The international community shares a common concern over restoring normal passage
At a crossroads of energy and empire, China's foreign minister pressed Iran this week to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow passage through which a fifth of the world's traded oil once flowed freely. The meeting in Beijing, the first of its kind since the war began, was less a bilateral conversation than a rehearsal for the larger stage: Donald Trump's imminent arrival in China for a summit that may determine whether diplomacy or blockade defines the next chapter of the conflict. In the long history of great powers managing smaller ones, Beijing is attempting something delicate — to be indispensable to both sides without becoming captive to either.
- The Strait of Hormuz has been closed since the war began, and every day it stays shut, the world's oil markets hold their breath.
- China imports 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil daily, making the blockade not just a geopolitical problem but a direct threat to Beijing's energy lifeline.
- Wang Yi pressed Iran's foreign minister in Beijing to reopen the strait and commit to a lasting ceasefire — framing Chinese self-interest as a universal humanitarian concern.
- The meeting carries symbolic weight: it was Araqchi's first trip to Beijing since the fighting started, signaling that diplomatic channels between Iran and China remain open.
- Trump's planned summit with Xi — the first US presidential visit to China in nearly a decade — looms over everything, with both sides already crediting Beijing for brokering a previous ceasefire.
- Trump publicly praised Xi's restraint while implying he holds personal leverage, a confidence that has yet to be tested face-to-face.
On a Wednesday in May, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi sat down in Beijing with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqchi and turned the conversation immediately to the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow passage between Iran and Oman through which roughly a fifth of the world's traded oil once moved freely. Blockaded on both sides since the war began, the strait has become the hinge of global energy politics, and Wang made clear that China wanted it open again, and soon.
Araqchi's visit was itself a signal — his first trip to Beijing since the fighting started, suggesting that diplomatic warmth between the two countries had survived the conflict. Wang pressed three connected ideas: that a lasting ceasefire was urgent, that the strait needed to be navigable again, and that China stood ready to help lower the temperature. He framed the reopening not as a Chinese interest alone but as a shared global concern, calling on all relevant parties to respond quickly.
The timing was charged. A week later, Donald Trump was scheduled to arrive in Beijing for a summit with Xi Jinping — the first visit by a sitting US president to China in nearly a decade. Both Trump and Iranian officials had already credited Beijing with brokering an April ceasefire, and the strait was certain to dominate the agenda. China's stake was concrete: it had been importing 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil per day, roughly 12 percent of its total consumption, and the blockade threatened that supply directly.
Yet Wang kept his public framing elevated — safe passage for all nations, not just Chinese tankers. He also praised Iran's stated commitment against pursuing nuclear weapons, a gesture positioning Beijing as a sponsor of Iranian legitimacy rather than merely a buyer of its oil. For months, China had tried to mediate without appearing to take sides, urging both Washington and Tehran toward talks while avoiding deeper entanglement.
Trump, speaking from the White House that same week, said Xi had been 'very respectful' and that China had not challenged the United States — projecting confidence that his personal relationship with Xi gave him leverage. Whether that confidence would hold once the two leaders were in the same room remained an open question. What was certain was that the closed, contested, and economically vital strait would sit at the center of everything.
Beijing's foreign minister sat down with his Iranian counterpart in the Chinese capital on a Wednesday in May, and the conversation turned immediately to a waterway that has become the hinge of global energy politics. Wang Yi pressed Abbas Araqchi to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage between Iran and Oman through which roughly a fifth of the world's traded oil moves each year. The strait has been largely closed since the war began—blockaded on both sides, by Iran and by the United States—and Wang made clear that China wanted it open again, and soon.
Araqchi was making his first trip to Beijing since the fighting started, a signal in itself that diplomatic channels were still warm. Wang used the occasion to push three connected ideas: that a lasting ceasefire was urgent, that the strait needed to be navigable again, and that China stood ready to help lower the temperature. He framed the reopening not as a Chinese interest alone but as something the whole world wanted. "The international community shares a common concern," Wang said, according to the official readout, "and China hopes relevant parties will respond as soon as possible."
The timing mattered. A week after this meeting, Donald Trump was scheduled to arrive in Beijing for a summit with Xi Jinping—the first visit by a sitting US president to China in nearly a decade. The Iran war and the blocked strait were certain to be on the agenda. Both Trump and Iranian officials had already given credit to Beijing for brokering a Pakistan-mediated ceasefire in April, a diplomatic win that suggested China's voice still carried weight with all sides.
China's interest in the strait was not abstract. The country had become a major buyer of Iranian oil despite American sanctions, importing 1.38 million barrels a day in 2025—roughly 12 percent of everything China consumed. The blockade threatened that supply. Yet Wang's public framing stayed focused on the broader principle: safe passage for all nations, not just Chinese tankers. He also took the opportunity to praise Iran's stated commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, a gesture meant to show that Beijing saw Iran as a responsible actor worth supporting.
For months, China had tried to walk a careful line—offering to mediate without appearing to take sides, urging both Washington and Tehran toward the negotiating table while avoiding the kind of entanglement that might draw Beijing into the conflict itself. Wang reiterated that position on Wednesday, emphasizing again that talks were the only path forward. Araqchi, for his part, told Wang that cooperation between the two countries would only deepen, a message carried back through Iranian state media.
Trump, speaking to reporters at the White House that same week, offered his own assessment of China's role. He said Xi had been "very respectful" and that the US had not been challenged by Beijing. The implication was clear: Trump believed he had leverage, that Xi would not push back because of his personal relationship with the American president. Whether that confidence would hold once the two leaders were in the same room remained to be seen. What was certain was that the Strait of Hormuz—closed, contested, and economically vital—would be at the center of their conversation.
Citas Notables
China believes that achieving a comprehensive ceasefire is an urgent priority, while reopening hostilities would be even more undesirable.— Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister
We haven't been challenged by China. Xi would not challenge the US because of me.— Donald Trump, US President
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does China care so much about this particular waterway? It's not like they own it.
They don't own it, but they depend on it. A third of their oil comes through there. When it closes, their economy feels it immediately. But there's more—they're also trying to show they can solve problems the US can't.
So this is about proving something?
Partly. But it's also real. If the strait stays closed, global oil prices spike, and that hurts everyone, including China. Wang Yi isn't being generous here—he's being practical. A working strait is a Chinese interest.
The article mentions Trump will visit. Does that change what China is trying to do?
It changes the stakes. If Trump and Xi meet and the strait is still closed, it looks like neither of them can deliver. If China can help reopen it before Trump arrives, it's a win for Beijing going into the summit. It's leverage.
And Iran? What do they get out of this?
Legitimacy, mostly. If China is publicly supporting them and pushing for negotiations, it suggests Iran isn't completely isolated. And if the strait reopens, their oil can flow again. That's worth a lot.
Is there any chance this actually works?
China has already brokered one ceasefire that both sides accepted. So yes, there's a real chance. But it depends on whether Trump and Xi actually want the same outcome, and whether either of them is willing to make concessions.