we will obliterate them
As American and Iranian negotiators convened in Switzerland to test the limits of a fragile memorandum of understanding, Senator Lindsey Graham offered a rare and unsettling form of diplomatic support — one premised on the expectation of failure. Speaking from a position of proximity to the president, Graham framed the 60-day talks not as a genuine opening but as a necessary prelude to military escalation, suggesting that the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow passage through which a third of the world's seaborne oil flows — could become an American-controlled tollbooth if diplomacy collapsed. It is a posture that reveals something enduring about the tension between negotiation as process and negotiation as theater.
- Graham emerged from four and a half hours with President Trump carrying not optimism but a contingency plan — diplomacy first, military seizure of the Strait of Hormuz second.
- His threat to 'obliterate' Iran if it resisted U.S. control of the waterway injected a maximalist edge into a moment when negotiators were still finding their seats in Switzerland.
- The ceasefire is already showing cracks — renewed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and Iranian accusations that the U.S. and Israel have violated the memorandum's terms, are eroding the foundation before talks have truly begun.
- Graham's earlier fierce opposition to the deal has softened into conditional acceptance, hinging on his belief that reconstruction funds will come from Gulf states rather than Western treasuries — a distinction he treats as morally significant.
- The next 60 days in Switzerland will determine whether Graham's dark forecast becomes policy — and whether the Trump administration's posture toward Iran hardens into something the region cannot absorb.
Senator Lindsey Graham arrived at CBS News on Sunday not to champion diplomacy but to set its expiration date. Fresh from four and a half hours with President Trump, he offered a structured vision: attempt negotiations with Iran, expect them to fail, and then take the Strait of Hormuz by force. The United States, in his telling, would control the waterway militarily, charge passage fees, and fund the operation with the proceeds. If Iran resisted, the consequences would be total.
The timing was pointed. Vice President JD Vance and other negotiators were already in Switzerland that same day, beginning a 60-day window established under a recently signed memorandum of understanding. Graham's words cast a long shadow over those talks before they had properly started.
His broader regional vision for 2026 was equally expansive — expanded Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia, an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a new doctrine of military strikes against Iran should it continue supporting attacks on Israel or Lebanon. It was a maximalist blueprint delivered with the assurance of someone who had recently sat across from the president.
Graham's position had shifted in recent weeks. He had once compared the emerging deal to a Marshall Plan administered while Nazis remained in power. But he had since recalibrated, persuaded that reconstruction funds would flow from Gulf states rather than Western governments — a distinction that, to him, signaled genuine regional belief in Iran's potential transformation.
Still, he called the memorandum 'problematic.' The reconstruction funds were insufficient, the ceasefire already fraying under renewed Israel-Hezbollah tensions, and Iran itself had threatened to close the strait again. Graham's message was ultimately an ultimatum dressed in the language of process: exhaust diplomacy, then be prepared to act without restraint. Whether that vision would find its moment depended entirely on what the next 60 days produced — and on how faithfully Graham had read the president's mind.
Senator Lindsey Graham walked into the CBS News studios on Sunday with a message that sounded like a wager. Try diplomacy with Iran, he said. It will probably fail. But try it anyway. Then, when it does, the Trump administration should seize control of one of the world's most critical shipping lanes by force.
Graham, the South Carolina Republican, had spent four and a half hours with President Trump on Friday. He emerged from that meeting with a detailed contingency plan. Vice President JD Vance and other negotiators were in Switzerland that same Sunday, beginning a 60-day window to hammer out terms following a memorandum of understanding the two countries had signed the week before. The clock was already ticking on what Graham seemed to view as a doomed enterprise.
"Let's try a diplomatic solution. I think it's going to fail. What happens next?" he said on "Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan." The answer, in his telling, was straightforward: the United States would take the Strait of Hormuz. Not negotiate for it. Not request passage through it. Take it. The military would control the waterway, charge fees to ships passing through, and use those revenues to fund the operation. If Iran objected, Graham was blunt: "we will obliterate them."
The senator's vision extended beyond the strait. He outlined a broader regional strategy for 2026: expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, end the Arab-Israeli conflict, and establish a new doctrine toward Iran. If the Islamic Republic continued attacking Israel or Lebanon, the response would be military strikes. It was a maximalist position, delivered with the confidence of someone who had recently sat across from the president.
Graham's shift in tone was notable. Earlier in the month, he had opposed the emerging deal with ferocity, particularly objecting to $300 billion in reconstruction funds slated for Iran. He had written on social media that the arrangement was "akin to a Marshall Plan for Germany with the Nazis still in charge." But in recent days, his position had softened—or at least become more nuanced. He now believed the money would likely come from U.S.-allied Gulf states rather than Western coffers. That distinction mattered to him. If Sunni Arab nations were willing to invest in Iran's reconstruction, it suggested they believed the country had fundamentally changed. It suggested business partnership was possible.
Yet even with that reframing, Graham called the memorandum "problematic." The reconstruction funds, he argued, simply weren't enough to transform Iran's economy or its trajectory. The real test would be whether Iran honored the agreement. Already, the ceasefire was fraying. Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia, had created fissures. Iran itself had threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz again, accusing the United States and Israel of violating the terms.
Graham's message was a kind of ultimatum wrapped in diplomatic language. Try the talks. Exhaust the option. But prepare for failure, and when it comes, be ready to act with overwhelming force. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a third of the world's seaborne oil passes, would become an American-controlled tollbooth. It was a vision of American power reasserted in the Middle East, unilateral and uncompromising. Whether that vision would materialize depended on how the next 60 days unfolded in Switzerland—and on whether Graham's reading of Trump's intentions proved accurate.
Citações Notáveis
Let's try a diplomatic solution. I think it's going to fail. What happens next?— Senator Lindsey Graham
The United States will control the Strait of Hormuz, we'll charge a fee for all those who go through to pay for the operation, and we're going to expand the Abraham Accords in calendar year 2026.— Senator Lindsey Graham
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why would Graham predict failure before negotiations even really begin? That seems to undermine the whole effort.
He's not trying to undermine it—he's trying to set expectations. He's saying to the administration: go through the motions, show good faith, but don't be naive. If it fails, here's what we do instead.
And the Strait of Hormuz seizure—is that actually feasible? Wouldn't that provoke a massive response?
Feasible militarily? Probably. Politically? That's the real question. It would reshape global trade overnight. But Graham seems to believe the Trump administration is willing to absorb that cost.
His position on the reconstruction money changed pretty dramatically. What shifted?
The source of the money. If it's coming from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies, not Western banks, that tells a different story—it means those countries think Iran is trustworthy enough to invest in. That's not appeasement to Graham; that's regional consensus.
So he's not actually against the deal itself?
He's against it failing and leaving America unprepared. The deal is a test. If Iran passes, great. If not, he's already written the script for what comes next.
And that script involves military action?
Absolutely. He's explicit about it. Seize the strait, charge fees, expand the Abraham Accords, and if Iran pushes back, strike them. It's a complete reordering of the regional balance.