Time favors Russia's position with every passing day
En algún lugar entre la mesa de negociaciones y las líneas del frente, el destino de Ucrania se debate en un idioma que no es el suyo. Washington anuncia que el acuerdo está casi cerrado; Kyiv responde que ningún papel firmado vale lo que no puede defenderse con tropas reales. La historia de los pactos rotos —Minsk, Budapest— pesa sobre cada propuesta como una advertencia no dicha, y la pregunta que nadie responde con claridad es si la paz que se negocia es para Ucrania o simplemente sobre ella.
- Washington declara el acuerdo un 90% completo, pero ese porcentaje restante contiene la pregunta más difícil: ¿quién garantiza que Rusia no romperá lo que firme?
- Zelenski rechaza cualquier arreglo que recuerde al Memorándum de Budapest o a los Acuerdos de Minsk, exigiendo tropas físicas sobre el terreno antes de ceder ni un centímetro de Donbás.
- Europa ofrece desplegar soldados como garantía de seguridad, pero Rusia descarta categóricamente cualquier presencia de la OTAN, cerrando el único camino que Ucrania considera viable.
- La administración Trump actúa como portavoz de las exigencias rusas, dejando a Kyiv sin un aliado que equilibre la balanza en la mesa.
- Sin alto el fuego, las elecciones que darían legitimidad democrática a cualquier cesión territorial son imposibles, y Rusia rechaza el alto el fuego porque el tiempo militar juega a su favor.
El equipo negociador estadounidense asegura que el acuerdo de paz para Ucrania está casi terminado. Quedan, dicen, solo algunos detalles: cómo estructurar una zona desmilitarizada en el Donbás ucraniano y qué garantías de seguridad recibirá Kyiv a cambio de ceder territorio. Pero Zelenski no lo ve así. Para él, un acuerdo sin respaldo real no es una garantía; es una repetición de errores que ya costaron caro.
El modelo en discusión se inspira en el Artículo 5 de la OTAN —la promesa de defensa colectiva—, pero nadie puede confirmar si Estados Unidos, que parece retirarse de Europa, honraría ese compromiso con tropas propias. Los negociadores de Trump, Witkoff y Kushner, creen que Rusia lo aceptará. La historia sugiere cautela.
El problema de fondo no es qué puede ofrecerse a Ucrania, sino qué está dispuesta a aceptar Moscú. La administración Trump ha asumido que Rusia está ganando la guerra y, por tanto, le corresponde dictar los términos. Lo que el Kremlin rechaza, desaparece de la mesa. Esta asimetría lo condiciona todo.
Zelenski exige algo cualitativamente distinto a los fracasos del pasado: tropas y armas sobre el terreno, capacidad de respuesta inmediata si Rusia viola el acuerdo, y el voto de sus ciudadanos antes de entregar ningún territorio. Europa respondió ofreciéndose a enviar soldados. Pero ahí se detiene todo: Ucrania pide garantías, esas garantías requieren tropas de la OTAN, y Rusia rechaza la OTAN sin matices. El círculo se cierra sin salida.
Hay además un problema de legitimidad. Putin niega reunirse con Zelenski alegando que este carece de mandato democrático al no haber celebrado elecciones. Zelenski, a su vez, sostiene que necesita el respaldo ciudadano antes de ceder territorio. Pero organizar elecciones bajo bombardeos es casi imposible. La secuencia lógica sería: alto el fuego, elecciones, negociación entre líderes con mandato real. Rusia rechaza el alto el fuego porque cada día de combate puede mejorar su posición. Y así, la piedra sube y vuelve a caer, una y otra vez.
The American negotiating team is calling it nearly done. Ninety percent of a Ukraine peace agreement, they say, with just a few details left to sort out—mainly how to structure a demilitarized trade zone in the Ukrainian portion of Donbás, and what security guarantees the West will actually offer Ukraine in exchange for handing over territory. But on the ground in Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelenski is not celebrating. He wants something far more concrete than a handshake and a promise.
The working model being discussed resembles NATO's Article 5—the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all. It sounds reassuring in theory. The problem is that no one knows whether the United States, which appears to be withdrawing from Europe, will actually commit its own troops to such a guarantee. The Trump administration's negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, believe Russia will accept this arrangement. But belief and reality have a way of diverging, especially when one side has shown a pattern of breaking agreements.
The deeper issue is not what can be offered to Ukraine, but what Russia will accept. The Trump administration has decided that Russia is winning this war and therefore gets to decide how it ends. There is no daylight between Washington's position and Moscow's demands. If the Kremlin says something is unacceptable, it is discarded. This asymmetry shapes everything that follows.
Zelenski is asking for something that is neither the failed Minsk agreements of the past nor the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for protection from Russia, the United States, and Britain—protection that evaporated in 2014 and again in 2022. He wants troops and weapons on the ground. He wants the ability to intervene the moment Russia breaks whatever agreement is signed and moves into the demilitarized zone. He has demanded a commitment to defend Ukrainian skies and waters, and he wants his own citizens to vote before he gives away any territory to the Kremlin.
Europe heard this and immediately offered to send troops. France, Britain, and Germany had already considered it; now they were ready to act. But this is where the machinery jams. The United States, speaking for Russia, demands territorial concessions. Ukraine demands security guarantees. Those guarantees appear to require NATO troops. Russia refuses NATO troops categorically. The circle closes. Nothing moves.
Two businessmen with minimal diplomatic experience are leading these talks, obsessed with creating trade zones in a landscape defined by imperial ambition. No one has broken the deadlock. And this is only the first part of the problem. The territorial demands on Ukraine reflect only what Trump believes might satisfy Putin. Zelenski knows this, which is why he keeps asking for a direct meeting with Putin—a request Putin refuses, citing the Ukrainian president's lack of legitimacy because he has not held elections.
Here lies another trap. Zelenski says he needs explicit approval from his citizens before surrendering territory. He could hold a referendum or presidential elections. But in the middle of bombardments and counterattacks, it is difficult to imagine ballot boxes in schools and vote counters working as if nothing is happening. The logical sequence would be: a ceasefire at current front lines, then elections, then a meeting between Putin and whoever Ukrainians choose to lead them. Let those two decide the future of their countries without the broken telephone that has been running for months.
Russia refuses the ceasefire. Time, Moscow believes, favors its position. Every day brings the possibility of military gains that improve its negotiating hand. So these talks continue in their futile rhythm—pushing the stone up the mountain only to watch it roll back down, again and again, to the despair of everyone watching.
Citas Notables
Zelenski wants something that is neither the failed Minsk agreements nor the Budapest Memorandum, but rather troops and weapons on the ground with the ability to intervene if Russia breaks the agreement— Zelenski's stated position
The Trump administration has decided that Russia is winning this war and therefore gets to decide how it ends— Analysis of US negotiating stance
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does the US keep saying ninety percent when nothing seems to be moving?
Because they're measuring progress on paper—the technical details of zones and trade arrangements. But the actual deal, the thing that makes Ukraine sign, depends on security guarantees that Russia won't accept. The ninety percent is real; the remaining ten percent is everything that matters.
So Zelenski is right to hold out?
He's holding out because the last time Ukraine trusted written promises, they were broken twice in a decade. He wants soldiers on the ground, not signatures. He wants to know that if Russia moves again, someone will actually fight.
But doesn't that guarantee require NATO troops, which Russia will never allow?
Exactly. That's the trap. Ukraine can't feel safe without NATO. Russia can't negotiate if NATO is there. And the US won't commit its own troops, so it's pushing Ukraine to accept less.
Why won't Putin meet Zelenski directly?
He says Zelenski lacks legitimacy because there haven't been elections. But that's a cover. Putin doesn't want to negotiate with Zelenski as an equal. He wants to dictate terms through intermediaries.
Could elections happen during the war?
Not really. You can't run a fair election while cities are being bombed. So Zelenski can't get the mandate he needs, which means he can't legitimately sign away territory, which means Putin won't talk to him. It's circular.
Is there any way out?
Only if someone breaks the pattern. A ceasefire first, elections after, then real negotiations between leaders. But Russia won't agree to a ceasefire because it thinks time is on its side.