Both sides quietly prepare for the next round of fighting
In Ethiopia's June 2026 elections, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed secured a commanding parliamentary majority, yet the vote itself was less a democratic mandate than a portrait of a fractured nation — millions excluded, polling stations shuttered by violence, and entire regions locked out of participation. The Nobel laureate who once promised reconciliation now presides over active insurgencies, a Tigray still haunted by one of this century's deadliest wars, and a regional geometry that could draw Eritrea, Sudan, and the broader Horn of Africa into renewed catastrophe. History has a way of measuring leaders not by the seats they win, but by the fires they choose to extinguish or ignore.
- Abiy's landslide masks a country where 143 polling stations never opened on election day because armed conflict made voting physically impossible.
- Six million Tigrayans were excluded from the vote entirely, and reports of forced youth recruitment by the TPLF signal that both sides may be quietly preparing for war rather than peace.
- The regional stakes have grown dramatically — Eritrea has reversed its wartime alliance and now backs Tigray's leaders, while Ethiopia's alleged support for Sudan's RSF creates a combustible web of proxy alignments across the Horn.
- The EU is calling for de-escalation, the US has imposed visa restrictions on hardline TPLF figures, and analysts at the International Crisis Group warn that low-level tension could rapidly spiral into a regional conflict.
- The window ahead is narrow — Abiy holds consolidated political power that could be turned toward genuine peace, but every current indicator suggests both sides are choosing preparation over negotiation.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed emerged from Ethiopia's June election with his Prosperity Party holding 438 of 501 parliamentary seats, securing him another term beginning in October. For his supporters, the result signals continuity and reform. But the election was shadowed by boycotts, violence, and mass exclusion — a hollow victory over a fractured country.
Abiy rose to power in 2018 as a healer of old divisions, winning the Nobel Peace Prize for brokering peace with Eritrea. That narrative has since collapsed. In the Amhara and Oromia regions, armed groups — the Fano militias and the Oromo Liberation Army — rejected the election outright, and fighting forced 143 polling stations to close on election day itself.
The gravest crisis remains Tigray, a region of six million people excluded entirely from voting. The 2022 civil war there killed an estimated 600,000 people and left the region near famine. A peace agreement signed that November was meant to close the chapter, but both sides now accuse each other of violating it. Reports indicate the TPLF is forcibly recruiting young men; a resident of Adwa told the BBC that armed men in civilian clothes came to his home and conscripted him into the armed struggle. Local authorities deny it, but analysts see the TPLF's moves as a direct response to threatening signals from Abiy's government.
What makes the situation potentially catastrophic is the regional alignment forming around Tigray. Eritrea, once Abiy's wartime ally, has switched sides and now backs Tigrayan leaders — driven partly by Abiy's repeated declarations that landlocked Ethiopia must regain Red Sea access, a direct threat to Eritrean sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia is accused of backing Sudan's RSF faction, while Eritrea and Tigray maintain ties to Sudan's military — the RSF's enemy. A resumption of fighting in Tigray could pull multiple nations into conflict across the Horn of Africa.
Analysts are divided on timing but united in alarm. Magnus Taylor of the International Crisis Group calls the current tension "a dangerous scenario" with clear escalation risk. The EU has urged de-escalation; the US has imposed visa restrictions on hardline TPLF members. The months ahead represent a narrow window — one in which Abiy's consolidated power could be turned toward genuine peace, or quietly spent preparing for the next war.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed walked away from Ethiopia's June election with overwhelming control of parliament, his Prosperity Party claiming 438 of the 501 contested seats. He will be sworn in for another term in October. For his supporters, the result promises continuity—the economic progress they credit him with steering, the reforms they believe he represents. But the election itself was a hollow affair, overshadowed by violence, boycotts, and the simple fact that millions of Ethiopians never got to vote at all.
Abiy came to power in 2018 on a wave of anti-government anger, initially celebrated as a healer of old wounds. A year later, he won the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for brokering peace with Eritrea. But that narrative has fractured. Today, security analysts across the continent worry that Africa's second-most populous nation is sliding toward something far worse than the tensions he once promised to resolve.
The immediate picture is fragmented and dangerous. In the Amhara and Oromia regions—home to much of Ethiopia's population—armed groups fighting for greater autonomy have rejected the election outright. The Fano militias in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia both boycotted the vote, and on election day itself, 143 polling stations in these two regions simply did not open because armed conflict made voting impossible. The government's security forces are locked in grinding, violent insurgencies with both groups, with no resolution in sight.
But the deeper crisis lies in Tigray, a region of six million people that was entirely excluded from voting. Tigray is still raw from a civil war that ended in 2022 after two years of fighting that killed an estimated 600,000 people—one of the deadliest conflicts of this century. The war left the region on the edge of famine, with accusations that the government deliberately blocked food aid to civilians, a charge Addis Ababa denied. The peace agreement signed in November 2022 was supposed to have closed that chapter. Instead, both sides now accuse each other of violating it.
What makes Tigray's situation explosive is the regional geometry around it. Eritrea, Ethiopia's northern neighbor, was allied with Abiy's government during the war and accused of atrocities against Tigrayan civilians—allegations it denied. But relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated sharply. Eritrea, a coastal nation with 1,350 kilometers of Red Sea shoreline, accuses landlocked Ethiopia of harboring imperial ambitions. Abiy has repeatedly stated that Ethiopia needs to regain access to a Red Sea port, something it lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993. In a dramatic reversal, Eritrea has now allied itself with Tigray's leaders. Should fighting resume, Eritrea would almost certainly side with Tigrayan forces.
The picture darkens further when Sudan enters the frame. Ethiopia is accused by multiple reports of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, one of the warring factions in Sudan's own civil war—accusations Addis Ababa has denied. Eritrea and Tigrayan forces, by contrast, are understood to have close ties to Sudan's military, which is fighting the RSF. This creates a toxic regional alignment: if conflict erupts in Tigray, it could pull in Eritrea, Sudan, and potentially destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.
On the ground in Tigray, there are signs both sides are preparing for renewed fighting rather than negotiating. Just before the election, the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the dominant political force in the region, disbanded an interim administration that Abiy had appointed and restored its own pre-war government structure. Reports indicate the TPLF is forcibly recruiting young men into its armed forces. A young man in the town of Adwa told the BBC that armed men in civilian clothes came to his home and told him he was being detained to join the armed struggle. Local authorities deny forced recruitment is happening, claiming youths are simply receiving training to defend themselves. But Cameron Hudson, an Africa analyst who worked for the US State Department, sees the TPLF's actions as a response to Abiy's own moves—that the prime minister has "moved away from the agreement and made threatening moves towards the Tigrayans."
Analysts are divided on whether war will come immediately, but none see a path toward stability. Magnus Taylor of the International Crisis Group says the current low-level tension is "a dangerous scenario," with the risk that it could escalate into a regional conflict centered on Tigray. The European Union has called for immediate de-escalation. The United States, which helped broker the 2022 peace deal, this week announced visa restrictions on hardline members of the TPLF and their families. For observers watching from outside, the coming months feel critical—a window in which Abiy could use his consolidated political power to genuinely address the conflict, or a period in which both sides quietly prepare for the next round of fighting.
Citas Notables
The risks are real and are driven by both sides. The Tigrayans bear responsibility for the growing tensions and they've been making moves and statements that suggest they are preparing for a renewal of fighting.— Cameron Hudson, Africa analyst formerly with the US State Department
With this very polarised, poisonous regional politics in which Addis Ababa believes that TPLF is siding with Ethiopia's enemies, there is more chance it might escalate into a regional conflict centred on Tigray.— Magnus Taylor, Horn of Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
So Abiy won decisively, but the election itself seems almost beside the point given what's happening in the regions.
Exactly. The landslide is real—438 seats out of 501—but it's a victory in a country that's fracturing. Millions of people didn't vote because their regions are too dangerous, or because they were excluded entirely.
Why was Tigray excluded? That's six million people.
The region is still recovering from a war that killed 600,000 people. The government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front signed a peace deal in 2022, but they're already accusing each other of breaking it. Holding an election there felt too risky—or too politically inconvenient.
And now there are signs they're preparing for another war?
Yes. The TPLF is recruiting young men, sometimes forcibly. Abiy's government is making what analysts call "threatening moves." Neither side seems to be negotiating in good faith. They're positioning.
What about Eritrea? I thought Abiy made peace with them?
He did, and he won a Nobel Prize for it. But that peace has collapsed. Eritrea now sees Ethiopia as a threat and has allied with Tigray's leaders. If fighting starts in Tigray, Eritrea will likely join in.
So this could become a regional war?
That's what analysts fear. You have Sudan's civil war next door, with Ethiopia and Eritrea backing opposite sides. If Tigray reignites, the whole region could destabilize.
What's Abiy's incentive to actually resolve this?
That's the question everyone's asking. He has consolidated power. He could use it to negotiate seriously. Or he could use it to finally crush his opponents. The coming months will tell.