Has Indonesia's free and active foreign policy faded away because Indonesia is scared of the US?
In the wake of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death in a strike attributed to US-Israeli action, Indonesia dispatched Foreign Minister Sugiono and a high-level delegation to Mashhad to attend the funeral and hold bilateral talks with Iranian counterpart Araghchi. The visit, upgraded from ambassador-level after domestic criticism, reflects Jakarta's enduring commitment to its 'free and active' foreign policy — a tradition of principled non-alignment that refuses to let great-power rivalries dictate the terms of smaller nations' relationships. With the Strait of Hormuz closed and regional tensions reshaping global energy flows, Indonesia's presence in Mashhad was at once a gesture of solidarity, a diplomatic signal, and a quiet negotiation with the pressures of a fractured world order.
- Khamenei's death in a US-Israeli strike has closed the Strait of Hormuz, rattling global energy markets and stranding tankers — including Indonesian ones — in contested waters.
- Jakarta's initial plan to send only its ambassador sparked sharp domestic criticism, with former officials accusing the government of quietly drifting toward US alignment and abandoning its non-aligned tradition.
- Under public pressure, the government reversed course within days, elevating the delegation to ministerial level and adding parliamentary and Muslim civil society leaders to signal the visit's seriousness.
- Sugiono and Araghchi are holding bilateral talks on trade, regional coordination, and the stalled D-8 summit — with the unspoken question of Hormuz access hovering over every exchange.
- Indonesia's bilateral trade with Iran has already fallen 26 percent in early 2026, and Jakarta's rotating chairmanship of the D-8 bloc gives it both incentive and leverage to push for de-escalation.
Indonesia's Foreign Minister Sugiono flew to Mashhad on Friday alongside parliamentary speaker Ahmad Muzani and prominent Muslim leaders from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, bound for the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — killed in a strike attributed to the United States and Israel. The delegation's composition was itself a message: Jakarta was showing up, and showing up seriously.
The decision to send Sugiono had not been the original plan. Indonesia initially announced ambassador-level representation, prompting swift backlash from critics who saw the move as a quiet capitulation to US pressure. Former deputy foreign minister Dino Patti Djalal publicly questioned whether Jakarta's celebrated 'free and active' foreign policy had lost its nerve. Within days, the government reversed course.
Beyond the ceremony, Sugiono and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held bilateral talks — their third engagement in recent months — aimed at reviving ties strained by regional conflict. The two countries had already seen bilateral trade fall roughly 26 percent in early 2026, and a D-8 summit under Indonesia's rotating chairmanship had been postponed because of the war. Getting that relationship back on track was part of the mission.
Looming over the talks was the Strait of Hormuz, closed by Iran in retaliation for Khamenei's death. The last Indonesian tanker caught in the closure was only now clearing the passage. Whether Sugiono pressed Tehran on reopening the waterway, the Foreign Ministry would not say — but the question was impossible to ignore.
Spokeswomen Yvonne Mewengkang framed the visit in the careful language of Jakarta's diplomatic tradition: Indonesia was not choosing sides, only honoring its commitment to engage all parties. Whether that formulation would satisfy critics at home, or carry weight in Tehran, was still an open question.
Indonesia's Foreign Minister Sugiono boarded a plane to Mashhad on Friday morning, carrying with him a message about where Jakarta stands in a region torn by conflict. He was not traveling alone. Alongside him came Ahmad Muzani, the speaker of Indonesia's People's Consultative Assembly, along with prominent Muslim leaders Gus Yahya from Nahdlatul Ulama and Syafiq Mughni from Muhammadiyah. Their destination: Iran's second-largest city, where they would pay respects at the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had been killed in a strike attributed to US and Israeli action.
The decision to send Sugiono himself—rather than the ambassador, as originally planned—was not incidental. It was a correction, made under pressure. When Indonesia first announced it would have only ambassador-level representation at Khamenei's funeral, the backlash was swift and pointed. Former deputy foreign minister Dino Patti Djalal published a lengthy critique questioning whether Jakarta's famous "free and active" foreign policy had become hostage to fear of the United States. The government's initial explanation—that Sugiono was too busy with visiting dignitaries in Jakarta—rang hollow to critics who saw it as a slight to a long-standing partner. Within days, the calculus shifted. Sugiono would go.
The visit carried weight beyond ceremony. On the sidelines of the funeral, Sugiono and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi would hold bilateral talks aimed at strengthening ties across what the Indonesian Foreign Ministry described vaguely as "various priority sectors." The two men had already spoken by phone, including in March when Jakarta had offered itself as a mediator in regional disputes. They had met face-to-face at a BRICS gathering in New Delhi two months prior. Now they would talk again, this time with the funeral's gravity as backdrop.
The timing was significant for reasons both symbolic and practical. The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil passes, had been effectively closed by Iranian action in retaliation for Khamenei's death. The last trapped Indonesian tanker was only now making its way out. The Foreign Ministry's spokeswoman, Yvonne Mewengkang, neither confirmed nor denied whether Sugiono would press Tehran to reopen the passage, but the question hung in the air. Global energy markets had already felt the wound.
Indonesia's economic stake in the relationship was real but modest. In 2025, bilateral trade between the two countries had reached $257.9 million. But the conflict had taken its toll. In the first five months of 2026, trade had fallen to $68.1 million, a decline of roughly 26 percent year-on-year. More broadly, Iran sat within the D-8, a bloc of major developing nations now under Indonesia's rotating chairmanship. A summit originally scheduled for mid-April in Jakarta had been postponed because of the regional war. The visit was, in part, about getting that relationship back on track.
When Mewengkang spoke to the press on Thursday, she framed the mission in the language of Jakarta's diplomatic tradition. "We wish to speed up coordination in the face of regional and global challenges," she said. "We believe that the visit reflects how Indonesia sticks to its 'free and active' foreign policy." It was a careful formulation—a way of saying that Jakarta was not choosing sides, that it would talk to everyone, that it would not be pushed into alignment by pressure from any quarter. Whether that message would land in Tehran, or whether it would satisfy the critics at home who had forced Sugiono onto the plane in the first place, remained to be seen.
Notable Quotes
Does this mean Indonesia's 'free and active' foreign policy is fading away because Indonesia is scared of the US?— Dino Patti Djalal, former Indonesian deputy foreign minister
We believe that the visit reflects how Indonesia sticks to its 'free and active' foreign policy.— Yvonne Mewengkang, Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Indonesia initially plan to send only an ambassador, when the relationship with Iran clearly mattered?
The government said it was logistics—Sugiono was busy with visiting leaders in Jakarta. But that explanation didn't hold up. People saw it as a signal that Indonesia was afraid to be seen standing too close to Iran, especially after the US and Israel killed Khamenei.
And the backlash changed that?
Yes. A former deputy foreign minister published a piece essentially asking: has Indonesia's non-aligned policy become a non-policy? Is fear now driving our choices? That stung enough that within days, Sugiono was on a plane.
What does he actually need to accomplish in those bilateral talks?
Officially, strengthening ties across priority sectors. But really, there are three things: signal that Indonesia hasn't abandoned Iran, try to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened because it's hurting global energy markets, and get Iran back to the table for that D-8 summit that got postponed.
The trade numbers dropped 26 percent. Is that because of the strait closure, or something else?
Both. The conflict disrupted everything—shipping, investment, normal commerce. But the strait closure is the visible wound. If it stays closed, the damage gets worse.
Does Sugiono have any leverage in these talks?
Not much, honestly. Indonesia's leverage is that it's respected as a non-aligned voice, that it doesn't take sides. That's actually valuable to Iran right now. But leverage to force the strait open? No. That's Tehran's card to play.