Wars no longer end. They are inconclusive and often normalised.
For twelve consecutive years, the world has grown measurably less peaceful — not through sudden catastrophe, but through the slow accumulation of unresolved wars, proliferating technologies of violence, and a civilizational choice to spend on weapons rather than reconciliation. The 2026 Global Peace Index finds 119 of 163 nations more dangerous than they were in 2008, with conflict deaths surpassing 181,000 in a single year and the economic cost of violence approaching $20 trillion. What the data reveals is not merely a security crisis but a failure of collective will — and, quietly, proof that where that will has been exercised, peace has followed.
- Twelve straight years of global decline have made this the longest unbroken deterioration in the Index's history, with 20 countries each recording over 1,000 internal conflict deaths in 2025 alone.
- Wars have stopped ending: decisive military victories collapsed from nearly half of all conflicts in the 1970s to fewer than one in ten by the 2010s, leaving Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Myanmar, and dozens of others in permanent suspension.
- Drone warfare surged 11,500 percent between 2018 and 2025, and terrorism's center of gravity has migrated to West Africa's Sahel — yet military resources and international attention have not followed the violence to its new geography.
- Global military spending hit $2.7 trillion in 2025 while peacebuilding received just 0.5 percent of that sum, a proportion that has nearly halved since 2008 even as the economic cost of violence doubled to nearly $20 trillion.
- Ethiopia's Tigray ceasefire cut annual conflict deaths by 97.7 percent in a single year, and Poland improved its peace score by 9.1 percent despite bordering an active war — evidence that deliberate institutional investment can reverse the trend.
- The trajectory is not yet fate: the same Index that documents collapse also documents that sustained cooperation, treaty frameworks, and multilateral funding have worked wherever they have genuinely been tried.
Eighteen years of data tell a story that numbers alone cannot quite capture. When the Global Peace Index was first assembled in 2008, the world, by most measures, was holding together. Today, 163 countries are measured, and 119 of them are less peaceful than they were then. The current streak of annual deterioration has reached 12 consecutive years — the longest in the history of the measurement itself.
In 2025 alone, violent conflict deaths exceeded 181,000. Between 2010 and 2021, the number of conflicts globally increased by 88 percent, and by 2024 there were 61 active state-based conflicts — the highest total since the end of World War II. But what has changed most profoundly is the nature of conflict itself: wars no longer end. In the 1970s, nearly half of all armed conflicts concluded with a decisive military victory; by the 2010s, that figure had fallen to fewer than nine percent. Yemen, Syria, the DRC, Somalia, Ukraine, Sudan, Myanmar — these are not crises moving toward conclusion. They are features of the current international order.
The geography of violence has also spread. Nearly two-thirds of the world's nations are now involved in external conflicts to some degree, up from 59 countries in 2008. Drone attacks rose approximately 11,500 percent between 2018 and 2025, with 565 different armed groups conducting strikes. Terrorism's epicenter has migrated from the Middle East and North Africa to West Africa's Sahel, which by 2025 accounted for more terrorism deaths than South Asia and MENA combined — yet the global counter-terrorism apparatus has not reoriented to match this shift.
Meanwhile, the world has chosen to spend on weapons rather than on peace. Global military expenditure reached $2.7 trillion in 2025, its steepest annual rise since 1988, while peacebuilding spending amounted to just 0.5 percent of that total — a proportion that has nearly halved since 2008. The total economic cost of violence reached $19.97 trillion, equivalent to 11.6 percent of global GDP and nearly double the figure recorded when the Index began.
Yet the data also contains proof that change is possible. Ethiopia's Pretoria Peace Agreement reduced Tigray conflict deaths by 97.7 percent in a single year. Poland recorded the Index's largest single-year improvement despite bordering an active war. Terrorism deaths fell to their lowest level since 2008. These successes share a common thread: they were achieved through sustained international cooperation — treaty frameworks, multilateral funding, deliberate institutional investment. The question now is whether the world will choose to make that investment at scale, or whether the 12-year decline will simply continue.
Eighteen years of data tell a story that numbers alone cannot quite capture. When researchers first assembled the Global Peace Index in 2008, they ranked 140 countries and found a world that, by most measures, was holding together. The deterioration that would follow was not yet visible in the spreadsheets. Today, 163 countries are measured, and 119 of them are less peaceful than they were then. The Index has recorded decline in 15 of its 18 editions. The current streak of annual deterioration has now reached 12 consecutive years—the longest in the history of the measurement itself.
The numbers are stark. In 2025 alone, violent conflict deaths exceeded 181,000. Twenty countries each recorded more than 1,000 deaths from internal conflict, the highest count since the Index began. Between 2010 and 2021, the number of conflicts globally increased by 88 percent. By 2024, there were 61 active state-based conflicts, the highest total since the end of World War II. But the raw count of deaths and wars tells only part of the story. What has changed is the nature of conflict itself—wars no longer end.
In the 1970s, nearly half of all armed conflicts concluded with a decisive military victory. By the 2010s, that figure had fallen to fewer than nine percent. Peace agreements, which once resolved a quarter of all wars, now account for just four percent. The result is a permanent global inventory of unresolved violence. Yemen has been at war since 2015. Syria since 2011. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has endured overlapping armed conflicts for more than three decades. Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991. Ukraine entered its fourth year of full-scale war in 2026. Sudan's civil war, which began in April 2023, had displaced more people than any other active conflict in the world within 18 months. Myanmar's post-coup conflict, which intensified in 2021, has drawn in dozens of armed ethnic groups with no resolution in sight. These are not crises moving toward conclusion. They are features of the current international order.
The geography of conflict has also shifted. In 2008, 59 countries were involved in external conflicts to some degree. By 2026, that figure had nearly doubled to 103—nearly two-thirds of the world. Internationalised intrastate conflicts, in which foreign states participate in wars inside another country's borders, increased by more than 175 percent since 2010. Proxy warfare has become a standard instrument of foreign policy. Technology has accelerated this transformation. Drone attacks rose approximately 11,500 percent between 2018 and 2025. In that seven-year span, 565 different armed groups carried out at least one strike, including non-state actors that lacked any precision-strike capability at the start of the period. The barrier to conducting targeted attacks has collapsed, and no binding international framework to govern it has emerged.
Terrorism itself has migrated. Between roughly 2015 and 2023, the global epicentre of terrorist violence shifted from the Middle East and North Africa to the Sahel belt of West Africa. By 2025, the Sahel accounted for more terrorism deaths than South Asia and MENA combined. Burkina Faso, which did not register as a significant terrorism concern in 2008, recorded the world's highest terrorism impact score in 2024. Sub-Saharan Africa's overall peace score has deteriorated 134 percent since 2008, the largest regional decline in the Index's history. South Asia has deteriorated 115 percent; MENA 105 percent. Yet the global counter-terrorism apparatus—its resources, attention, and military deployment—has not reoriented to match this shift. The map of violence has spread, but the response has not followed.
Meanwhile, the world has chosen to spend on weapons rather than on peace. Global military expenditure reached $2.7 trillion in 2025, a 9.4 percent real-terms increase and the steepest annual rise since 1988. Ninety-seven of 163 countries increased their military expenditure as a share of GDP in 2026, with military spending now at its highest level since the Index began. Global peacebuilding and peacekeeping expenditure was $49.2 billion in 2025—just 0.5 percent of total military spending. In 2008, that proportion was approximately 0.83 percent. In absolute terms, peacebuilding spending grew. As a proportion of what the world spends on the tools of violence, it fell by nearly half. The total economic cost of violence—the resources consumed by conflict, crime, and militarisation across all economies—reached $19.97 trillion in 2025, equivalent to 11.6 percent of global GDP, and nearly double the $11 trillion recorded in 2008.
Yet the data also contains proof that change is possible. Bhutan ranked 69th in 2008. In 2026 it ranked 16th, a rise of 53 places driven by institutional investment in governance and well-being, not military capacity. Following Ethiopia's Pretoria Peace Agreement in November 2022, conflict deaths in the Tigray region fell from over 100,000 annually to approximately 2,300 in 2023—a reduction of 97.7 percent in a single year. A ceasefire, pursued and implemented, produced results that no military expenditure had achieved. Despite sharing a border with an active war, Poland recorded the largest single-year improvement in the 2026 Index: 9.1 percent, rising 23 places. Terrorism deaths fell to their lowest level since 2008 in 2026, driven largely by the territorial defeat of ISIS and improved counter-terrorism cooperation among states. UN peacekeeping funding recorded the largest improvement of any of the 23 peace indicators in 2026, improving 6.2 percent with 101 of 163 countries improving. These successes share a common thread: they were achieved through sustained international cooperation built over decades—treaty frameworks, multilateral funding mechanisms, intelligence-sharing arrangements. They happened through deliberate institutional investment. The question now is whether the world will choose to make that investment at scale, or whether the 12-year decline will continue.
Citações Notáveis
Wars are no longer won or lost, they are inconclusive and often normalised. Each active conflict adds to a permanent global inventory of ongoing violence.— Global Peace Index analysis
Following Ethiopia's Pretoria Peace Agreement in November 2022, conflict deaths in the Tigray region fell from over 100,000 annually to approximately 2,300 in 2023, a reduction of 97.7 percent in a single year.— Global Peace Index data
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
What strikes you most about this 12-year streak of decline?
That it's not a fluctuation. Eighteen years of data is long enough to see the difference between a bad year and a structural shift. This is structural. The world has learned to live with permanent conflict.
How does that happen? How do you learn to live with war?
Wars stop ending. In the 1970s, nearly half of all conflicts concluded with a decisive outcome. Now it's fewer than nine percent. Yemen, Syria, the DRC—these aren't crises moving toward resolution. They're just the landscape now. The cost gets absorbed into the baseline.
But military spending is at record highs. Shouldn't that be solving something?
That's the paradox. We're spending $2.7 trillion on military capacity while spending less than half a percent of that on peacebuilding. The tools of violence have proliferated faster than the tools of peace. Drone strikes increased 11,500 percent in seven years. The barrier to conducting targeted attacks has collapsed. We've made war easier, not harder.
Is there anything in the data that suggests this could reverse?
Yes. Ethiopia's ceasefire reduced annual deaths in Tigray from over 100,000 to 2,300 in a single year. Bhutan rose 53 places by investing in governance, not weapons. Poland improved 9.1 percent despite bordering an active war. These aren't accidents. They happened through sustained institutional investment—treaties, multilateral funding, intelligence-sharing. The data shows change is possible. The question is whether we'll choose it.
What does the $19.97 trillion figure mean in practical terms?
It's the economic cost of violence—what the world loses to conflict, crime, and militarisation. That's 11.6 percent of global GDP. Nearly double what it was in 2008. That's not just human suffering. That's output lost, institutions eroded, populations displaced. The price of inaction accumulates.