Over a million officials punished in a decade of purges
In a military court in China, two former defence ministers — Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu — received death sentences with a two-year reprieve, the latest and most dramatic chapter in Xi Jinping's decade-long campaign to purge corruption from the Communist Party and its armed forces. Both men had once commanded the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force, the crown jewel of China's strategic military power, before ascending to the highest offices of national defence. Their fall from the apex of power to the threshold of execution is a reminder that in systems where authority concentrates in a single hand, proximity to the centre offers no permanent shelter.
- Two of China's most senior military figures — former defence ministers who once sat on the Central Military Commission — have been sentenced to death, a verdict that reverberates through the entire PLA command structure.
- The corruption ran deep: Wei accepted bribes across a five-year tenure, while Li both took and offered them, and investigations following Li's removal swept up multiple Rocket Force commanders beneath them.
- Xi's anti-corruption campaign, now in its fourteenth year, has punished over one million officials, but the sentencing of two consecutive defence ministers signals an escalation into the most elite circles of power.
- The two-year reprieve attached to both sentences keeps the outcome deliberately suspended — commutation or execution remains possible — a calculated ambiguity that amplifies the message without closing the door.
- The convictions raise uncomfortable questions about systemic oversight: if men personally selected by Xi and trusted with China's nuclear arsenal could engage in pervasive graft, the problem was never merely individual.
On Thursday, a Chinese military court sentenced former defence ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu to death with a two-year reprieve, the culmination of investigations that began with their expulsion from the Communist Party in 2024. Wei was convicted of accepting bribes during his tenure from 2018 to 2023; Li, whose time in office lasted only a matter of months after Xi personally appointed him, faced the graver charge of both accepting and offering them.
The two men share more than their titles. Both had previously commanded the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force — the strategic missile branch Xi created in 2015 — before ascending to the defence ministry. When Li was removed from office, the investigations did not stop with him. A cascade of charges followed against senior Rocket Force commanders, suggesting the corruption had taken root across one of China's most strategically vital institutions.
Their convictions belong to the broader architecture of Xi's anti-corruption campaign, launched in 2012 and now among the most extensive political purges in modern Chinese history. More than one million officials have been punished under its reach, including scores of military generals. The campaign has served simultaneously as moral renewal and political consolidation — a mechanism for removing rivals while reshaping the party in Xi's image.
That both Wei and Li sat on the Central Military Commission, the body Xi himself chairs, makes their fall all the more striking. These were not peripheral figures caught in routine misconduct; they occupied the summit of Chinese military power. The two-year reprieve written into their sentences leaves their ultimate fate unresolved — a conditional justice that is itself a form of message, delivered with the precision that only a state in full control of its own narrative can manage.
China's military court handed down death sentences with a two-year reprieve on Thursday to Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, two former defence ministers who served under President Xi Jinping. The sentences came after both men were expelled from the Communist Party in 2024 on corruption charges. Wei was convicted of accepting bribes; Li faced the more serious charge of both accepting and offering them. The rulings, announced through state media, mark the culmination of a years-long investigation into two of China's most senior military figures.
Wei held the defence ministry portfolio from 2018 until 2023, when Li succeeded him in the role. Li's tenure proved remarkably brief—he served only a few months before his removal. Both men shared a significant connection: they had each led the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force, the strategic missile command that Xi established in 2015 as part of his broader military restructuring. Wei had headed the force from its creation in 2015 until 2017, before moving into the civilian defence ministry. Li, by contrast, was personally selected by Xi himself for the top defence post, a sign of the president's confidence that would prove misplaced.
The corruption that ensnared both men unfolded within the highest echelons of China's military establishment. After Li's removal from office, a cascade of investigations followed. Several of the Rocket Force's top officials were subsequently removed and charged with corruption offenses of their own, suggesting the graft extended beyond the two former ministers into the broader command structure. The pattern points to systemic problems within one of China's most strategically important military branches.
These convictions fit squarely within Xi's larger anti-corruption crusade, a campaign he launched upon taking power in 2012 that has now spanned more than a decade. The scale of that effort is staggering: over one million officials have been punished under its auspices, including numerous military generals. The campaign has become a defining feature of Xi's governance, presented both as a moral cleansing of the party and as a consolidation of his own authority. By removing rivals and potential challengers through corruption investigations, Xi has reshaped the party and military in his image.
The fact that both Wei and Li served on the Central Military Commission—the body that Xi himself heads—underscores how thoroughly the anti-corruption campaign has penetrated even the most elite circles of power. These were not minor officials caught in routine graft; they were men who sat at the apex of China's military decision-making. Their fall from grace, announced through official channels with the precision of state media, sends a clear message about the consequences of corruption at the highest levels. Yet it also raises questions about oversight and accountability within a system where power flows so heavily toward a single leader. The two-year reprieve built into their sentences leaves open the possibility of commutation or execution, a detail that underscores the conditional nature of justice in China's political system.
Notable Quotes
Wei was convicted of accepting bribes; Li was convicted of both accepting and offering bribes— China's military court ruling
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would Xi personally select someone for defence minister only to have him convicted of corruption months later? Doesn't that reflect poorly on Xi's judgment?
It does raise that question, but the timing matters. Li was selected, served briefly, and then removed. The investigation came later. In Xi's system, removing someone and then prosecuting them can actually demonstrate strength—it shows he's willing to purge even his own picks if they prove corrupt. The narrative becomes about his vigilance, not his poor judgment.
And Wei—he headed the Rocket Force from the start, then became defence minister. How does someone in that position for years not get caught earlier?
That's the real puzzle. Wei was in sensitive positions for a long time. The fact that the investigation happened after he left office, and after Li's removal triggered a broader purge of the Rocket Force, suggests the corruption may have been systemic and hard to detect from outside. Or it wasn't a priority until it became politically useful to investigate.
Over a million officials punished in this campaign. Does that number feel real to you, or is it inflated?
It's real in the sense that China has genuinely removed and prosecuted large numbers of people. But "punished" is broad—it includes everything from warnings to execution. The scale is real; what it means is harder to pin down. It's both a genuine anti-corruption effort and a tool for consolidating power.
The two-year reprieve—what does that actually mean for them?
It's a sentence that can be commuted or carried out. It gives the state flexibility. They're not free, but they're not dead yet. It's a form of control that keeps them in limbo, and it keeps the threat alive.