What the hell is the point of a court that says nothing?
En un martes de diciembre, Jorge Rodríguez anunció ante la Asamblea Nacional venezolana la intención de retirarse de la Corte Penal Internacional, envolviendo en retórica antiimperialista lo que es, en esencia, un intento de escapar de una investigación activa por crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos desde 2017. Venezuela se uniría así a un reducido grupo de naciones que han rechazado la autoridad del tribunal de La Haya, aunque la investigación continuará desde esa ciudad sin la cooperación de Caracas. En la historia larga de la justicia internacional, este gesto recuerda que los instrumentos creados para proteger a los más vulnerables son tan poderosos como la voluntad de los Estados de someterse a ellos.
- El jefe del Parlamento venezolano anunció el retiro del país de la CPI justo nueve días después de que el tribunal cerrara su oficina en Caracas por falta de avances, una coincidencia que revela la urgencia política del movimiento.
- Rodríguez acusó a la CPI de ser un instrumento del Departamento de Estado estadounidense, ignorando que el mismo tribunal emitió órdenes de arresto contra el primer ministro israelí Netanyahu en 2024, lo que desmiente su argumento central.
- El cierre de la oficina en Caracas no significó el fin de la investigación: un equipo de fiscales en La Haya sigue activo, y la CPI ya rechazó en 2023 el argumento venezolano de que su propio sistema judicial investigaba los casos de manera adecuada.
- Si el parlamento aprueba el proyecto de ley en segunda votación, Venezuela se blindaría jurídicamente frente a las investigaciones por crímenes cometidos desde 2017, aunque sin poder borrar los siete años de trabajo acumulado por el tribunal.
- Las víctimas de la represión estatal venezolana quedarían aún más alejadas de cualquier mecanismo de rendición de cuentas, mientras el gobierno de Maduro viste una maniobra legal con el lenguaje de la soberanía y la solidaridad con Palestina.
Jorge Rodríguez, presidente de la Asamblea Nacional venezolana, anunció ante el parlamento la intención del país de abandonar la Corte Penal Internacional. Calificó al tribunal de inútil y subordinado a potencias extranjeras, y vinculó el retiro a la solidaridad con Palestina, afirmando que la CPI no había actuado frente al conflicto en Gaza. Sin embargo, esa afirmación era inexacta: en 2024, el tribunal emitió órdenes de arresto contra el primer ministro israelí Benjamin Netanyahu y su exministro de Defensa por crímenes de guerra y de lesa humanidad.
El verdadero trasfondo del anuncio era otro. La CPI investiga a Venezuela desde 2018 por presuntos crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos a partir de 2017, cuando el gobierno de Maduro recrudeció su represión contra la oposición. En 2023, el tribunal rechazó el argumento venezolano de que su propio sistema judicial investigaba los hechos de forma adecuada, y autorizó que la investigación continuara. El cierre de la oficina en Caracas, anunciado apenas nueve días antes del discurso de Rodríguez, no detuvo el proceso: los fiscales seguirán trabajando desde La Haya.
El proyecto de ley para revocar la adhesión venezolana al Estatuto de Roma requería una segunda votación, que Rodríguez instó a aprobar el jueves siguiente. De prosperar, Venezuela se uniría a un pequeño grupo de países que han rechazado la autoridad de la CPI. La maniobra no eliminaría la investigación ni las acusaciones acumuladas durante siete años, pero privaría al tribunal de cualquier cooperación formal con Caracas y dejaría a las víctimas de la represión estatal aún más lejos de una posible rendición de cuentas. Detrás del lenguaje de soberanía y antiimperialismo, el movimiento tenía una lógica más concreta: alejar al Estado venezolano del alcance jurídico del único tribunal internacional con competencia para juzgar esos crímenes.
Jorge Rodríguez, who leads Venezuela's National Assembly, stood before parliament on a Tuesday and announced his country's intention to leave the International Criminal Court. The withdrawal, he said, would be a matter of historical record—a rejection of what he called the court's uselessness and its servitude to foreign powers. Venezuela, he argued, had no reason to remain in an institution whose judges were not there to dispense justice or protect rights.
The parliament was debating a bill to repeal Venezuela's commitment to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC. The measure still required a second vote, which Rodríguez urged his colleagues to approve the following Thursday. His framing of the withdrawal was deliberate: he tied it to solidarity with Palestine, pointing out that the court had done nothing about what he characterized as Israeli genocide in Gaza. This was technically inaccurate. In 2024, the ICC had issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza Strip.
Rodríguez's real grievance, however, centered on a different accusation. He claimed the U.S. State Department owned the ICC, that it controlled the court's operations and bent them to American interests. He questioned the court's relevance with crude directness: what was the point of an institution that said nothing about the psychological warfare and military threats Venezuela faced from the United States? The U.S. maintained a naval and air presence in the Caribbean, officially justified as counternarcotics operations, but which Maduro's government interpreted as preparation for regime change.
The timing of Rodríguez's announcement was not coincidental. Just nine days earlier, on December 1st, the ICC's prosecutor had announced the closure of its office in Caracas. The decision came after years of what the court described as insufficient progress. Mame Mandiaye Niang, the deputy prosecutor, explained that despite sustained engagement with Venezuelan authorities, the court had concluded that real progress remained elusive. The office, which had opened in 2024, would shut down. But Niang made clear that the investigation itself would continue—a team of prosecutors working from The Hague would keep pursuing the cases.
The investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela had begun in 2018, initiated by a referral from multiple countries. It focused on events since 2017, when the Maduro government's crackdown on opposition intensified. The Venezuelan government had repeatedly tried to stop the investigation, claiming its own judicial system was conducting adequate inquiries. The ICC rejected that argument in 2023 and authorized the investigation to proceed.
What Rodríguez did not mention in his parliamentary speech was that the court's closure of its Caracas office was, in effect, a judgment. The ICC had determined that Venezuela was not genuinely investigating the allegations itself—that the complementarity principle, which requires countries to pursue their own cases before international courts intervene, was not being honored. By withdrawing from the court, Venezuela would remove itself from the jurisdiction that had been investigating those allegations for seven years. The investigation would continue from The Hague, but without the cooperation of Venezuelan authorities, and without the legal standing to compel testimony or evidence from within the country.
The parliament's vote on Thursday would determine whether this withdrawal proceeded. If approved, Venezuela would join a small group of nations that have rejected the ICC's authority. The move would not erase the investigation or the allegations. It would simply place them beyond the reach of Venezuelan cooperation—a legal maneuver dressed in the language of sovereignty and anti-imperialism.
Notable Quotes
We are leaving that court because it is useless, but also because we are denouncing the servitude of its representatives— Jorge Rodríguez, Venezuelan Parliament president
Real progress remains a challenge despite sustained commitment with Venezuelan authorities— Mame Mandiaye Niang, ICC deputy prosecutor
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Rodríguez frame this as solidarity with Palestine rather than just saying Venezuela wants out?
Because it gives the withdrawal a moral dimension beyond self-interest. If he simply said the court was investigating his government, it sounds defensive. But if he says the court is biased and serves American power, and he's standing with Palestine, it becomes a principled stance against imperialism.
But the ICC did issue warrants for Netanyahu. Doesn't that undercut his argument?
It does, which is why he doesn't mention it. The facts are inconvenient. He's constructing a narrative, not describing reality. The court becomes useful when it aligns with his position, invisible when it doesn't.
What does closing the Caracas office actually mean for the investigation?
It means the court loses its on-the-ground presence, its ability to meet with witnesses, to gather documents, to work with local institutions. The investigation continues, but it's now remote, dependent on whatever evidence already exists or can be obtained from outside Venezuela.
And if Venezuela withdraws, the investigation just stops?
No. The investigation continues from The Hague. But Venezuela's withdrawal means the government has no legal obligation to cooperate, to hand over documents, to allow prosecutors to interview officials. It becomes much harder to build a case.
So this is about making the investigation impossible to complete?
It's about making it much more difficult. And it's legal. Countries have the right to withdraw from the ICC. But the timing—right after the prosecutor said there's been no real progress—suggests this is a response to pressure, not a principled position.