China weathered the initial shock better than any regional peer
When American and Israeli strikes killed Iran's supreme leader in late February, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz became a test of which nations had prepared for the world they feared rather than the one they hoped for. China, having spent years stockpiling oil and building the world's largest renewable energy base, passed that test while its neighbors struggled. In the unfolding geography of great-power competition, crises do not merely disrupt — they reveal, and sometimes reward, those who anticipated them.
- Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the killing of Khamenei sent energy prices soaring, cutting off roughly 80% of Asia's oil and 90% of its LNG in a single stroke.
- India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian economies scrambled for supply at inflated prices, exposing the fragility of energy systems built on uninterrupted Middle Eastern flows.
- China's 104-day oil reserve buffer and 1.4 terawatts of operational renewable capacity absorbed the shock that left its regional competitors reeling.
- As panicked nations rushed to build out clean energy alternatives, they turned to China — the dominant supplier of solar panels, batteries, and EVs — driving a 110% surge in Chinese EV exports and a 60% jump in solar shipments.
- Beijing is now leveraging the crisis diplomatically, casting American military involvement as a source of global instability while positioning itself as the indispensable architect of the world's energy future.
When US and Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, Iran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz — the chokepoint through which roughly 80 percent of Asia's oil normally flows. For most of the continent, the resulting price shock was a crisis. For China, it was closer to a confirmation of strategy.
A report by Asia Group examined how the four largest Asian economies weathered the disruption. The verdict was unambiguous: China alone emerged as a clear winner. The foundation of that resilience was built years in advance. Beijing had aggressively expanded its crude stockpiles in 2025 when prices were still low, accumulating reserves sufficient to cover 104 days of imports — a buffer that shielded the country while neighbors scrambled at inflated prices.
Beyond oil reserves, China's extraordinary renewable buildout proved equally decisive. In 2025 alone, it installed 315 gigawatts of new solar capacity — more than half the global total — bringing its operational renewable base to 1.4 terawatts. When the strait closed and fossil fuel prices spiked, China's diversified energy base absorbed the blow rather than transmitting it.
The crisis then accelerated a global clean energy transition that plays entirely to China's industrial strengths. Nations rushing to reduce fossil fuel dependence found themselves turning to the one country that controls solar, battery, and EV supply chains. Chinese EV exports surged over 110 percent year-on-year in May; solar shipments jumped 60 percent in April. China has been flooding global markets with these technologies at low prices — alarming Western governments, but cementing Beijing's role as the indispensable supplier of the energy transition.
Geopolitically, Beijing has framed American involvement in the Middle East as a destabilizing force that imposes costs on the world, positioning itself as the rational, prepared alternative. Some analysts caution against reading every American difficulty as a Chinese gain — China has little appetite for taking on the costly role of Middle East security guarantor. The Hormuz closure may also give Beijing pause about Taiwan, as the episode illustrated the dangers of contested maritime chokepoints. Still, the Asia Group's assessment suggests Beijing views these as manageable complications within a broader picture of strategic advantage.
When the United States and Israel struck Iranian military and government targets on February 28, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the consequences rippled far beyond the Middle East. Iran's response was to choke off the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly 80 percent of Asia's oil and nearly 90 percent of its liquefied natural gas normally flows. The closure sent global energy prices soaring. For most of Asia, it was a crisis. For China, it was something closer to vindication.
A report released this week by Asia Group, a geopolitical consulting firm, examined how the world's four largest Asian economies—China, India, Japan, and South Korea—along with emerging markets across Southeast Asia, weathered the shock. The conclusion was stark: China emerged as the sole clear winner. While its neighbors scrambled to secure energy supplies at inflated prices, China's combination of strategic foresight and industrial dominance allowed it not merely to survive the disruption but to benefit from it.
The foundation of China's resilience lay in decisions made years earlier. The country has long maintained substantial crude oil reserves, and in 2025, when global prices were still relatively cheap, Beijing aggressively expanded these stockpiles. Chinese crude imports that year reached 11.6 million barrels per day, with over 80 percent of the increase flowing directly into storage. By January of this year, China had accumulated enough reserves to cover 104 days of imports at 2025 consumption levels—a buffer that insulated the country from the price shocks that hammered energy-dependent neighbors.
But oil reserves alone do not explain China's advantage. Over the past several years, Beijing has undertaken an extraordinary buildout of renewable energy infrastructure. In 2025 alone, China installed 315 gigawatts of new solar capacity—more than half of all new solar capacity added globally that year. The year before, it had added 277 gigawatts. These investments have created a renewable energy base of 1.4 terawatts already operational, with Beijing targeting half of China's total energy supply to come from non-fossil sources by 2030. Though coal still accounts for more than 50 percent of China's energy mix, the trajectory is unmistakable. When the Strait of Hormuz closed and oil prices spiked, China's renewable capacity meant the shock was absorbed rather than felt acutely.
The crisis has also accelerated a global shift toward clean energy that plays directly to China's existing strengths. As other nations rushed to expand their renewable capacity and electric vehicle production in response to the energy crisis, they turned to the one country that dominates the supply chains for these technologies. China controls the manufacturing and export of solar panels, batteries, and related equipment. In May, Chinese electric vehicle exports surged more than 110 percent compared to the previous year. Solar shipments in April jumped 60 percent. Beijing has been exporting this technology at low prices, flooding global markets in a way that has alarmed Western governments worried about their own industries, but which has cemented China's position as the indispensable supplier of the world's energy transition.
Geopolitically, the crisis has handed Beijing a narrative gift. While Trump administration officials have claimed that the United States and China are aligned in seeking a Middle East ceasefire, the Asia Group report notes that Beijing has seized the opportunity to portray American involvement in the region as destabilizing—a force that imposes costs on the entire world. China has called for a ceasefire while positioning itself as the rational actor, the country whose energy strategy and industrial capacity allow it to weather global shocks that others cannot.
Yet there are complications. Some analysts caution that viewing every American setback as a Chinese gain oversimplifies the picture. Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, notes that China has no interest in replacing the United States as the dominant security provider in the Middle East—a role that would be costly and destabilizing for Beijing. Additionally, the crisis may have given Chinese leadership pause about military action elsewhere. The difficulty of moving ships through hostile territory, demonstrated by Iran's closure of the strait, could factor into Beijing's calculations about a potential military assault on Taiwan. The Asia Group's assessment, however, suggests that Beijing views these complications not as existential threats but as manageable challenges—and as opportunities to be exploited.
Citas Notables
Beijing views the pain points not as existential threats, but as challenges to be managed and even opportunities to be exploited— Asia Group report
The crisis allows Beijing to cast the United States as the destabilising actor whose Middle East entanglements impose costs on the world— Asia Group report
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does China's oil stockpile matter so much here? Couldn't any country have done the same?
They could have, but they didn't. China made the decision years ago to build reserves, and then doubled down in 2025 when prices were low. Most countries don't think that way—they buy energy when they need it. China was patient.
So it's just about having more oil stored up?
That's part of it, but the real advantage is the combination. The stockpiles buy time. The renewables mean you don't need as much oil in the first place. Together, they create a kind of immunity that other countries don't have.
What about India and Japan? They're large economies too.
They're exposed in ways China isn't. They import far more oil relative to their reserves, and they haven't built renewable capacity at China's scale. When prices spike, they feel it immediately. China absorbs the shock.
Does this mean China is now more powerful?
It's more complicated than that. China has gained leverage in energy markets and clean technology. But the report hints at something else—China now has to think carefully about Taiwan, because the strait crisis showed how vulnerable shipping lanes can be.
So the crisis could actually make China more cautious?
Possibly. Military action in the Taiwan Strait would face similar risks. That's not a win for China, even if everything else about this crisis has been.
What does China want people to think about all this?
That the United States destabilizes the world, and China manages crises responsibly. That's the narrative Beijing is pushing. Whether it's true is another question.