The conditions for a civil war are probable
En los primeros días de septiembre de 2021, el general Mark Milley, máximo jefe militar de Estados Unidos, ofreció una evaluación sin rodeos: Afganistán marchaba hacia la guerra civil. Su advertencia no era especulación abstracta, sino el eco de una lección histórica que el mundo ya había aprendido a un costo enorme — que el vacío de poder en tierras fracturadas no permanece vacío por mucho tiempo, y que quienes lo llenan no siempre son los que el mundo desearía.
- El general Milley no habló de posibilidades sino de probabilidades: la guerra civil en Afganistán era, a su juicio militar, el escenario más probable tras la retirada estadounidense.
- El Talibán había conquistado el país en semanas, pero la provincia norteña de Panjshir resistía, y la diferencia entre ganar una guerra y gobernar una nación se hacía cada vez más evidente.
- La verdadera alarma no era el caos político inmediato, sino lo que podría crecer dentro de él: grupos terroristas como Al Qaeda o el Estado Islámico, históricamente expertos en explotar el desorden.
- Milley estimó una ventana de uno a tres años antes de que una amenaza terrorista reconstituida pudiera emerger desde suelo afgano, poniendo en jaque dos décadas de esfuerzo militar estadounidense.
- Los gobiernos occidentales observaban con temor que Afganistán volviera a convertirse en lo que era antes del 11 de septiembre: un santuario para quienes planean ataques contra sus intereses.
Un sábado de principios de septiembre de 2021, el general Mark Milley, presidente del Estado Mayor Conjunto de Estados Unidos, se sentó frente a una cámara y pronunció un juicio militar sin ambigüedades: Afganistán probablemente caería en una guerra civil. No era una advertencia cautelosa ni diplomática. Era una evaluación directa de las condiciones sobre el terreno.
El Talibán había tomado el control del país en cuestión de semanas, mientras las tropas estadounidenses completaban su retirada y el gobierno afgano que Washington había construido durante veinte años se derrumbaba. Solo Panjshir, en el norte, permanecía fuera del control talibán, sostenido por fuerzas de resistencia que se negaban a rendirse.
Pero Milley dudaba de que el Talibán pudiera convertir su victoria militar en un gobierno funcional. Conquistar un país y administrarlo son empresas distintas. Y si el grupo fracasaba en consolidar el poder, el vacío resultante podría ser aprovechado por organizaciones terroristas. Al Qaeda había encontrado refugio en Afganistán antes del 11 de septiembre de 2001. El Estado Islámico había crecido allí en años recientes. El general calculó que en un plazo de uno a tres años, una amenaza terrorista reconstituida podría volver a emerger desde ese territorio.
Esa posibilidad era precisamente la razón por la que Estados Unidos había invadido Afganistán dos décadas atrás. Veinte años, cientos de miles de millones de dólares y miles de vidas después, la misión no terminaba en victoria sino en retirada. Los gobiernos occidentales temían que el país volviera a ser lo que había sido: un lugar donde los extremistas podían organizarse y planear. La advertencia de Milley sugería que ni siquiera el propio ejército estadounidense estaba seguro de poder contener esa amenaza si Afganistán se fragmentaba en una guerra civil.
The American military's top officer sat down with a television network on a Saturday morning in early September 2021 and delivered a stark assessment: Afghanistan was headed toward civil war. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not hedge. His military judgment, he said, was that the conditions for internal conflict were probable—not possible, not concerning, but likely.
This warning arrived as the Taliban was consolidating its grip on a country it had seized in a matter of weeks. American troops had withdrawn. The Afghan government that Washington had spent two decades building had collapsed. Only Panjshir, a province in the north, remained outside Taliban control, held by resistance forces determined not to surrender. Everywhere else, the militant group that had ruled Afghanistan before 2001 was now ruling it again.
But Milley's concern went deeper than the immediate political chaos. He doubted whether the Taliban, still in the process of forming a functioning government, possessed the capacity or the will to actually govern. Consolidating power and maintaining effective administration across a fractured country were two different things. The Taliban had proven itself formidable as a military force. Whether it could be a state was another question entirely.
The general's real worry was what might fill the vacuum if the Taliban failed. A civil war would create conditions—ungoverned space, desperation, ideological ferment—that terrorist organizations had historically exploited. Al Qaeda had sheltered in Afghanistan before 2001. The Islamic State had grown there in recent years. If the country descended into conflict, these groups or others like them could resurge. Milley estimated the timeline: within one to three years, the United States could be facing a reconstituted terrorist threat emanating from Afghan soil.
This was not abstract speculation. It was the foundation of America's entire post-9/11 military enterprise in Afghanistan. In 2001, after Al Qaeda operatives trained in Afghanistan attacked New York and Washington, the United States had invaded, toppled the Taliban government that harbored them, and committed itself to preventing the country from ever again becoming a sanctuary for groups plotting attacks on American soil. Twenty years, hundreds of billions of dollars, and thousands of American lives later, that mission had ended not in victory but in withdrawal.
Western governments understood the stakes. They feared exactly what Milley was describing: Afghanistan reverting to what it had been—a place where extremists could organize, train, and plan. The United States maintained that it retained the capability to counter any terrorist threat that emerged from Afghanistan, even with troops gone. But Milley's warning suggested the American military itself was uncertain whether that capability would be enough if the country fractured into civil war.
The general's assessment reflected a hard reality that had become impossible to ignore in those first weeks after the American withdrawal. The Taliban's military victory had been swift and complete. But military victory and political consolidation are not the same thing. A country at war with itself, divided among competing factions, would be a different kind of problem—one that no amount of over-the-horizon military power might be able to solve.
Citações Notáveis
My military judgment is that it is probable that the conditions for a civil war will develop— General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
There is a very strong probability of a civil war that could lead to a reconstitution of Al Qaeda or growth of ISIS or other terrorist groups— General Mark Milley
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
When Milley says civil war is "probable," is he describing something that's already starting, or something he thinks will happen?
He's describing a condition he believes will develop. The Taliban has won militarily, but he doubts they can actually govern. That gap—between military control and political legitimacy—is where civil war lives.
Why would the Taliban struggle to govern if they just defeated everyone?
Because defeating an army and running a country are different skills. The Taliban has to collect taxes, provide services, manage competing factions within its own movement. Panjshir is already resisting. Other groups won't simply accept Taliban rule.
And the terrorism angle—is he saying terrorists will use the chaos, or that the Taliban itself might become the problem?
Both, actually. He's saying if Afghanistan fractures into civil war, groups like Al Qaeda or ISIS will exploit the disorder. They'll have space to operate, recruit, train. The Taliban might not even be able to stop them.
So the American withdrawal didn't just end the war—it potentially created the conditions for a worse one?
That's the implication. Twenty years of American military presence was supposed to prevent exactly this scenario. Now Milley is saying it's probable anyway, within one to three years.
Can the U.S. actually counter a terrorist threat from Afghanistan without troops on the ground?
That's the question Milley seems to be raising without quite saying it. The official position is yes. But his warning suggests the military leadership isn't confident.