Food security is national security, and we cannot allow foreign adversaries to buy up American farmland near our most sensitive military sites.
As American and Chinese leaders prepared to meet at the summit table, a bipartisan coalition in Congress moved to address a quieter contest playing out across the nation's fields and fence lines. The legislation targets not the breadth of Chinese agricultural ownership in the United States — which remains a sliver of foreign holdings — but its proximity to the places a nation guards most carefully. In the long negotiation between openness and sovereignty, this bill asks where the boundary between property rights and national security ought to be drawn.
- Lawmakers from both parties seized the moment of a Trump-Xi summit to introduce a bill closing loopholes that have allowed foreign adversaries to purchase farmland near military bases and critical infrastructure.
- A 2022 ruling that a federal investment review committee had no jurisdiction over Chinese land purchases near two Air Force installations exposed the gap this legislation now aims to seal.
- Critics at the Cato Institute warn that restricting American citizens' right to sell their own property demands far stronger justification than a fraction-of-a-percent ownership figure can provide.
- Unreliable USDA data — still collected largely on paper forms in county offices — means policymakers are debating restrictions without a clear picture of what is actually being bought or where.
- States are not waiting for federal action, with dozens passing their own foreign ownership laws, including Utah, where a Chinese-linked aircraft company's land deal near an airport was disrupted.
When President Trump sat down with Chinese President Xi Jinping this week, a bipartisan group of lawmakers chose the moment to introduce legislation they say closes a dangerous gap in national security. Led by Rep. John Moolenaar, chair of the House Select Committee on China, the bill would require federal review of land purchases near military installations and critical infrastructure by China, Russia, and other designated adversaries — a review that, remarkably, a key committee ruled in 2022 it had no authority to conduct.
The raw numbers tell a story of modest scale: foreign entities hold more than 40 million acres of American farmland, but Chinese ownership accounts for less than one percent of that total. Texas leads in Chinese-held acreage, followed by North Carolina, Missouri, Florida, and Virginia. The single largest presence is Smithfield Foods, the Virginia pork giant acquired by a Chinese meat company in 2013. Yet for lawmakers, the concern has never been volume — it has been location. North Dakota's 2023 decision to block a Chinese corn mill near Grand Forks Air Force Base became the defining image of what proximity to sensitive sites can mean.
Not everyone shares the alarm. The Cato Institute's Scott Lincicome called congressional anxiety exaggerated, noting that restricting American citizens' property rights requires a stronger case than the data currently supports. That data, meanwhile, is itself a problem: the Government Accountability Office found in early 2024 that the USDA's tracking of foreign agricultural holdings relies heavily on paper forms and cannot produce reliable information for Congress or the public. The agency says it has begun modernizing its systems, with 2025 figures expected by late 2026.
States have grown impatient with the federal pace, passing their own restrictions in growing numbers. Utah's governor recently signed expanded foreign ownership limits, disrupting a land sale tied to a Chinese state-owned aviation company near Provo Airport. As Hudson Institute fellow Michael Sobolik put it, the aggregate number may be small — but what matters is where the land sits. That question, unresolved as the summit opened, sits at the intersection of property rights, national security, and the limits of the data available to answer it.
President Trump was heading into a high-stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this week when a bipartisan group of lawmakers decided the moment was right to introduce legislation they say closes a significant gap in national security. The bill targets what members of Congress describe as dangerous loopholes that have allowed China and other foreign adversaries to purchase American farmland, particularly near military installations and critical infrastructure.
Rep. John Moolenaar, a Michigan Republican who chairs the Select Committee on China, led the charge. "Food security is national security," he said in a statement, "and we cannot allow foreign adversaries like China to buy up American farmland near our most sensitive military and critical infrastructure sites." The bill has drawn support from both sides of the aisle, including Democratic co-sponsors from New Jersey and California. A Trump administration official confirmed to CBS News that monitoring foreign land ownership remains a priority, with the White House reviewing how states track such transactions.
The scale of foreign agricultural ownership in the United States is substantial but not dominated by Chinese interests. According to the Department of Agriculture's most recent assessment from December 2024, foreign entities control more than 40 million acres of American farmland—roughly 2 percent of the nation's total. Chinese investments, however, account for less than 1 percent of all foreign-held agricultural land. The states with the largest Chinese holdings tell a geographic story: Texas leads with nearly 124,000 acres, followed by North Carolina with over 44,000 acres, Missouri with nearly 43,000 acres, Florida with about 12,500 acres, and Virginia with roughly 4,600 acres. One company dominates the Chinese footprint: Smithfield Foods Inc., the Virginia-based pork producer purchased by a Chinese meat company in 2013 for billions of dollars, now ranks as the second-largest Chinese holder of U.S. agricultural land, controlling tens of thousands of acres.
The concern animating lawmakers is not the overall volume but the location. In 2023, North Dakota lawmakers blocked a Chinese company from building a corn mill near Grand Forks Air Force Base, a decision that crystallized the security argument. Moolenaar's bill would require the Treasury Department's Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. to review land purchases involving China, Russia, and other designated adversaries. Notably, that same committee ruled in 2022 that it had no jurisdiction over a Chinese company's purchase of farmland in North Dakota near both Cavalier Space Force Station and Grand Forks Air Force Base—a gap the new legislation aims to close.
Not everyone sees the threat as urgent. Scott Lincicome, vice president of general economics at the Cato Institute, told CBS News that congressional anxiety about Chinese farmland purchases appears exaggerated. "If you look at the latest data from the USDA, Chinese ownership of farmland is a tiny, tiny sliver of all U.S. farmland," he said. He acknowledged a legitimate security argument for land near military bases but pushed back on broader restrictions, noting that American citizens are the ones selling the property. "The federal government restricting the property rights of American citizens" requires stronger justification, he argued.
A significant obstacle to informed policymaking is the quality of available data. The Government Accountability Office found in January 2024 that the USDA relies heavily on paper forms filed in state county offices and needs to substantially improve how it collects, tracks, and shares information about foreign agricultural holdings. "Without improving its internal processes, USDA cannot report reliable information to Congress or the public," the GAO concluded. A USDA official told CBS News the agency has taken steps to strengthen mandatory disclosure, including launching an online portal for reports and a public submission form. Data for 2025 should become available in late 2026.
Meanwhile, states are moving on their own. Dozens now have laws restricting foreign ownership or investment in agricultural land within their borders, with momentum accelerating in recent years. Utah's Republican Governor Spencer Cox signed legislation expanding previous foreign restrictions, a move that disrupted a land sale near Provo Airport involving Cirrus Aircraft, majority-owned by China's state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation. The Agriculture Department and American Farm Bureau have reported that roughly 34,000 acres in Utah are held by Chinese investors and companies.
Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute specializing in U.S.-China relations, framed the issue differently than the raw numbers suggest. "Total farmland owned by Chinese Communist Party entities may be small in aggregate—but that isn't what matters," he told CBS News. What matters, he said, is proximity to sensitive locations. As Trump prepares to sit down with Xi, the question of how much American agricultural land should remain off-limits to Chinese ownership remains unresolved, with data gaps still complicating the conversation.
Citas Notables
Food security is national security, and we cannot allow foreign adversaries like China to buy up American farmland near our most sensitive military and critical infrastructure sites.— Rep. John Moolenaar, Michigan Republican
Chinese ownership of farmland is a tiny, tiny sliver of all U.S. farmland, but the federal government restricting the property rights of American citizens requires stronger justification.— Scott Lincicome, Cato Institute
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does it matter if China owns farmland near military bases? They're just growing crops, aren't they?
The concern isn't really about the crops. It's about what proximity to sensitive installations could enable—surveillance, intelligence gathering, understanding military operations and vulnerabilities. A farm near an air base gives you a foothold in a strategic location.
But the numbers seem tiny. Less than 1 percent of foreign-held farmland. Why the urgency?
Because concentration matters more than volume. Texas has nearly 124,000 acres in Chinese hands. If those acres cluster near military infrastructure, the aggregate number becomes less relevant than the location. It's not about total farmland; it's about which farmland.
So why hasn't this been restricted already?
There's a legal gap. The Treasury Department's investment review committee ruled in 2022 it had no jurisdiction over farmland purchases. And the USDA's data collection is so fragmented—mostly paper forms filed in county offices—that nobody has a clear picture of where Chinese holdings actually are.
What does the Trump administration think?
They've signaled it's a priority. Trump signed a national security memo last February restricting Chinese investment in agriculture and other strategic sectors. But the White House also talks about balancing security with keeping America attractive for investment.
Is there real disagreement about this?
Yes. Some economists argue the security concerns are overblown and that restricting property rights of American sellers is a dangerous precedent. Others say proximity to military bases justifies the restrictions. The data gaps make it hard to settle the argument with facts.