It will be a qualitative operation that could come from anywhere. It's an open war.
Along the banks of the Tigris, where ancient empires once contested the same ground, a militia commander has renewed a vow as old as war itself: that blood demands blood. The United States struck Iranian-backed fighters near the Iraq-Syria border in late June, killing four men, and now their commander promises a response worthy of remembrance. This exchange is not an isolated incident but a chapter in a longer story of proxy conflict, assassination, and escalation that has been unfolding since the killing of General Soleimani in 2020. With Iran's hardline leadership ascending in Tehran, the forces that sustain this cycle show little sign of fatigue.
- A militia commander seated beneath a portrait of Soleimani has publicly vowed a 'qualitative' retaliatory strike against American forces — from the air, the sea, or across borders — with no deadline and no apparent restraint.
- The June 27 US airstrike that killed four fighters near the Iraq-Syria border was itself a response to a pattern of drone and rocket attacks on American troops that has grown more sophisticated and more frequent since early 2020.
- The election of hardline Iranian president Raisi — who has already rejected negotiations with Washington — is being read by militia leaders as a green light to escalate, not a reason to pause.
- US forces in eastern Syria were already hit by rocket fire the day after the June strike, establishing that retaliation is not a threat but an ongoing rhythm.
- The militia's fighters are not a fringe force but part of a vast, Iran-sustained regional network stretching from Iraq into Syria, positioned near key border towns and operating under the nominal umbrella of Iraqi state-sanctioned forces.
On a Monday afternoon in early July, Abu Alaa al-Walae, commander of the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, sat down with reporters in a Baghdad office and made a promise. Four of his men had been killed in a US airstrike near the Iraq-Syria border on June 27 — a strike the Pentagon said targeted facilities used to coordinate drone attacks on American forces. Al-Walae called what was coming an "open war" and described a future operation that would be remembered: something that could come from the air, the sea, or anywhere along the region's borders.
The escalation has been building for over a year. Since the US killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport in January 2020, attacks on American forces have grown more frequent and more technically advanced — from rockets to explosives-laden drones. By April, US officials had documented at least five drone attacks by Iran-backed groups, including one targeting the military section of Irbil's international airport. The militias deny maintaining weapons caches or conducting the operations attributed to them, insisting their fighters were on legitimate counter-terrorism missions when the June strike occurred.
Al-Walae, who once spent time in US military detention and whose militia was among the first to deploy to Syria in 2012, spoke with the calm of someone accustomed to being taken seriously. He would not confirm past drone use but hinted clearly at what was coming. Seated beneath a poster of Soleimani and a photograph of himself with Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, he said the operation would be one "in which everyone says they have taken revenge from the Americans."
The interview's timing was sharpened by events in Tehran. Hardline president-elect Ebrahim Raisi had just won Iran's election and had already rejected any meeting with President Biden or negotiations over Iran's missiles and regional proxies. Al-Walae read this as a mandate: "Iran-backed militant groups will have their best times" under Raisi's leadership. The incoming administration in Tehran, in other words, would not be pulling back the very forces now vowing retaliation. US troops in eastern Syria had already absorbed rocket fire the day after the June airstrike. The cycle, by all appearances, was accelerating.
In a Baghdad office overlooking the Tigris River, a militia commander sat down with reporters on a Monday afternoon in early July and made a promise: America would pay for the deaths of four of his men. Abu Alaa al-Walae, who leads Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, an Iranian-backed militia group, spoke with unusual directness about what he called an "open war." The U.S. Air Force had struck targets near the Iraq-Syria border on June 27, hitting what the Pentagon described as facilities used by Iran-backed groups to coordinate drone attacks inside Iraq. Four militiamen died in that strike. Now al-Walae was signaling that a response was coming—something, he said, that would be remembered.
The cycle of escalation between American forces and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq has been tightening for months. Since the U.S. killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport in early 2020—an operation that also claimed the life of Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis—the attacks have grown more frequent and more sophisticated. Rocket strikes gave way to drone operations. In mid-April, an explosives-laden drone targeted the military section of Irbil's international airport in Iraq's Kurdish north, where American troops are stationed. U.S. officials documented at least five drone attacks by Iran-backed militias since April alone. The Pentagon has grown visibly concerned about this shift in tactics. The militias, for their part, deny they maintain weapons warehouses or conduct the operations Americans attribute to them. The Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi state-sanctioned umbrella organization of mostly Shiite militias, claimed their men were on legitimate counter-terrorism missions when the June strike occurred.
Al-Walae, a bearded man in his office decorated with a poster of the slain Soleimani and a framed photograph of himself standing beside Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah, spoke with the precision of someone accustomed to being heard. He would not confirm whether his group had used drones in past attacks, but he hinted broadly at their future use. "We want an operation that befits those martyrs," he said of the four killed fighters. "Even if it comes late, time is not important." He elaborated: "We want it to be an operation in which everyone says they have taken revenge from the Americans. It will be a qualitative operation that could come from the air, the sea, along Iraq's border, in the region or anywhere."
The timing of al-Walae's interview carried particular weight because of developments in Tehran. Iran's hardline judiciary chief Ebrahim Raisi had just won the presidential election and was scheduled to take office the following month. In his first public remarks after the vote, Raisi rejected any possibility of meeting with President Joe Biden or negotiating over Iran's ballistic missile program or its support for regional militant groups. Al-Walae saw this as a signal. "Iran-backed militant groups will have their best times," he said of the coming four years under Raisi's leadership. The implication was clear: the incoming Iranian administration would not constrain the very groups that had just vowed retaliation against the United States.
Al-Walae himself carried the weight of this regional conflict in his biography. He had once been imprisoned by U.S. troops in Iraq. His militia, he said, had been among the first to cross into Syria in 2012 to fight alongside President Bashar Assad's forces, initially to protect Shiite holy shrines south of Damascus. Thousands of Iran-backed fighters remain deployed in Syria today, many of them positioned near the Iraqi border in towns like Boukamal and Mayadeen. These are not isolated actors but part of a coordinated regional network that Iran has spent years building and sustaining.
The immediate aftermath of the June 27 airstrike had already shown the pattern. U.S. troops in eastern Syria came under rocket fire the very next day, though no casualties were reported. Now, with al-Walae's public vow of retaliation and Raisi's election signaling a harder line from Tehran, the cycle appeared poised to accelerate. Al-Walae also offered a domestic prediction: Iraq's parliamentary elections, scheduled for October, would likely be postponed to April, he said, citing the country's severe infrastructure crisis and rolling blackouts during the brutal summer heat. It was a small detail in a larger picture of a region where American military presence, Iranian influence, and local militias exist in a state of perpetual tension, each waiting for the other to move.
Citas Notables
We want an operation that befits those martyrs. Even if it comes late, time is not important.— Abu Alaa al-Walae, militia commander
Iran-backed militant groups will have their best times under the incoming administration.— Abu Alaa al-Walae, on Raisi's election
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did al-Walae choose to give this interview now, to foreign media, when he says his group rarely does?
Because he wanted to send a message. Not just to the Americans, but to his own fighters, to Iran, to the broader Shiite militia network. A public vow of retaliation is a commitment he can't walk back.
He was vague about drones. Why not just say whether they've used them before?
Plausible deniability. If he admits it, he's confessing to attacks on American forces. If he hints at it, he signals capability and intent without giving the U.S. legal grounds to escalate further. It's a careful game.
What does Raisi's election actually change on the ground?
It removes any internal Iranian pressure to restrain these groups. Raisi has already said he won't negotiate with Biden. That's a green light to the militias that Tehran won't pull them back.
The four men killed—do we know anything about them?
The source doesn't name them or give details. They're martyrs now, which is precisely why al-Walae has to respond. His credibility with his fighters depends on it.
Is this cycle actually escalating, or is it just the new normal?
It's escalating in sophistication. Rockets are crude; drones require planning, coordination, technical skill. The fact that five drone attacks happened in three months suggests this is becoming their preferred method.
What's the endgame here?
There probably isn't one. Both sides are locked in a pattern where each strike demands a response, and each response demands another strike. The only way out is negotiation, and Raisi just said that's off the table.