A military built on personal loyalty rather than institutional continuity
In Beijing, two former defence ministers have been handed suspended death sentences — a verdict that, under Chinese law, will almost certainly resolve into life imprisonment. The sentences mark another turning point in Xi Jinping's long campaign to reshape the People's Liberation Army in his own image, removing those whose loyalties or conduct fell short of the standard he demands. What unfolds here is not merely a legal proceeding but a signal: that no rank, however elevated, offers shelter from the reach of political consolidation.
- Two of China's most senior former defence ministers now face the prospect of spending the rest of their lives imprisoned, their political rights stripped and personal assets confiscated.
- The purge has torn through the military's highest ranks — reaching the nuclear-armed Rocket Force and even the top general of the PLA, a figure once considered among Xi's closest allies.
- The Central Military Commission, once an eleven-member body, has been reduced to just two people — Xi himself and one other — a structural transformation with no modern precedent.
- The new defence minister was pointedly excluded from the CMC, breaking with years of established practice and signalling that the restructuring of military authority is far from finished.
- Xi has framed corruption as an existential threat to Communist Party rule, and the relentless pace of removals suggests the campaign will continue to reshape who holds power — and on what terms.
Two former Chinese defence ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, have been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve after being convicted of bribery by a military court. Under Chinese law, such sentences are typically commuted to life imprisonment if no further crimes are committed during the reprieve period — and the court has ruled that no parole or further commutation will be possible thereafter. Both men have been stripped of their political rights for life and had their personal property confiscated.
Wei held the defence portfolio from 2018 to 2023, when Li succeeded him — though Li's tenure proved extraordinarily brief. He vanished from public life within months of taking office and was formally removed in October 2023. Both were expelled from the Communist Party in 2024, having previously held seats on the Central Military Commission, the body that commands China's armed forces under Xi's chairmanship.
The purge has been sweeping in its reach. It has extended to the Rocket Force, China's nuclear and missile command, and more recently claimed Zhang Youxia — the PLA's top general and a Politburo member long seen as a Xi loyalist. The Central Military Commission itself has been hollowed out from eleven members to just two: Xi and one other. The new defence minister, Dong Jun, was conspicuously not appointed to the commission — a break with longstanding convention that suggests the military's institutional structure remains unsettled.
Analysts see the campaign as serving two purposes simultaneously: rooting out genuine corruption while ensuring that those who remain in uniform owe their positions — and their loyalty — to Xi alone. The president has called corruption the party's gravest internal threat, and the pace of removals suggests the reckoning is not yet over.
Two former Chinese defence ministers have been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, marking another milestone in President Xi Jinping's sweeping campaign to purge the military of corruption and consolidate his control over the armed forces. Wei Fenghe, 72, and Li Shangfu, 68, were convicted by a military court of accepting bribes—with Li also found guilty of offering them. The sentences, announced through state media, strip both men of their political rights for life and confiscate their personal property. Under Chinese law, a death sentence with reprieve is typically commuted to life imprisonment if the prisoner commits no further crimes during the reprieve period, and the court has ruled that no additional commutation or parole will be possible after that conversion.
Wei served as defence minister from 2018 until 2023, when Li took over the role. Li's tenure was remarkably brief; he disappeared from public view within months and was formally removed from office in October 2023. Both men were expelled from the Communist Party in 2024. Before their downfall, they held seats on China's Central Military Commission, the powerful body that oversees the armed forces and is chaired by Xi himself. Their removal represents the latest chapter in a corruption crackdown that has reshaped the military's leadership structure since Xi came to power in 2012.
The purge has reached into the highest echelons of China's defence establishment. In 2023, it extended to the Rocket Force, the elite unit responsible for nuclear weapons and conventional missiles. Earlier this year, the campaign escalated dramatically with the removal of Zhang Youxia, the top general in the People's Liberation Army and a Politburo member long regarded as close to Xi. The scale of the restructuring is evident in the composition of the Central Military Commission itself: it once had eleven members, but now consists of just Xi and one other person. This dramatic thinning of the commission's ranks underscores how thoroughly Xi has consolidated military authority.
Analysts interpret the purges as serving a dual purpose: reforming the military while ensuring unwavering loyalty to Xi. The president has publicly described corruption as "the biggest threat" to the Communist Party and characterized the anti-graft campaign as "grave and complex," signalling that the effort will continue. The appointment of Li's successor, Dong Jun, as the new defence minister, offers a telling detail about the ongoing restructuring. Dong was notably not appointed to the Central Military Commission—a position that had been standard for defence ministers in previous years. This break with precedent suggests the military's institutional landscape remains in flux, with Xi maintaining direct control over the commission while keeping the defence ministry at arm's length from its highest councils.
Citações Notáveis
Xi Jinping described corruption as 'the biggest threat' to the Communist Party and characterized the anti-graft campaign as 'grave and complex'— President Xi Jinping
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why sentence them to death with reprieve rather than just imprisoning them outright?
It's a signal. A death sentence—even one that will be commuted—carries symbolic weight in China's political system. It says these were grave crimes, not mere administrative failures. The reprieve gives the system a way to appear merciful while ensuring they never leave prison.
So they'll spend the rest of their lives in prison?
Almost certainly. The court has already said there's no possibility of further commutation or parole after the reprieve ends. It's a life sentence dressed in different language.
What does it mean that the new defence minister wasn't appointed to the Central Military Commission?
It's unusual. Historically, that appointment came with the job. By breaking that pattern, Xi is keeping the commission smaller and more tightly controlled—just himself and one other person now. It suggests he doesn't fully trust the defence ministry as an institution.
Is this purge still ongoing?
All signs point to yes. Xi has called corruption the party's biggest threat, and the military remains a primary target. The removal of Zhang Youxia, a general Xi was supposedly close to, shows no one is safe. The purge appears designed to reshape loyalty itself.
What's the risk in removing so many senior military figures at once?
Institutional knowledge walks out the door. Relationships fracture. But from Xi's perspective, that's perhaps the point—a military built on personal loyalty to him rather than institutional continuity is harder to challenge.