Their AI ambitions remain tethered to cables that could be cut
The Gulf states are wagering their post-oil future on artificial intelligence, pouring billions into data centers and cloud infrastructure in a bid to become the world's next great exporters of computational power. Yet this ambition rests on a paradox familiar to great transitions: the new economy is hostage to the same geographic vulnerabilities as the old one, with nearly all regional data traffic threading through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea — waterways as contested today as they have ever been. A single cable-cutting incident in 2025 cost an estimated $3.5 billion and offered a preview of what a more deliberate disruption could mean for an AI economy that demands uninterrupted, massive data flows. The region is now racing to build redundancy before its ambitions outpace its resilience.
- Gulf states have staked their economic future on AI exports, but 95% of their international data traffic flows through just a handful of cables in some of the world's most volatile waters.
- Iran's reported consideration of seizing control of seven cables through the Strait of Hormuz — and a 2025 Red Sea cutting that caused $3.5B in damages — transformed theoretical risk into lived reality.
- Hyperscale cloud providers now operating in the region are demanding the same four-to-five-path redundancy standard used in transatlantic and transpacific markets, exposing how dangerously thin Gulf connectivity remains.
- A multilayered response is taking shape: terrestrial fiber corridors through Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey are being planned or revived, alongside new submarine-terrestrial hybrid routes designed to bypass Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb.
- Two flagship projects — Saudi Arabia's $800M SilkLink revival of the old JADI route and the $700M WorldLink corridor through Iraq — signal serious intent, but both pass through countries where geopolitical stability is far from guaranteed.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have spent billions positioning themselves as the next great exporters of computing power — the computational muscle behind global AI systems. They are attracting hyperscale cloud providers, building data centers, and betting on becoming indispensable nodes in the AI economy. But nearly all the data flowing in and out of the region travels through submarine cables running beneath the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, two of the most geopolitically fraught passages on Earth.
Submarine cables carry roughly 95 percent of all international data traffic, and for the Gulf, the concentration of routes is dangerously narrow. When U.S.-Iran tensions escalated earlier this year, reports emerged that Iran was considering seizing control of seven cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz. The threat was not abstract: in 2025, two cables connecting Europe with the Middle East and Asia were cut in the Red Sea, degrading connectivity across the Gulf for days and causing an estimated $3.5 billion in damages — and that incident occurred before the region's AI data centers had fully come online.
The stakes are higher now. Traditional internet outages cause slowdowns; outages in AI infrastructure, which demands massive and continuous data flows, trigger serious operational and financial consequences. Hyperscale providers operating in the Middle East are demanding the same four-to-five independent pathway redundancy standard applied to transatlantic and transpacific routes. The Gulf currently falls far short of that benchmark.
The pressure has forced a strategic rethink. A multilayered approach is emerging: terrestrial fiber corridors through Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman extending toward Europe via Jordan and the Levant; new submarine-terrestrial hybrid systems bypassing Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb; and northern corridors running through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. A proposed terrestrial system through Syria could support 144 fiber pairs — six times the capacity of a typical submarine cable — though surface installation makes it far more exposed to physical disruption.
Two projects anchor this shift. Saudi Arabia's Stc Group is investing $800 million to revive the JADI route — connecting Jeddah, Amman, Damascus, and Istanbul — rebranded as SilkLink, a corridor that opened just before Syria's civil war and never recovered. Meanwhile, a consortium of Iraqi and Emirati firms is building WorldLink, a $700 million hybrid cable running from the UAE through the Strait of Hormuz to Iraq, then overland to Turkey. Both projects create new east-west corridors that reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints. Neither Syria nor Iraq, however, is immune to the instability that makes these routes necessary in the first place. Until redundancy is real, the Gulf's AI ambitions remain tethered to cables that could, at any moment, be cut.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have spent billions building artificial intelligence infrastructure, positioning themselves as the next great exporters of computing power. But their entire ambition rests on something surprisingly fragile: a handful of submarine cables threading through some of the world's most volatile waterways.
The Gulf states are attempting a historic economic pivot. For decades, they exported oil. Now they want to export processing capacity—the computational muscle that powers AI systems globally. They're attracting hyperscale cloud providers, building data centers, and betting that they can become indispensable nodes in the global AI economy. The problem is that nearly all the data flowing in and out of the region travels through cables laid on the ocean floor, and those cables run through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, two of the most geopolitically fraught passages on Earth.
Submarine cables carry roughly 95 percent of all international data traffic. For the Gulf, the vulnerability is acute: the region's connectivity to Europe and the United States depends on a narrow concentration of routes. When tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran escalated earlier this year, experts warned that a regional conflict could sever critical cable infrastructure. In May, reports suggested Iran was considering taking control of seven submarine cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz. The threat was not hypothetical. In 2025, two cables connecting Europe with the Middle East and Asia were cut in the Red Sea, degrading internet connectivity across the Gulf for days and causing an estimated $3.5 billion in damages from lost services.
That incident occurred before AI deployment accelerated and data centers came online. Now hyperscale cloud providers operating in the Middle East are demanding the same resilience standards they apply to transatlantic and transpacific routes. Those markets typically operate through four or five physically separate network paths to minimize disruption risk. The Gulf, by contrast, still depends heavily on a small cluster of routes. The difference matters enormously. A brief outage in traditional internet traffic causes slowdowns. A brief outage in AI infrastructure—which requires massive, continuous data flows between hyperscale data centers, cloud providers, and enterprise clients—can trigger significant operational and financial consequences.
The pressure is forcing Gulf states to rethink their entire connectivity strategy. A multilayered approach is emerging. The first layer involves landing stations in the Gulf connected by terrestrial fiber corridors running through Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, extending toward Europe and Asia through Jordan and the Levant. A second layer would introduce new submarine-terrestrial systems that bypass critical chokepoints around Egypt and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. A third would create northern terrestrial corridors through Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Some of the region's most ambitious projects involve countries previously viewed mainly through the lens of conflict. A terrestrial system proposed through Syria could support 144 fiber pairs, compared to the 24 typical of current submarine cables—enormous capacity potential, though surface installation makes it far more vulnerable to physical disruption.
Two projects exemplify this shift. Saudi Arabia's state telecom company, Stc Group, is investing $800 million to reactivate the JADI route—named for Jeddah, Amman, Damascus, and Istanbul—which opened just before Syria descended into civil war in 2011 and never fully recovered. The company has renamed it SilkLink. A consortium of Iraqi and Emirati firms is building WorldLink, a $700 million cable that will run underwater through the Strait of Hormuz from the UAE to Iraq, then connect via terrestrial cables to Turkey. These projects are strategically significant because they create additional east-west connectivity corridors that reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints. But they remain incomplete, and neither Syria nor Iraq has proven immune to the fragile geopolitical order of the Middle East. Satellite connectivity is also drawing growing interest as part of broader resilience planning. If these projects succeed, the Gulf's dependence on two narrow maritime corridors will diminish. Until then, the region's AI ambitions remain tethered to cables that could be cut.
Citações Notáveis
Cloud providers and regional operators are pushing for diversification because their needs go beyond bandwidth. They now need multiple independent routes, predictable latency, and survivability during geopolitical stress.— Imad Atwi, Strategy & Middle East consulting partner
Projects like WorldLink and SilkLink are strategically important because they create additional east-west connectivity corridors that reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints.— Carl Sykes, Neptune P2P Group maritime risk consultant
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does a cable cut matter so much more for AI than for regular internet?
Because AI infrastructure demands constant, massive flows of data between data centers. A traditional internet user might notice slowness. An AI system loses synchronization, training halts, inference fails. Minutes of downtime become millions in losses.
So the Gulf states are essentially building an economy on infrastructure they don't fully control?
Worse—they're building it on infrastructure that runs through some of the world's most contested waters. The Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint by geography and by politics. That's the vulnerability they're trying to solve.
These new terrestrial routes through Syria and Iraq—are those actually safer?
Safer from maritime threats, yes. But terrestrial cables are exposed to physical damage, political instability, and conflict. Syria just had a civil war. Iraq is still fragile. You're trading one risk for another.
What happens if one of these big projects fails?
The Gulf stays dependent on the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz routes. Their AI export economy becomes hostage to geopolitics. One incident like the 2025 cable cuts could cost billions again.
Is anyone else in the world facing this problem?
Not like this. Europe has the Atlantic. Asia has the Pacific. Both have multiple independent routes. The Gulf has a few cables through two narrow straits. It's a structural disadvantage they're trying to engineer away.