Brazil activates uncontracted thermal plants to avert power rationing amid drought

Energy is scarce and expensive—everyone could help conserve
A consumer advocate's suggestion that the government rejected, choosing instead to quietly activate expensive backup power plants.

Beneath the surface of Brazil's energy emergency lies an older and recurring tension: a civilization built upon the abundance of water now confronting its limits. Facing its worst drought in years, the government is awakening idle thermal power plants to spare what remains in its hydroelectric reservoirs, hoping technology and policy can substitute for rain. Officials insist catastrophe is not imminent, yet the numbers, the forecasts, and the political anxiety gathering around the 2022 elections suggest a nation navigating between denial and genuine reckoning.

  • Hydroelectric reservoirs have fallen to historic lows as Brazil endures its most severe drought in years, threatening the backbone of a power grid that depends overwhelmingly on water.
  • Idle merchant thermal plants — facilities with no active contracts and no operations — are being rushed into service as an emergency buffer, with the government offering better payment terms to make activation worthwhile.
  • Officials flatly deny any risk of blackouts or rationing, yet rainfall in May came in below normal and forecasters expect the deficit to persist for at least three more months.
  • Dam operators are being allowed to hold back more water than usual, sacrificing downstream agriculture and fishing communities in the short term to preserve electricity generation capacity.
  • Market analysts warn that even if rationing is avoided, electricity supply could become a hard ceiling on economic recovery if growth accelerates into peak demand seasons.
  • A high-level emergency task force spanning seven ministries has been assembled, with political stakes sharpened by declining presidential approval ratings and the looming shadow of the 2022 election.

Brazil's energy ministry moved to authorize contracts with thermal power plants that had been sitting dormant — facilities previously confined to short-term markets with no active operations. The trigger was a drought of historic severity that had drained the hydroelectric reservoirs supplying most of the country's electricity to levels rarely seen before. By bringing these plants online, the government hoped to generate enough electricity to ease pressure on the dams and avoid rationing altogether.

Under the new framework, the National Electric System Operator could activate these plants at will rather than negotiating each case individually. Executive Secretary Marisete Pereira offered reassurances that the situation bore no resemblance to the blackout crisis of 2001, noting that thermal activation had already been underway since October. Rationing, she insisted, was not on the table. Yet rainfall in May had fallen short of normal, and forecasters expected the shortfall to continue for three more months — a forecast that sat uneasily alongside official optimism.

The Electric Sector Monitoring Committee proposed allowing major dams to retain more water than their usual operating rules required, temporarily reducing the releases that sustain downstream farming and fishing. The committee planned to reassess conditions weekly. Officials acknowledged that thermal generation was costly but said they were exploring blends of natural gas, biomass, and fuel oil to find the most affordable mix, with biomass becoming more competitive during harvest season.

Analysts stopped short of predicting rationing but cautioned that electricity could become a genuine constraint if the economy accelerated. The sharpest pressure points were peak demand hours — winter evenings and summer afternoons — when consumption surged. Distribution companies believed the moment called for public conservation messaging, and Paulo Pedrosa of the Association of Large Energy Consumers argued that Brazilians deserved to be told plainly that energy was scarce and expensive. The presidential palace and the energy ministry's technical team rejected that framing.

Behind the policy debate sat an unmistakable political calculation. An emergency task force drawing together seven ministries was assembled to manage the crisis. In the Northeast, falling river levels threatened drinking water supplies and the livelihoods of fishing communities — constituencies whose representatives in Congress were already restless. With President Bolsonaro's approval ratings sliding and the 2022 election approaching, an energy crisis layered atop a pandemic was a risk the government was determined, at almost any cost, to prevent.

Brazil's energy ministry was preparing to issue new rules that would allow the government to contract with thermal power plants that had been sitting idle, a move born of genuine desperation. The country was facing its worst drought in years, and the hydroelectric reservoirs that supply most of the nation's electricity had fallen to historically low levels. These so-called merchant thermal plants—facilities that had previously sold power only on short-term markets and now had no contracts and no operations—represented a potential lifeline.

The strategy was straightforward: bring these plants online to generate electricity and thereby preserve the water sitting behind the dams. Under the new rules, the National Electric System Operator could activate these plants whenever it deemed necessary, rather than having to negotiate case by case. The energy ministry's executive secretary, Marisete Pereira, said the government would offer better payment terms to make the arrangement attractive to plant operators. The goal was to expand thermal generation capacity enough to avoid rationing altogether.

Pereira insisted the situation, while serious, was not approaching the catastrophe of 2001, when Brazil had suffered widespread blackouts. She pointed out that the government had been activating thermal plants since October and was monitoring conditions closely. There was no risk of blackouts, she said, and with these new measures, rationing would not be necessary. Yet the numbers told a different story. Rainfall in May had fallen below normal, and forecasters expected that pattern to continue for the next three months. The National Electric System Operator's data showed reservoirs at levels not seen in recent memory.

On Thursday of that week, the Electric Sector Monitoring Committee had proposed relaxing operational restrictions on major dams to allow them to hold back more water. These facilities were normally required to maintain minimum water releases to support downstream agriculture, cities, and fishing. The new approach would let them retain more water for power generation, with the committee planning to reassess weekly based on rainfall patterns and reservoir conditions.

The government acknowledged that merchant thermal plants were expensive to operate, but officials said they were exploring ways to blend different energy sources—natural gas, biomass, fuel oil—to find the most cost-effective mix. During harvest season, for instance, biomass-generated electricity became more competitive. The ministry said it was not planning emergency energy purchases at this moment, though that option remained available.

Market analysts believed Brazil was not yet on the brink of rationing, but they warned that electricity supply could become a serious constraint if the economy began growing rapidly. The real concern was meeting demand during peak hours—early evening in winter when televisions and showers ran simultaneously, and early afternoon in summer when air conditioning demand spiked. Representatives of power distribution companies thought the situation was grave enough to warrant public messaging about conservation, or at least announcements encouraging people to shift their consumption away from peak times.

Paulo Pedrosa, president of the Association of Large Energy Consumers, suggested the government should simply tell the public that energy was scarce and expensive, allowing everyone to make informed decisions about conservation. But the energy ministry's technical team and the presidential palace had rejected that approach. In Congress, lawmakers were anxious about the political fallout of an energy crisis unfolding during a pandemic and an election year.

The presidential office created an emergency task force to manage the crisis, bringing together ministers from economy, infrastructure, agriculture, communications, regional development, environment, and the attorney general's office. The political calculation was clear: in the Northeast especially, low river levels threatened water intake for cities and fish stocks for fishing communities. With congressional representatives from the centrist bloc and agricultural caucus worried about irrigation capacity and rural livelihoods, and with President Jair Bolsonaro's approval ratings declining as he prepared for reelection, the last thing the government needed was another crisis derailing the campaign.

We have been taking measures since October. We were already activating thermal plants. We are very attentive.
— Marisete Pereira, executive secretary of the Energy Ministry
Perhaps it would be more correct to tell the population that energy is scarce and the price is higher, so everyone can conserve.
— Paulo Pedrosa, president of the Association of Large Energy Consumers
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Inventor

Why activate these merchant plants now instead of earlier, when they might have been cheaper to operate?

Model

The government had been turning them on since October, but only case by case. The new rule removes that friction—the operator can just flip the switch whenever needed. It's about speed and flexibility when you're watching reservoirs drain.

Inventor

Is this actually a drought, or is it a failure of planning?

Model

Both, probably. The rainfall is genuinely below normal and expected to stay that way. But the real issue is that Brazil built its entire system around hydropower, and when the rains don't come, there's no backup. Thermal plants are expensive, which is why they were left idle in the first place.

Inventor

Why did officials deny the risk of blackouts so firmly?

Model

Politics. It's an election year. Bolsonaro's popularity is already weak, and a second crisis—first the pandemic, now this—looks like incompetence. Saying "we have it under control" is safer than admitting you might need to ration power.

Inventor

But if they're really worried, why not just tell people to use less electricity?

Model

That's what the consumer groups wanted. But the government rejected it. Admitting scarcity is an admission of failure. It's easier to quietly activate expensive plants and hope the rains come back.

Inventor

What happens if they don't?

Model

Then you're burning through money on thermal generation, and eventually you either ration anyway or you face blackouts. The weekly monitoring of reservoir levels suggests they're preparing for either outcome.

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