The form shapes the function.
Em Brasília, juristas, economistas e representantes do setor financeiro se reuniram para debater uma proposta que tocaria no coração do sistema monetário brasileiro: a PEC 65/2023, que pretende transformar o Banco Central de autarquia especial em empresa pública. A mudança, aparentemente técnica, redefiniria os vínculos entre independência institucional, controle democrático e política monetária. É um momento em que o Brasil interroga a si mesmo sobre como equilibrar autonomia técnica e prestação de contas ao povo — uma tensão que nenhuma democracia resolve de uma vez por todas.
- A proposta de mudar a natureza jurídica do Banco Central agita o debate institucional brasileiro ao questionar décadas de arranjo entre autonomia técnica e controle público.
- A reclassificação para empresa pública deslocaria o banco do direito público para o privado, alterando profundamente sua governança, seus mecanismos de fiscalização e sua relação com o Congresso.
- O novo modelo de controle externo, via Tribunal de Contas, representa uma reconfiguração dos freios e contrapesos — e exige legislação complementar para ganhar forma concreta.
- Banqueiros, ministros, economistas e magistrados sentaram-se à mesma mesa, sinalizando que as consequências da mudança seriam sentidas em múltiplas esferas do poder e da economia.
- O debate ainda está em aberto: a proposta avança no Congresso carregando consigo a pergunta central sobre quem, afinal, deve ter a última palavra sobre a política monetária do país.
Em uma manhã de quarta-feira no B Hotel, em Brasília, uma coalizão de instituições jurídicas e financeiras se debruçou sobre a PEC 65/2023 — proposta de emenda constitucional que transformaria o Banco Central de autarquia especial em empresa pública. O evento, organizado por Consultor Jurídico, Brasil 247 e Grupo Prerrogativas, reuniu ministros, economistas, banqueiros e magistrados para examinar o que essa mudança significaria na prática.
A distinção entre autarquia especial e empresa pública pode parecer tecnicidade pura, mas suas implicações são vastas. O Banco Central passaria a operar sob o regime de direito privado, alterando sua governança, sua autonomia e a forma como responde ao Congresso e à sociedade. A proposta mira diretamente o artigo 164 da Constituição, reescrevendo as regras que definem a natureza da instituição e seu vínculo com o poder legislativo.
Os quatro painéis do evento percorreram dimensões distintas da proposta. O primeiro examinou a autonomia administrativa e financeira do banco, com a participação de Isaac Sidney, presidente da Febraban, e representantes de categorias profissionais do setor. O segundo painel voltou-se para inovação digital e cidadania financeira, reunindo o ministro Márcio França e membros do Conselho Nacional de Justiça, além de vozes do setor privado.
No plano constitucional, a emenda redesenharia o controle externo: a fiscalização contábil, orçamentária, financeira e patrimonial passaria a ser exercida pelo Congresso com o auxílio do Tribunal de Contas, enquanto o banco manteria seus próprios sistemas de controle interno. Mas a aprovação da PEC seria apenas o primeiro passo — uma legislação complementar seria necessária para dar forma concreta ao novo arranjo institucional.
O que estava em jogo em Brasília era, no fundo, uma pergunta antiga e sempre atual: como uma democracia estrutura uma instituição que precisa tomar decisões técnicas sem se tornar impermeável à vontade popular? A reunião não respondeu a essa pergunta, mas deixou claro que o Brasil está disposto a fazê-la novamente.
On a Wednesday morning in Brasília, a coalition of legal and financial institutions gathered to examine a constitutional proposal that would fundamentally reshape Brazil's Central Bank. The event, organized by Consultor Jurídico, Brasil 247, TV 247, and Grupo Prerrogativas, brought together government officials, economists, bankers, and judges to debate PEC 65/2023—a proposed constitutional amendment that would transform the Central Bank from a special autarchy into a public company.
The shift in legal status may sound technical, but it carries enormous weight. Currently, the Central Bank operates as a special autarchy, a form of public institution with particular autonomy. The proposed amendment would move it into the realm of private law, reclassifying it as a public company. This change would ripple through how the institution is governed, how it answers to oversight bodies, and ultimately how monetary policy decisions are made in Brazil. The amendment specifically targets Article 164 of the Constitution, rewriting the rules that define the bank's nature and its relationship to Congress.
The event unfolded across four panels at the B Hotel, beginning at nine in the morning. The opening session featured economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. and federal deputy Lindbergh Farias, setting the stage for deeper dives into specific dimensions of the proposal. The first substantive panel examined the administrative and financial autonomy of the Central Bank, drawing in Isaac Sidney, president of Febraban, the banking federation; Rogério Portugal Bacellar, who leads both the notaries association and the national confederation of notaries and registrars; and Fábio Faiad, president of the union representing employees of Banco do Brasil.
A second panel shifted focus to digital innovation and financial citizenship, bringing together Márcio França, the minister overseeing entrepreneurship and small business; Marco Aurélio de Carvalho, coordinator of Grupo Prerrogativas; Daniela Madeira, a counselor at the National Council of Justice; and André Gomes Netto, president of the Brazilian institute for studies of financial instruments. The agenda also included presentations from Vallya and Cerrado Asset, bringing private sector perspectives into the conversation.
The constitutional amendment, if passed, would alter how Congress exercises oversight of the Central Bank. The new language would specify that auditing—covering accounting, budgetary, financial, operational, and asset matters—would occur through external control exercised by Congress with assistance from the Court of Accounts, while the bank itself would maintain its own internal control systems. This represents a recalibration of checks and balances, moving away from the current framework that governs a special autarchy toward one designed for a public company operating within private law structures.
What makes this debate consequential is that it touches the machinery of monetary policy itself. The Central Bank's institutional form shapes its independence, its accountability, and its capacity to act. Transforming it into a public company would require complementary legislation to spell out how the new structure would actually function—a second legislative lift that would follow constitutional approval. The event brought together the stakeholders who would live with those consequences: bankers who depend on the bank's decisions, government officials who shape policy, economists who study its effects, and judicial figures responsible for ensuring it operates within legal bounds.
The discussion reflected a broader tension in Brazilian governance: how to balance institutional autonomy with democratic accountability, how to structure an institution that must make technical decisions while remaining answerable to elected representatives. The proposal itself signals that this balance is being reconsidered, and the gathering in Brasília was an attempt to think through what that reconsideration might mean.
Citações Notáveis
The amendment would specify that auditing—covering accounting, budgetary, financial, operational, and asset matters—would occur through external control exercised by Congress with assistance from the Court of Accounts— PEC 65/2023 proposed language
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter whether the Central Bank is classified as a special autarchy versus a public company? Aren't those just legal categories?
They're legal categories, yes, but they carry real consequences. A special autarchy operates under public law with particular protections for independence. A public company sits in private law territory, which changes how it can be structured, how it answers to oversight, and what rules apply to its operations. The form shapes the function.
So if this amendment passes, what actually changes in how the Central Bank operates day-to-day?
That's the question no one can fully answer yet. The amendment itself is just the constitutional framework. You'd need complementary legislation to spell out the details—how decisions get made, who reports to whom, what the internal governance looks like. That's where the real work happens.
Who benefits from this change? Who loses?
That's what the debate is really about. Bankers might see it as clarifying the bank's status and potentially making it more responsive to market needs. Government officials might see it as a way to exercise more influence. Economists worry about independence. Workers at the bank worry about their status and protections. There's no neutral position here.
Is this about making the Central Bank more or less independent?
That's the paradox. On the surface, moving to a public company structure might seem to reduce independence. But the amendment also specifies new oversight mechanisms through Congress and the Court of Accounts. It could go either way depending on how the complementary law is written. That's why everyone showed up to argue about it.
What happens next?
The amendment has to move through Congress. It needs a supermajority to pass. The debate in Brasília was partly about building consensus, partly about staking out positions before that legislative battle begins. The real test comes when the actual votes happen.