the conversation made clear that the window for diplomacy may be narrowing. Whether Lebanon can buy enough time — and whether Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran will allow it to — remains deeply uncertain.
Lebanon's foreign minister walked into a difficult position this week, caught between two forces pulling in opposite directions. Youssef Rajji told Al Jazeera on Friday that his government had received warnings—from Arab states and international partners—that Israel was preparing a large military operation against Hezbollah. At the same time, Beirut was scrambling through diplomatic channels to prevent exactly that from happening, trying to negotiate assurances that Lebanese state institutions and facilities would be spared if any operation went forward.
The core problem is simple enough to state and nearly impossible to solve: Hezbollah still has its weapons. More than a year ago, in November 2024, Israel and the Iranian-backed militant group agreed to a ceasefire that was supposed to end with Hezbollah disarming and the Lebanese Armed Forces taking full control of the country's territory as Israeli troops withdrew. None of that has happened. Hezbollah has not given up its arsenal. Israel has kept soldiers on Lebanese soil and continues to carry out strikes it says target Hezbollah's attempts to rebuild. The ceasefire, in other words, has become a frozen conflict—unstable, unresolved, and now threatening to thaw into something worse.
Rajji's government is trying to thread a needle. On one hand, it is pushing Hezbollah to voluntarily surrender its weapons, arguing that the group's arsenal has failed at its stated purpose. Over the past two years, Rajji said, Hezbollah's military capacity proved ineffective at supporting Gaza or defending Lebanon itself. Why hold onto weapons that don't work? On the other hand, Beirut is engaged in what Rajji called intensive talks with Israel—though he was careful to say these are not traditional negotiations but rather efforts to restore the armistice arrangement. The Lebanese government wants guarantees that if things do escalate, its own institutions will not become targets.
But there is a larger shadow over all of this: Iran. Rajji did not mince words about Tehran's role in Lebanon and the broader Middle East. He called Iranian policy "a source of instability" and described Iran's influence as "very negative." The foreign minister said Lebanon's government—which he characterized as pro-Western—would be open to dialogue with Iran if Tehran stopped funding what he called "an illegal organization" in Lebanon, meaning Hezbollah, and stopped meddling in Lebanese internal affairs. This is the real structural problem. Hezbollah is not simply a Lebanese militia; it is a proxy force sustained by Iranian money, weapons, and strategic direction. Disarming it is not just a military question. It is a question about whether Lebanon can reclaim sovereignty from an external power.
The diplomatic temperature rose slightly this week when Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, announced he would travel to Beirut for talks after Rajji declined to visit Tehran. Rajji had suggested his Iranian counterpart was welcome in Lebanon or that they could meet on neutral ground. It was a small gesture of engagement, but one that underscored how fragile the current arrangement is. Warnings of an Israeli offensive are not abstract threats. They are signals that time is running out—that the international community, or at least the parties involved, believe the current stalemate cannot hold much longer. Lebanon is trying to use diplomacy to buy time and prevent a return to open conflict. Whether that effort succeeds depends on whether Hezbollah can be persuaded to disarm, whether Israel will accept a negotiated solution, and whether Iran will allow its Lebanese proxy to step back from the brink.
Citações Notáveis
Rajji described Iran's policy as 'a source of instability' and said Lebanon would engage with Tehran only if it stopped funding Hezbollah and ceased interfering in Lebanese affairs— Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, speaking to Al Jazeera
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why would Hezbollah agree to disarm now, when it didn't over the past year?
Because the calculus has shifted. The group was badly weakened in the 2023-2024 conflict. Rajji is essentially saying: your weapons didn't protect Gaza, didn't protect Lebanon, so what are you holding them for? But that's a rational argument, and Hezbollah's decisions aren't purely rational—they're shaped by Tehran.
So this is really about Iran, not Hezbollah?
It's both. Hezbollah won't disarm without Iranian permission. And Iran has every reason to keep a proxy force in Lebanon—it's leverage in the region, a way to threaten Israel, a way to maintain influence. Rajji calling Iran "a source of instability" is him saying out loud what everyone knows: we can't solve this without dealing with Tehran.
What happens if the Israeli offensive actually comes?
That's what Rajji is trying to prevent. He's negotiating with Israel to protect Lebanese state institutions, and negotiating with Hezbollah to disarm before Israel decides it has no choice but to act. It's a race against time.
And if he fails?
Then Lebanon becomes a battlefield again. Civilian infrastructure gets damaged. The ceasefire collapses. The whole fragile arrangement falls apart, and you're back to open conflict with no clear end in sight.