Israel needed assurance that its security wouldn't be threatened by withdrawal.
Two administrations, separated by an election, arrived at nearly the same blueprint for governing postwar Gaza — and yet the plan remains unbuilt. Antony Blinken spent fifteen months assembling a fragile architecture of international commitment, Arab funding, and Palestinian reform, only to see it dissolve when political power shifted. Trump inherited the structure and simplified it, trading difficult obligations for easier endorsements, but the troops have not arrived, the money has not flowed, and Gaza's future remains as unresolved as the morning after October 7 made it.
- Hamas's October 7 attack was designed in part to destroy the Saudi-Israeli normalization effort Blinken was days away from finalizing — and it succeeded.
- Blinken's 14-point Transitional Mission was a carefully balanced web of security guarantees, Palestinian statehood commitments, and Arab financial pledges that required every party to accept something painful.
- Trump's election instantly drained the leverage needed to hold those commitments together, and Blinken left office handing his blueprint to an administration that had never fully believed in it.
- The Trump team kept the skeleton of Blinken's plan but removed its most demanding bones — softening statehood language and sidelining the Palestinian Authority to make Israeli acceptance easier.
- The UN Security Council endorsed the resulting framework, but promised troops have not materialized, Arab enthusiasm has cooled, and phase two negotiations remain deadlocked.
- Millions of displaced Palestinians wait inside a governance vacuum, while the structural conditions that produced October 7 continue unreformed beneath the surface of a declared peace.
In the days before October 7, 2023, Antony Blinken was in the final stretch of a diplomatic effort to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords. Then Hamas attacked, and the entire architecture of Middle Eastern diplomacy collapsed in a single morning. Documents later recovered from Gaza confirmed that destroying the normalization effort was among the attack's explicit goals. To a significant degree, it worked.
Blinken pivoted to crisis management but never abandoned the question of what would come after the war. By the fall of 2024, he had assembled a 14-point plan — a Transitional Mission built on international troops, Arab funding, Palestinian Authority reforms, and a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco had all made commitments. The plan was intricate and fragile: give Israel security guarantees, give Palestinians a route to statehood, give Arab states a stake in the outcome, and revive the dream of Saudi-Israeli normalization as the reward.
Then Trump won the November election, and the leverage required to hold those commitments together evaporated. The Biden White House had never fully embraced Blinken's approach, and by January he was out of office, delivering a farewell speech and hoping the incoming administration would carry the work forward.
Remarkably, Trump did not discard the framework. Working with Tony Blair and Jared Kushner, the new administration adopted much of Blinken's structure while stripping away its most demanding elements. The language on Palestinian statehood softened from requirement to possibility. The Palestinian Authority was largely excluded from interim governance. The result was easier for Israel to accept — but the shortcuts may have undermined the whole.
The UN Security Council endorsed Trump's Board of Peace and International Stabilization Force, and Trump declared peace from the Knesset in October. But promised troops have not arrived. The PA, sidelined, has little reason to cooperate. Arab states, offered only the possibility of Palestinian statehood rather than its promise, have grown less committed to funding Gaza's reconstruction. Phase two negotiations remain stalled, Saudi normalization has receded again, and the cycle that produced October 7 remains unbroken.
In the days before October 7, 2023, Antony Blinken was supposed to be in Israel closing a deal. The secretary of state had spent months working with Saudi Arabia on a document that would lay out what Israel needed to do—modest concessions, mostly—to finally bring Riyadh into the Abraham Accords. It was meant to be transformative. Then Hamas attacked, and the entire architecture of Middle Eastern diplomacy collapsed in a single morning.
Blinken did make it to Israel that week, but not to sign normalization agreements. He came to rally support for a country under siege. Documents later recovered from Gaza would reveal that one of Hamas's explicit goals in launching the attack was to destroy the very Saudi-Israeli normalization effort that Blinken had been building. To a large extent, the terror group succeeded. The Biden administration shelved its regional ambitions and pivoted to immediate crisis management: military support for Israel, negotiations for hostage releases, and the grinding work of trying to end a war that would consume the next fifteen months.
But Blinken never stopped thinking about what came after. While others in the White House focused on getting a ceasefire and freeing the 251 people taken hostage into Gaza, the secretary of state became convinced that planning for Gaza's governance after the war was equally critical. Israel needed assurance that its security wouldn't be threatened by withdrawal. Hamas needed to believe the war would actually end. The answer, Blinken believed, was a detailed blueprint for the day after—a Transitional Mission that would manage Gaza's security, governance, and reconstruction through an international force, with Arab states providing both troops and funding. And if he could make that work, he could resurrect the Saudi normalization talks as a sweetener for Israel to accept the plan.
By the fall of 2024, Blinken had assembled the pieces. A 14-point plan emerged from months of negotiations with Arab allies, Palestinian officials, and Israeli counterparts. Saudi Arabia agreed to finance the mission. The UAE and Qatar committed to troops and money. Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco pledged forces. Italy, Spain, and Indonesia signaled interest. The plan required the Palestinian Authority to reform itself, to govern transparently, to fight corruption. It required Israel to refrain from actions in the West Bank that would undermine a two-state solution. It required all parties to accept that a Palestinian state was not just possible but necessary—the foundation on which everything else would rest. Blinken had even secured verbal commitments from Arab partners to contribute hundreds of millions of dollars monthly to rebuild Gaza and support PA reforms. The plan was intricate, fragile, and theoretically elegant: give Israel the security guarantees it needed, give Palestinians a pathway to statehood, give Arab states a role in their region's future, and resurrect the dream of Saudi-Israeli peace.
Then Trump won the November 2024 election, and the leverage evaporated. The Biden administration's ability to pressure Israel, the PA, and Arab allies to commit to a plan that required difficult compromises simply vanished. The White House itself had never fully backed Blinken's approach, preferring to keep postwar planning separate from ceasefire negotiations to avoid emboldening Hamas. By January, Blinken was out of office, delivering a farewell speech in which he handed off his plan to the incoming administration and hoped for the best.
Trump, remarkably, did not discard the framework. Working with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his adviser Jared Kushner, the new administration adopted much of Blinken's architecture but stripped away the parts that had made it so difficult to sell. The Transitional Mission became a Board of Peace. The multinational force became the International Stabilization Force. The language about Palestinian statehood softened from a requirement to a possibility. The Palestinian Authority, which Blinken had tried to involve from the start, was largely iced out of interim governance. The result was easier for Israel to accept—no ultimatums required, no pressure to part ways with far-right coalition partners. In September 2024, Trump secured endorsements from both Israel and Arab allies for his 20-point plan, two weeks before a ceasefire was actually agreed.
But the shortcut may have cost more than it gained. While the UN Security Council has backed the creation of Trump's Board of Peace and International Stabilization Force, countries have yet to actually contribute troops despite whatever commitments they made before the vote. The PA, excluded from interim governance, has little incentive to cooperate. Arab states, offered only the possibility rather than the promise of Palestinian statehood, have grown less enthusiastic about investing in Gaza's future. Trump declared "now you have peace" from the Knesset in October, but phase two negotiations remain stalled. The dream of Saudi normalization, which seemed within reach on October 6, 2023, has receded once again. Gaza's governance remains uncertain, its reconstruction unfunded, and the cycle that led to October 7 unbroken.
Citas Notables
Israel needed to make sure that October 7 wasn't going to happen again, and that's what we were going to ensure by being behind the multinational force— Senior Biden official, explaining the security logic of the Transitional Mission
Our plan was to confront Bibi with a choice: Either end the war and create a path to a two-state solution and Saudi normalization, or reject what we saw as the only path to longterm security and regional integration— Senior Biden official, describing the administration's strategy if Harris had won the 2024 election
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did Blinken think he could make all these pieces fit together—the Transitional Mission, the Saudi normalization, the PA reforms, the international force?
Because he believed the pieces actually did fit. If you give Israel a credible security guarantee through an international force, you remove its excuse to stay in Gaza. If you give Arab states a role in Gaza's future and a pathway to Palestinian statehood, you get their troops and money. If you tie it all to Saudi normalization, you give Israel something it desperately wants. It was elegant in theory.
But it required everyone to move at once, didn't it? Israel had to accept PA involvement, the PA had to reform itself, Arab states had to commit troops before the war even ended.
Exactly. That's why it was so fragile. The UAE got "skittish" when conversations turned to actual troop numbers. Arab countries wanted to see the war end first, or wanted guarantees about Palestinian statehood before they moved forward. And Netanyahu simply avoided postwar planning for months because it would have forced him to choose between his far-right coalition partners and a two-state solution.
So when Trump came in and softened the language about Palestinian statehood, made it a possibility instead of a requirement, he was actually solving a real problem.
He was solving Israel's problem. But he may have created a different one. Without the requirement for Palestinian statehood, Arab states have less reason to invest. The PA, which Blinken tried to involve from the beginning, is now sidelined. And countries haven't actually sent troops, even though they said they would.
Is it possible that Blinken's version would have worked if Harris had won?
Maybe. The Biden officials believed they could have confronted Netanyahu with a choice: accept the plan and get Saudi normalization, or reject it and face endless war and isolation. But that required leverage, and leverage evaporates the moment the political ground shifts. Trump's victory made that leverage disappear overnight.