Ex-military chief urges Burnham to pass 'Moscow test' on defence spending

Almost like a wartime prime minister at the moment
Radakin describes the mental posture required of Britain's next leader to address global threats and strengthen NATO credibility.

As Britain prepares to name a new prime minister and publish a long-delayed defence spending plan, a former military chief has reframed the question of national leadership in terms that reach beyond domestic politics. Admiral Sir Tony Radakin's 'Moscow test' asks not what a policy means to a local constituency, but what it signals to adversaries and allies watching from abroad. The gap between what the military says it needs and what the Treasury appears willing to fund is not merely a budget dispute — it is a question of whether Britain's commitments to its allies are promises or performances. The Defence Investment Plan, due before a NATO summit in early July, will offer the first honest answer.

  • The resignation of both the Defence Secretary and the Armed Forces Minister this month signals that the gap between military need and Treasury offer — reportedly £28 billion requested, £10 billion offered — has already broken the government's internal consensus.
  • Admiral Radakin painted an unsparing picture of underfunding in practice: ships unable to leave port, aircraft grounded for lack of spare parts, armoured vehicles sitting idle — a military described as 'too bare' to honour its alliance commitments.
  • With a NATO summit in Turkey set for July 7th, the Defence Investment Plan must be published under intense international scrutiny, transforming a domestic budget negotiation into a test of Britain's credibility as a nuclear power and alliance partner.
  • Frontrunner Andy Burnham, who has built his political identity around local accountability, now faces a demand from military leadership to adopt a different frame entirely — one measured not in constituency approval but in how Britain appears to Moscow.
  • Incoming Defence Secretary Dan Jarvis insists the refreshed plan will prioritise frontline capability, including lethal strike drones, but Radakin's warning is clear: understanding the stakes is not the same as having the will to meet them.

Andy Burnham, widely expected to become Britain's next prime minister, has long measured policy worth against what he calls the Makerfield test — a local accountability standard rooted in the Manchester constituency he represents. Now, a former military chief is proposing a harder measure: the Moscow test.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, until recently Chief of the Defence Staff, argued on the BBC that whoever succeeds Sir Keir Starmer must ask what Britain looks like to its adversaries. Does it appear credible within NATO? Does it project the strength of a nuclear power? Does it stand as a reliable partner to America? These, Radakin said, are the questions that actually determine national safety — a deliberate shift from local politics to geopolitical survival.

His intervention lands at a moment of real fracture within government. The Defence Investment Plan — a roadmap for military funding through the coming years — must be published before a NATO summit in Turkey on July 7th. But the process has already claimed casualties. Defence Secretary John Healey and Armed Forces Minister Al Carns both resigned earlier this month, saying the proposed investment fell short of what the military requires. Reports indicate the Ministry of Defence sought an additional £28 billion through the decade's end and was offered £10 billion — a shortfall that Healey warned would force operational cutbacks rather than genuine strengthening.

Radakin was direct about what underfunding looks like in practice: ships docked for lack of maintenance funds, aircraft grounded, armoured vehicles unavailable. Britain's capabilities, he said, are 'too bare.' This is not a question of ambition — it is a question of whether the country can honour what it has promised its allies.

The government has committed to raising defence spending to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035, and spending has already risen under Starmer. But the distance between that pledge and the current plan is where the real argument lives. New Defence Secretary Dan Jarvis has promised the refreshed plan will prioritise frontline capability, including new strike drones, and has vouched that Burnham grasps the stakes.

Radakin's point, however, is that grasping the stakes is not sufficient. The next prime minister, he said, must operate almost like a wartime leader — willing to subordinate other priorities, to make difficult choices about where money flows, to accept that some departments must lose so that defence can gain. The Moscow test is his way of saying the next leader will be judged not by what resonates in any constituency, but by whether Britain remains credible to those who might threaten it — and those who depend on it.

Andy Burnham, the frontrunner to become Britain's next prime minister, has long said that any policy worth pursuing must pass what he calls the Makerfield test—a reference to the Manchester constituency he represents. Now, as the government prepares to release its long-awaited defence spending plan, a former military leader is proposing an additional measure: the Moscow test.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, who until recently served as Chief of the Defence Staff, made the case on the BBC that whoever takes over from Sir Keir Starmer must ask themselves a harder question than domestic politics allows. What does Britain look like to Moscow? Does the country appear as a credible member of NATO? Does it project the strength of a nuclear power? Does it stand as a reliable ally to America? These, Radakin argued, are the things that actually keep the nation safe. The framing is deliberate: it shifts the lens from local concerns to geopolitical survival, from the particular to the existential.

Radakin's intervention arrives at a moment of genuine tension within government. The Defence Investment Plan, which will lay out how Britain intends to fund its military over the coming years, has been the subject of intense negotiation in Whitehall. The government has committed to publishing it before a NATO summit in Turkey on July 7th. But the plan's contents have already sparked resignations. Both Defence Secretary John Healey and Armed Forces Minister Al Carns stepped down earlier this month, citing what they described as insufficient investment. Reports suggest the Ministry of Defence requested an additional £28 billion through the end of the decade but was offered only £10 billion—a gap that Healey said would force operational cutbacks rather than the strengthening the military needs.

The underlying dispute is not abstract. Radakin spoke plainly about what underfunding means in practice. Ships sit in port because there is no money for maintenance. Aircraft cannot fly because spare parts and upkeep are starved of resources. Tanks and armoured vehicles remain unavailable for operations. The military's capabilities, he said, are "too bare." This is not a matter of ambition or aspiration; it is a question of whether Britain can do what it has promised its allies it will do.

The government has pledged, along with most other NATO members, to increase defence spending to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035. Under Starmer's leadership, spending has already risen. But the gap between the pledge and the plan appears to be where the real argument lives. Dan Jarvis, Healey's successor as Defence Secretary, has said the refreshed plan will "prioritise getting the latest kit" to front-line forces, including new lethal strike drones. He has also insisted that Burnham, should he become prime minister, understands the stakes and will make national security his first priority.

Yet Radakin's framing suggests that understanding is not enough. A prime minister, he said, must operate "almost like a wartime prime minister" in the current moment. That is not metaphor. It is a description of the mental posture required: the willingness to subordinate other concerns, to make hard choices about resource allocation, to accept that some departments will lose money so that defence can gain it. The Moscow test is his way of saying that the next leader will be judged not by what plays well in Makerfield or any other constituency, but by whether Britain remains credible to those who might threaten it and those who depend on it. The Defence Investment Plan, when it arrives, will be the first real measure of whether that test can be passed.

What do we look like to Moscow? Do we look like a strong member of the NATO alliance? Do we look like a strong nuclear power? Do we look like a strong ally of America?
— Admiral Sir Tony Radakin
The UK's military capabilities are too bare, lacking sufficient funding for day-to-day operations, maintenance, and equipment availability
— Admiral Sir Tony Radakin
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Inventor

Why does Radakin frame this as a "Moscow test" rather than simply saying the military needs more money?

Model

Because money alone doesn't answer the question. You can spend billions and still look weak if you're divided or uncertain. Moscow watches how you behave, what you commit to, whether you follow through. It's about credibility.

Inventor

But Burnham hasn't said he disagrees with the 3.5 percent target. So what's the actual test?

Model

The test is whether he'll actually fund it when the bills come due. Healey and Carns resigned because they saw the draft plan falling short. That's the real moment—when you have to choose between other priorities and defence.

Inventor

Is Radakin suggesting Burnham might fail that test?

Model

He's not accusing him. He's warning him. There's a difference. He's saying: this is what the job demands. Don't underestimate it.

Inventor

What does "too bare" actually mean in military terms?

Model

It means the armed forces can't sustain themselves. Ships can't leave port because there's no money for fuel and repairs. Aircraft are grounded. Vehicles sit idle. You have the equipment but not the resources to use it.

Inventor

So the real problem isn't the Defence Investment Plan itself, but the gap between what was asked for and what was offered?

Model

Exactly. The MoD asked for £28 billion more. They got £10 billion. That gap is where the real argument is—and where the Moscow test actually gets decided.

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