Insecurity is what drives an arms race
At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles placed before the region a question as old as power itself: when does a nation's military growth become a threat to the peace of its neighbours? Warning that China's buildup — the largest since the Second World War — risks triggering a spiral of reactive rearmament across the Indo-Pacific, Marles called not for confrontation but for the harder work of reassurance, transparency, and dialogue. His speech was both a statement of Australia's strategic commitments and an appeal to a logic that arms races have rarely respected.
- China's military expansion, now the largest since WWII, is generating alarm across the Indo-Pacific as neighbours weigh whether to treat it as a signal of intent rather than routine modernisation.
- The militarisation of artificial islands in the South China Sea has sharpened the tension, with Marles framing it as a direct challenge to international law and the legitimacy of other nations' sovereign claims.
- Australia is deepening its own defence posture — reaffirming 2% GDP spending, advancing the AUKUS trilateral pact, and pursuing new security ties with Japan and India — while insisting its rearmament is transparent, not provocative.
- The war in Ukraine looms as a cautionary backdrop, demonstrating that economic interdependence cannot substitute for a stable balance of power when one actor grows decisively dominant.
- The unresolved question hanging over the entire speech is whether Beijing will offer the reassuring statecraft Marles called for — or whether the arms race spiral he warned against has already quietly begun.
Richard Marles arrived at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore with a message calibrated to unsettle without inflaming. China's military expansion, he told the assembled security officials, is now the most ambitious any nation has undertaken since the end of the Second World War. The scale is not contested. What matters, he argued, is whether the region can avoid the self-defeating logic that follows: neighbours perceiving threat, upgrading their own capabilities, and locking the Indo-Pacific into an arms race born of mutual fear.
Marles was careful to acknowledge China's right to modernise its forces. But he drew a distinction between capability and signal — arguing that at a certain magnitude, military buildup must be accompanied by reassuring statecraft: transparent intentions, genuine dialogue, and respect for international law. Without that reassurance, he warned, insecurity compounds itself. His pointed example was the South China Sea, where China has militarised artificial islands and pressed claims that neighbouring states and international law do not recognise. This, he said, is not modernisation — it is a challenge to the rules-based order.
Australia's own posture was laid out plainly. The Albanese government will hold to 2% of GDP in defence spending. The 70-year alliance with the United States remains foundational. And through AUKUS, Australia will accelerate development in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, undersea warfare, and hypersonics. But Marles signalled that the security architecture he envisions is wider than any single pact — announcing plans to visit Japan and India as part of a broader regional engagement.
The shadow of Ukraine fell across the speech. Russia's invasion, Marles argued, proved that economic ties alone cannot prevent conflict when a decisive military imbalance tempts a determined adversary. Australia's solidarity with Europe, he said, is inseparable from its commitment to the same principles in the Indo-Pacific. What he left unspoken — but unmistakable — was the central uncertainty: whether Beijing will offer the reassurance he called for, or whether the spiral he described is already in motion.
Richard Marles stood before the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday morning and laid out a calculation that has begun to reshape how Australia thinks about its place in the world. China's military expansion, he said, is now the largest and most ambitious any country has undertaken since the end of the Second World War. The scale of it is not in dispute. What matters, Marles argued, is what happens next—and whether the region tumbles into an arms race born of fear.
The defence minister's framing was careful but pointed. Australia does not question China's right to modernise its military, he said. Every nation has the prerogative to build capabilities that serve its interests. But there is a threshold where scale becomes signal, and signal becomes threat. When military buildup reaches the magnitude China has achieved, it must be accompanied by what Marles called reassuring statecraft—transparent intentions, dialogue, respect for international law. Without that reassurance, he warned, the logic of security becomes self-defeating. Neighbours will see the buildup as a risk and respond by upgrading their own capabilities. Insecurity drives arms races. And once that spiral begins, it is difficult to arrest.
Marles pointed specifically to the South China Sea, where China has militarised artificial islands and extended its military presence across waters that neighbouring countries claim as their own. He characterised this not as routine military modernisation but as something more deliberate: an attempt to deny the legitimacy of other nations' claims through force. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea should apply everywhere, he said, including there. The message was unmistakable—China's actions in those waters are not merely military decisions but challenges to the rules-based order itself.
The speech also reflected how the new Australian government intends to position the country in a region growing more tense by the month. Marles reaffirmed that Australia will spend 2 percent of its GDP on defence—a commitment the Albanese government has maintained despite the change of administration. The 70-year alliance with the United States, he said, has never been more important. That partnership will be deepened through Aukus, the trilateral security agreement with Britain and the US that will accelerate the development of capabilities in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, undersea warfare, and hypersonics. But Australia will not limit itself to that arrangement. Marles announced he would travel to Japan on Monday and visit India soon, signalling that the government sees the region's security architecture as something broader and more complex than any single alliance.
The broader context for Marles's remarks is the war in Ukraine, which he invoked as a cautionary tale. Russia's invasion demonstrated that economic interdependence alone does not prevent conflict. When one country's military buildup creates a decisive imbalance of power, a determined adversary may calculate that the benefits of war outweigh the risks. Moscow made that calculation and catastrophically misjudged. Australia, Marles said, stands with Europe not only to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine but to reject the principle that any power has the right to dominate its neighbours. That principle, he argued, matters everywhere—in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific alike.
What Marles did not say, but what hung over the speech, is the question of whether reassurance from Beijing is forthcoming or even possible. China has shown little inclination to moderate its military expansion or to frame it in terms designed to comfort its neighbours. The buildup continues. The militarisation of the South China Sea continues. And so the region faces a choice: whether to accept the new military reality as permanent and adjust accordingly, or whether to treat it as a threat that demands response. Marles's speech was an attempt to articulate a third path—one in which transparency and dialogue might yet prevent the worst outcome. Whether that path remains open is now a question for Beijing to answer.
Notable Quotes
Without reassurance from China, it is inevitable that countries will seek to upgrade their own military capabilities in response— Richard Marles, Defence Minister
China's militarisation of the South China Sea needs to be understood as intent to deny the legitimacy of neighbours' claims through force— Richard Marles, Defence Minister
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Marles keep saying China has the right to modernise its military if he's so concerned about what it's doing?
Because he's trying to avoid giving Beijing an excuse to dismiss Australia's concerns as mere jealousy or containment. If Australia says China shouldn't build up its military at all, China can claim the West is trying to keep it weak. But if Australia says the buildup itself is fine—just do it transparently and reassuringly—then the onus shifts. China has to explain why it won't be transparent.
And if China doesn't explain? If it just keeps building?
Then the logic Marles described takes over. Other countries see the buildup, feel threatened, and start their own. You get an arms race. The whole region becomes less stable, more expensive, more dangerous.
Is he saying Australia will arm itself more if China doesn't reassure?
Not directly. But yes, that's the implication. Australia is already committing 2 percent of GDP to defence. If the region spirals, that number will likely go up. Japan and India will do the same. Everyone becomes poorer and more militarised.
Why mention Ukraine?
Because it's the proof of concept. Everyone thought Russia and Europe were too economically tied to fight. Economic interdependence was supposed to be a brake on conflict. It wasn't. That's a warning for the Indo-Pacific—don't assume prosperity prevents war.
So what does Marles actually want China to do?
Slow down, be transparent about intentions, respect international law in the South China Sea, and signal that it's not trying to dominate its neighbours. Basically, give the region reason to believe the buildup isn't a prelude to coercion.