Castillo voters wanted transformation; Fujimori voters wanted to prevent it.
A las puertas de una elección que dividiría al Perú en dos visiones irreconciliables, el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos reveló que los votantes de Castillo buscaban transformación mientras que los de Fujimori buscaban contención. No era simplemente una disputa entre candidatos, sino entre dos diagnósticos distintos sobre el mal que aquejaba al país. En ese espacio entre el deseo de cambio y el miedo al cambio, se jugaría el destino de una nación.
- A dos semanas de la segunda vuelta del 6 de junio, Perú se encontraba fracturado entre quienes exigían un nuevo orden y quienes temían perder el existente.
- El 47% de los votantes de Castillo lo respaldaba por su promesa de cambio, mientras que el 55% de los seguidores de Fujimori actuaba movido por el miedo al comunismo o a la izquierda.
- La encuesta del IEP, con 1,208 entrevistados en 24 departamentos y un margen de error de 2.8 puntos porcentuales, exponía motivaciones profundamente asimétricas: un voto afirmativo frente a un voto defensivo.
- El antifujimorismo también pesaba: casi tres de cada diez votantes de Castillo lo elegían no tanto por él sino contra ella, añadiendo otra capa de complejidad al mapa electoral.
- El resultado final dependería de cuál narrativa —la esperanza en la transformación o el temor a la radicalización— lograra convencer a los indecisos en la recta final de la campaña.
Dos semanas antes de que Perú eligiera a su próximo presidente, el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos publicó una radiografía de las motivaciones que empujaban a los votantes hacia Pedro Castillo o Keiko Fujimori. La encuesta, realizada el 20 y 21 de mayo con 1,208 personas en 24 departamentos, reveló que los dos electorados no solo preferían candidatos distintos, sino que partían de diagnósticos opuestos sobre el problema central del país.
Entre quienes apoyaban a Castillo, casi la mitad —el 47%— lo hacía por su promesa de cambio. Un 29% adicional expresaba un rechazo activo al legado político de los Fujimori, mientras que proporciones menores destacaban su preocupación por los más pobres o la confianza personal que les inspiraba.
El electorado de Fujimori respondía a una lógica distinta. Más de la mitad —el 55%— estaba motivado por el temor a que la izquierda o el comunismo llegaran al poder. Era, en esencia, un voto de contención antes que de convicción. Solo el 11% la elegía por su promesa de cambio; la estabilidad y la confianza personal completaban el cuadro.
Lo que los números dibujaban era una nación escindida no solo entre dos candidatos, sino entre dos maneras de entender qué era lo que Peru necesitaba sanar. El desenlace dependería de cuál de esas dos visiones resultara más persuasiva para los votantes aún indecisos en los días que quedaban.
Two weeks remained before Peru would choose its next president, and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos had just released a portrait of what was driving voters toward one candidate or the other. On June 6, Peruvians would cast ballots in a runoff between Pedro Castillo of Perú Libre and Keiko Fujimori of Fuerza Popular—a choice that had cleaved the country along fundamentally different lines about what the nation needed most.
The IEP survey, conducted May 20-21 across 1,208 respondents spanning 24 departments and reaching a 94.5 percent provincial representation rate, revealed starkly different motivations animating each camp. For Castillo supporters, the arithmetic was straightforward: nearly half—47 percent—backed him primarily because he promised change. Another 29 percent were driven by anti-Fujimori sentiment, a reflexive opposition to the family's political legacy. Smaller but meaningful shares cited his concern for the poor and their personal trust in him as reasons to vote his way.
Fujimori's coalition operated from a different calculus entirely. More than half her supporters—55 percent—were animated by a single fear: that the left or communism might gain power. This was not a vote for something but against something, a defensive posture rather than an affirmative one. Only 11 percent of her backers cited her promise of change. Stability and order drew 18 percent, and personal trust in Fujimori herself accounted for 13 percent. The regional breakdown showed these motivations varied across Peru's geography, but the national pattern held: Castillo voters wanted transformation; Fujimori voters wanted to prevent it.
The survey methodology was rigorous. The IEP, operating under JNE registration 0393-REE/JNE, had drawn its sample from Peru's eligible voting population of 24.3 million citizens aged 18 and older. The 1,208 interviews were distributed across urban and rural areas, with a maximum margin of error of 2.8 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level. The sampling frame used randomly selected mobile phone numbers, a technique that captured both metropolitan Lima and the dispersed populations of rural Peru.
What the numbers suggested was a nation divided not merely between two candidates but between two visions of what Peru's problem actually was. For nearly half of Castillo's voters, the problem was stagnation—a system that had failed to deliver, that had left too many behind. For Fujimori's majority, the problem was the threat of radical change itself, the risk that a leftist government might undo the economic order they believed in or feared losing. These were not easily reconcilable positions. The election would turn on which vision proved more persuasive to the undecided and which campaign could more effectively mobilize its base in the final fortnight.
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Castillo's promise of change resonate so much more than Fujimori's?
Because Peru had been through decades of economic policy that concentrated wealth and left rural areas especially behind. People were exhausted. Change wasn't abstract—it meant schools, roads, dignity.
But Fujimori's voters aren't wrong about the risks, are they? A leftist government could destabilize things.
No, they're not wrong. That's what makes this election so sharp. Both sides are responding to real fears—one about exclusion, one about upheaval. They're just prioritizing differently.
The anti-communism number is striking—55 percent. Is that about ideology or something else?
It's partly Cold War memory, partly class anxiety. Peru's business class and middle sectors remember the 1980s violence and associate the left with chaos. For them, Fujimori represents order, even if she's controversial.
So Castillo's 47 percent for change—is that soft support or hard?
Mixed. Some of it is genuine enthusiasm. But a lot is desperation. People are voting for change because the status quo has failed them, not necessarily because they trust Castillo specifically.
What happens if Castillo wins?
Markets would likely panic in the short term. But the real question is whether he can deliver on change without triggering the instability his opponents fear—or whether he'll become the self-fulfilling prophecy they're warning about.