Substituting providers without strengthening institutions changes dependence, not sovereignty.
Africa's expanding menu of foreign partners has not dissolved the deeper asymmetries that have long shaped the continent's place in the world economy. A generation of policymakers now navigates a genuinely multipolar environment—evaluating China, the United States, Russia, and others by what they actually deliver in infrastructure, employment, and security—yet the structural patterns Kwame Nkrumah identified in 1965 persist across multiple relationships, regardless of which capital originates them. The Sahel's rising civilian death toll, even after security providers were swapped, offers a sobering reminder that changing the terms of dependence is not the same as ending it.
- African states are exercising real diplomatic leverage in a crowded field of suitors—from Beijing to Moscow to Washington—but the competition among external powers intensifies pressure as much as it creates freedom.
- Civilian fatalities in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger climbed between 2020 and 2023 even after French forces were expelled and Russian-linked contractors arrived, exposing the limits of security substitution without institutional reform.
- Neo-colonialism has not disappeared; it has diversified—opaque resource contracts, debt arrangements with confidentiality clauses, and trade structures that keep Africa exporting raw commodities and importing finished goods now implicate many capitals at once.
- The African Union's modest self-financed budget, a still-incomplete Standby Force, and a slower-than-promised Continental Free Trade Area reveal the gap between the rhetoric of African solutions and the institutional capacity to deliver them.
- The path forward runs through domestic financing, accountable governance, and a clear-eyed accounting of what any foreign partner can and cannot provide—not through the next summit communiqué.
Gustavo de Carvalho, programme head for African Governance and Diplomacy at the South African Institute of International Affairs, is careful to distinguish what is genuinely new from what is merely louder. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War—through Bandung, through the Non-Aligned Movement. What has changed is the international system itself. The unipolar moment has passed, the menu of partners has grown, and a generation of policymakers under fifty now makes decisions without Cold War inhibitions weighing on every choice.
African publics, Afrobarometer surveys suggest, are not ideological about any of this. They assess external partners on tangible outcomes: infrastructure built, jobs created, security delivered. China registers as a broadly positive economic presence. The United States retains appeal as a development model. Russia's footprint, despite its political volume, remains smaller and regionally concentrated. Multipolarity is not a destination—it is a working environment that multiplies both options and risks.
The neo-colonialism question demands consistency. Nkrumah's original formulation was precise: political independence alongside continued external control of economic and political life. Applied honestly, that lens reveals a structural picture that implicates many actors simultaneously—French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the DRC, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that routinely fall short of the standards their governments profess. Africa still exports raw commodities and imports finished goods. Intra-African trade hovers near fifteen percent of total trade. African governments pay a debt risk premium that exceeds what fundamentals justify. Naming a single neo-coloniser, de Carvalho observes, reveals the speaker's politics more than the underlying structure.
The Sahel makes the stakes concrete. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger expelled French forces, distanced themselves from ECOWAS and UN missions, and welcomed Russian security contractors. ACLED data show that civilian fatalities from political violence rose across that same period. Changing who provides security without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty—it renegotiates the terms of dependence.
The principle that African solutions must address African problems is correct, de Carvalho argues, but it is regularly bent in two unhelpful directions: by external actors using it to exit responsibilities they still hold over financial flows and arms transfers, and by some African leaders using it to deflect scrutiny of governance failures. Genuine agency requires more than the slogan. The African Union still relies on external partners for a significant share of its programmatic funding. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational. The Continental Free Trade Area has moved more slowly than its architects hoped. The longer arc of development runs through African governments financing more of their own priorities, publics holding leaders accountable, and a sober reckoning with what any foreign force—Russian-linked contractors, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others—can realistically deliver.
Gustavo de Carvalho sits in the Moscow bureau of Pressenza, the acting programme head for African Governance and Diplomacy at the South African Institute of International Affairs, and he wants to be precise about what is actually new on the continent. Africa is not experiencing a second awakening, he argues. African states exercised real agency during the Cold War—from the Bandung Conference to the Non-Aligned Movement. What has shifted is the structure of the international system itself. The unipolar moment has ended. The menu of partners has expanded. A generation of policymakers under fifty now operates without the weight of Cold War constraints or the immediate post-Cold War period hanging over their decisions.
But here is what matters most: African citizens are not ideological. They are pragmatic. Afrobarometer surveys across more than thirty countries show that people evaluate external partners on what actually arrives—infrastructure, jobs, security. China is generally seen as a positive economic force. The United States retains the strongest appeal as a development model. Russia, despite its louder political voice, has a smaller footprint, concentrated in specific regions. Multipolarity is not a destination Africa is reaching. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks simultaneously.
The question of neo-colonialism requires care. The term has analytical value when applied consistently, de Carvalho explains, but loses it when used selectively to embarrass whichever power one dislikes. Kwame Nkrumah's 1965 definition was precise: political independence paired with continued external control over economic and political life. The honest test is whether contemporary patterns reproduce that asymmetry, regardless of which capital they originate from. The structural picture is documented. Africa still exports raw commodities and imports finished goods. Intra-African trade hovers around fifteen percent of total trade, far below levels in Asia or Europe. African governments pay a measurable risk premium on debt that exceeds what the fundamentals justify. Applied consistently, this lens reveals opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, debt agreements with confidentiality clauses, and aid structures that bypass African institutions. That description fits French commercial arrangements in francophone Africa, Chinese mining concessions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Russian-linked gold extraction in the Central African Republic and Sudan, Gulf-backed port and farmland deals along the Red Sea, and Western corporate practices that have not always met the standards their governments preach. Naming a single neo-coloniser tells you more about the speaker's politics than about the structure itself.
Competition among external powers is real and intensifying. The proliferation of Africa-plus-one summits is the clearest indicator. Russia held summits in Sochi in 2019 and St Petersburg in 2023. The EU, Turkey, Japan, India, the United States, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all host their own variants. Trade figures reveal the actual weight. China-Africa trade reached around 280 billion dollars in 2023. United States-Africa trade sits between 60 and 70 billion dollars. Russia-Africa trade is roughly 24 billion dollars, heavily concentrated in grain, fertiliser and arms. Describing the continent as a chessboard understates how African states themselves are shaping these dynamics, sometimes through skilful diversification and sometimes through security bargains that carry longer-term costs. The Sahel illustrates this starkly. Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces, downgraded relationships with ECOWAS and the UN stabilisation mission, and welcomed Russian security contractors. Yet civilian fatalities from political violence rose rather than fell across the same period, according to ACLED data. Substituting security providers without strengthening domestic institutions does not produce sovereignty. It changes the terms of dependence.
The principle that African solutions must address African problems is correct, de Carvalho says, but it is regularly weaponised in two unhelpful directions. External actors invoke it to justify withdrawing from responsibilities they continue to hold, particularly over financial flows and arms transfers that pass through their own jurisdictions. Some African leaders invoke it to deflect legitimate scrutiny of governance failures, repression or corruption. Genuine African agency requires more than rhetoric. The African Union's operating budget remains modest in absolute terms, and external partners still cover a significant share of programmatic activities, which shapes what gets funded. The African Standby Force, conceived in 2003, remains only partially operational more than two decades later. The African Continental Free Trade Area, in force since 2021, has rolled out more slowly than drafters hoped because the political will to lower national barriers lags behind the speeches. Long-term development depends on African leaders financing more of their own security and development priorities, on publics holding them accountable, and on a clearer-eyed view of what foreign forces can deliver. Whether the actors are Russian-linked contractors in the Sahel and Central African Republic, Western counter-terrorism deployments, or others, external security providers tend to address symptoms while leaving the political and economic drivers of insecurity intact.
Notable Quotes
Multipolarity is not a destination Africans are arriving at. It is a working environment that creates more options and more risks at once.— Gustavo de Carvalho, SAIIA
Applied consistently, the neo-colonialism lens directs attention to opaque resource-for-infrastructure contracts, security-for-mineral bargains, and debt agreements with confidentiality clauses—regardless of which power originates them.— Gustavo de Carvalho, SAIIA
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
You say African policymakers are pragmatic, not ideological. But doesn't that pragmatism sometimes mean accepting deals that look good in the short term but lock in dependence for decades?
Exactly. That's the tension. A government gets a port built or a road paved—tangible, visible. The public sees it. But the contract terms, the debt structure, the mineral concessions—those are often opaque. Pragmatism without transparency is just another word for vulnerability.
So when Mali and Burkina Faso switched from French to Russian security contractors, that was pragmatism failing?
It was pragmatism without the second part of the equation. They made a rational choice to change providers. But they didn't strengthen their own institutions while doing it. Civilian deaths went up. You can't substitute your way to sovereignty.
The AU's budget is modest. The African Standby Force is still incomplete after twenty years. Does that mean African solutions are just not feasible right now?
Not feasible, or not prioritised? There's a difference. The money exists elsewhere—in arms transfers, in external aid. The question is whether African leaders are willing to redirect resources toward African institutions instead of toward external partnerships that feel more immediate.
And the publics? Are they demanding that?
Afrobarometer shows they care about outcomes—jobs, infrastructure, security. They're not demanding ideology. But they're also not demanding transparency in the deals that produce those outcomes. That's where the gap is.