The tolerance has a limit, but this government cannot ignore the Amazon.
En el Perú de octubre de 2021, la Defensoría del Pueblo revela una cartografía del malestar social que el gobierno preferiría no leer: 148 conflictos activos y 47 más en gestación, la mayoría enraizados en la tensión histórica entre la extracción de recursos naturales y las comunidades que habitan esos territorios. No se trata de incidentes aislados, sino de una acumulación de agravios no resueltos que atraviesan décadas, regiones y gobiernos de distinto signo. El corredor minero del sur y la Amazonía loreteña concentran el peso más grave de esta fractura, recordándonos que el desarrollo económico de un país puede construirse, paradójicamente, sobre la exclusión de quienes custodian sus recursos.
- Los conflictos activos han crecido mes a mes desde que Castillo asumió el poder, desmintiendo la narrativa oficial de que la tensión social está bajo control.
- 47 nuevos focos de conflicto amenazan con escalar, y 33 de ellos involucran directamente a empresas extractivas en regiones donde la tierra ya es territorio en disputa.
- En Loreto, comunidades indígenas han paralizado operaciones petroleras con un costo de cuatro millones de dólares diarios para Petroperú, convirtiendo una demanda histórica en una crisis económica inmediata.
- El Estado gestiona 90 mesas de diálogo en todo el país, pero la multiplicación de alertas formales sugiere que el diálogo corre más lento que el conflicto.
- Más allá de los derrames de petróleo y los daños ambientales, las comunidades amazónicas exigen algo que ninguna mesa de diálogo ha puesto sobre la mesa: un plan de vida para el mundo que vendrá después del petróleo.
La Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú no solo cuenta conflictos; los rastrea, los clasifica y, cuando es necesario, lanza alertas formales antes de que detonen. Su informe de octubre de 2021 registra 148 conflictos activos —nueve más que en agosto— y advierte sobre 47 situaciones adicionales que muestran señales tempranas de escalada. La mayoría de estos casos emergentes involucran actividad empresarial, y su geografía es elocuente: Cusco y Apurímac, corazón del corredor minero del sur, concentran los mayores focos de tensión. Las Bambas, Hudbay, Perugia y Anabi son algunos de los nombres que aparecen en el mapa de conflictos potenciales.
De los 129 conflictos socioambientales activos, 84 involucran a empresas mineras y 25 a operaciones de hidrocarburos. El gobierno nacional carga con la responsabilidad de gestionar 101 de estos casos vinculados a empresas, apoyado por 90 mesas de diálogo en funcionamiento. Aun así, la Defensoría ha emitido 28 alertas formales que exigen intervención prioritaria, nueve de ellas concentradas en Loreto y Piura.
Loreto es el epicentro más urgente. Con 29 conflictos activos, la región amazónica enfrenta una crisis que tiene nombre propio: comunidades indígenas han tomado la infraestructura petrolera, paralizando operaciones y generando pérdidas de cuatro millones de dólares diarios para Petroperú. José Fachín, líder de la Federación de Comunidades Nativas del corredor petrolero, rechaza que esto sea una simple protesta laboral. Es, dice, el resultado de décadas de exclusión sistemática de la Amazonía en las políticas del Estado.
Las comunidades firmaron un pacto político con el gobierno de Castillo, pero ese acuerdo no las exime de exigir respuestas concretas. Más allá de los derrames y el daño ambiental acumulado, Fachín plantea una pregunta que el Estado aún no ha respondido: ¿qué plan existe para la vida económica de estas comunidades cuando el petróleo se agote? Un gobierno que se proclama del pueblo, advierte, no puede seguir tratando a los pueblos amazónicos con la misma indiferencia que sus predecesores.
Peru's government insists it has the social unrest under control. The numbers tell a different story. According to the country's Ombudsman office, active conflicts have climbed steadily since Pedro Castillo took office in July 2021—from 139 in August to 142 in September to 148 by October. These are not theoretical disputes. They are live, ongoing tensions between communities, the state, and corporations, documented and tracked by the institution tasked with monitoring them.
But the real warning lies not in what is already burning, but in what the Ombudsman sees coming. The office has identified 47 additional cases showing early signs of escalation—situations where contradictions between society, the state, and the market are beginning to harden into formal conflict. Of these 47, thirty-three involve corporate activity. The geography matters: Cusco leads with eight potential flashpoints, followed by Apurímac with six. Both regions sit within Peru's southern mining corridor, where the ground itself has become contested territory.
The Ombudsman has mapped the landscape with precision. The companies at the center of these emerging disputes are familiar names in Peruvian mining: Las Bambas and Hudbay in Cusco; Perugia and Anabi in Apurímac. In the most recent reporting period, eight new conflicts erupted, seven of them socio-environmental in nature—meaning they pit extractive industries against local populations. Antamina, Raura, Antapite, Inkabor, and the agricultural firm Caña Brava all appear on the list of newly active disputes.
The scale of the challenge is distributed unevenly across government. The national executive carries responsibility for 101 company-related conflicts. Regional governments manage twenty-one. Municipalities handle seven. To manage these tensions, ninety dialogue tables have been established across the country, sixty-eight of them involving corporate representatives. Yet the broader picture reveals the dominance of resource extraction in Peru's social fabric: of 129 active socio-environmental conflicts, eighty-four involve mining companies, twenty-five concern hydrocarbon operations, and nine relate to water and sanitation. Among the mining disputes, sixty-three are currently active; twenty-three hydrocarbon conflicts are ongoing.
The Ombudsman has also issued twenty-eight formal alerts—cases deemed urgent enough to warrant priority intervention by authorities. These represent situations where early action might prevent escalation into full-scale confrontation. Nine of these alert cases are concentrated in Loreto and Piura, regions where the stakes have become existential for indigenous communities.
Loreto, in Peru's Amazon region, carries the heaviest burden. The department hosts twenty-nine active conflicts, all of them live. Cusco follows with ten active cases, while both Áncash and Puno each report eleven. The pattern is unmistakable: Peru's extractive heartland is also its conflict heartland.
In Loreto, the crisis has a specific face. Indigenous communities occupying the oil infrastructure have brought operations to a standstill, costing the state oil company Petroperú approximately four million dollars daily. José Fachín, an advisor and leader of the Federation of Native Communities along Loreto's oil corridor, framed the dispute not as a simple labor action but as a decades-long demand for recognition and remedy. The Amazon and Loreto have been systematically excluded from state policy, he said. The communities have signed a political pact with the Castillo government, but that agreement does not authorize the state to ignore their needs. Beyond immediate grievances over oil spills and environmental damage, Fachín emphasized a deeper concern: what comes after petroleum. Indigenous communities are demanding a plan for economic survival in a post-extraction future, a vision the state has yet to provide. He characterized the government's response as inadequate, arguing that a self-proclaimed "people's government" cannot treat Amazonian populations with the same indifference that marked the previous two decades of political persecution and police repression.
Citações Notáveis
The Amazon and Loreto have always been excluded from all state policies. Tolerance has a limit.— José Fachín, Federation of Native Communities, Loreto
This is not a simple social conflict. The state must recognize that twenty years of government have meant political persecution and police repression of indigenous agendas.— José Fachín
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does the Ombudsman distinguish between active conflicts and potential ones? What's the practical difference?
The active ones are already consuming resources and attention—dialogue tables, negotiators, security presence. The forty-seven potential cases are early warning signals. They're situations where tension exists but hasn't yet crystallized into formal confrontation. The Ombudsman is essentially saying: these will become active conflicts unless something changes.
And the fact that thirty-three of those forty-seven involve companies—does that surprise you?
Not really. Peru's economy is built on extraction. Mining, oil, agriculture. When you have that kind of economic structure, conflict is almost structural. Communities live on the land where resources are extracted. Their interests and the companies' interests are fundamentally opposed.
The government claims to have things under control. What would control actually look like?
Probably fewer new conflicts emerging, for one thing. And dialogue tables that actually resolve disputes rather than just managing them. Right now there are ninety dialogue tables but conflicts keep multiplying. That suggests the tables are buying time, not solving problems.
What strikes you most about the Loreto situation?
That it's not really about oil anymore. José Fachín is clear: communities have been excluded from state policy for twenty years. They're not just demanding compensation for spills. They're demanding a future that doesn't depend on extraction. That's a much bigger ask than any dialogue table can handle.
So what happens next?
Either the government develops a genuine post-extraction economic plan for these regions, or the conflicts will keep escalating. The Ombudsman is essentially saying: you have forty-seven warning signs. Pay attention now, or manage full-scale crises later.