Most Americans believe tariffs have backfired on both sides
As President Trump traveled to Beijing for high-stakes trade negotiations, a joint NPR-Chicago Council-Ipsos poll revealed that most Americans have already rendered their verdict on his signature tariff strategy: they believe it has hurt both the United States and China alike. The survey arrived not as a surprise, but as a clarification — a moment in which the accumulated weight of lived economic experience translated into collective public judgment. Whatever leverage tariffs were meant to provide at the negotiating table, the domestic audience watching from home had largely concluded the costs outweighed the gains.
- A clear majority of Americans now believe U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods have damaged both economies, not just China's — undercutting the core premise of the trade war strategy.
- The poll landed precisely as Trump entered Beijing, meaning he carried skeptical public opinion into the room alongside whatever diplomatic leverage he hoped to wield.
- Americans are feeling the tariffs in tangible ways — through grocery prices, consumer goods costs, and supply chain disruptions that have made abstract trade policy feel personal.
- Respondents also expressed concern about the war in Iran, painting a broader portrait of a public growing wary of the administration's international gambles.
- The findings create a political bind: returning with expanded tariffs defies public sentiment, but negotiating them away signals the strategy was flawed from the start.
When President Trump departed for Beijing, a new poll from NPR, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and Ipsos was already circulating among policy watchers — and its message was unambiguous. Most Americans believe the tariffs imposed on Chinese goods have harmed both economies, not just China's. It wasn't a close finding buried in the data. It was the dominant view.
The timing gave the survey unusual weight. Trump was walking into negotiations with China while a majority of his own public had already concluded his signature trade policy was backfiring. Americans had watched long enough — through rising prices and shifting supply chains — to form opinions grounded in their daily lives rather than in abstract economic theory.
The poll also registered skepticism about the war in Iran, suggesting a broader public wariness about the costs of the administration's international posture. Together, the findings sketched a portrait of an electorate that had grown impatient with strategies it perceived as mutually damaging.
What the survey couldn't resolve was what comes next. A deal that preserves or deepens tariffs runs against the current of public opinion. A deal that rolls them back implicitly concedes the public was right to doubt them. Either way, Trump arrived in Beijing not with a nation rallying behind his approach, but with a majority already skeptical — and that quiet pressure would hang over whatever was negotiated in the days ahead.
President Trump was heading to China this week when a fresh survey landed on the desks of policy watchers and political analysts across the country. The poll, conducted jointly by NPR, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and Ipsos, delivered a straightforward message about what ordinary Americans think of the trade war that has defined much of his administration's economic strategy: most of them believe the tariffs have backfired.
The numbers told a clear story. A majority of Americans surveyed said they view the tariffs imposed on Chinese goods as harmful to both the U.S. economy and China's economy alike. This wasn't a narrow split or a finding buried in the crosstabs. It was the dominant view among respondents, suggesting that whatever the administration's rationale for the trade barriers, the public has largely concluded they are doing more damage than good.
The timing of the poll mattered. As Trump prepared for his trip to Beijing, he was walking into negotiations with a domestic audience that had already made up its mind about his signature trade policy. The tariffs had been in place long enough for Americans to form opinions based on what they saw in their own lives—prices at the grocery store, the cost of goods, the broader economic ripple effects that tariffs create when they move through supply chains and eventually reach consumers.
The survey also captured American sentiment on another major foreign policy question: the war in Iran. Respondents indicated they saw the conflict as damaging to American interests, adding another layer of skepticism about the administration's international approach. The picture that emerged was of a public that had grown wary of the costs—both economic and geopolitical—of the current administration's strategy.
What made this poll significant was not that it was shocking. Americans have long harbored mixed feelings about trade policy, and tariffs are inherently unpopular when they raise prices. But the clarity of the finding, coming at this particular moment, suggested that Trump's negotiating position in China was not being bolstered by public enthusiasm at home. He was not heading into talks with a nation behind him, convinced that his tariff strategy was working. Instead, he was arriving with a majority of Americans already skeptical of the approach.
The poll results raised an implicit question about what comes next. If the president returns from China with a deal that maintains or expands tariffs, he will be doing so against the backdrop of public opinion that views them as mutually destructive. If he negotiates a reduction in tariffs, he will be responding to pressure that the American people have already made clear they feel. Either way, the survey had captured a moment in which the public's patience with the trade war appeared to be wearing thin, and that reality would shape whatever negotiations unfolded in the days ahead.
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Why does it matter what Americans think about tariffs if the president is already committed to the policy?
Because negotiations are rarely just about economics or strategy on paper. They're also about what a leader can sustain at home. If most Americans think tariffs are hurting both sides, that creates political pressure—either to change course or to show results that justify the pain.
But couldn't Trump argue that short-term pain is necessary for long-term gain?
He could, and his administration has made that argument. But the poll suggests Americans aren't convinced by it yet. They're not seeing evidence that the strategy is working, just that prices are higher and the conflict continues.
What does this mean for the China trip specifically?
It means he's negotiating from a position where his own public doesn't believe in the approach. That can weaken your hand. China knows the American people are tired of this. It's leverage.
So the poll is essentially saying Americans want a deal?
Not exactly. It's saying Americans think the current situation is bad for everyone. Whether they want a deal or just want the tariffs to work—that's a different question the poll doesn't quite answer. But the frustration is clear.