Africa could industrialize—or become another extraction economy
From the soil of a continent long shaped by extraction, a new contest is unfolding — one that will determine who commands the supply chains of the twenty-first century. Africa holds the cobalt, platinum, and rare earths that power electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, and modern warfare, and four global powers are maneuvering to control not just the mines, but the entire chain from ore to finished material. A new academic study maps this competition with clarity, and its quiet warning is ancient in character: wealth that flows outward without transformation leaves its source no richer than before.
- Africa supplies three-quarters of the world's cobalt and platinum, making its mineral wealth not a regional story but a fulcrum of global technological and military power.
- China has moved most decisively — embedding itself through infrastructure financing, ownership stakes, and, critically, dominance over the refining and processing capacity that transforms raw ore into usable industrial material.
- Russia has taken a leaner, more volatile path, trading security partnerships and private military presence for mineral access in unstable regions, tying resource extraction directly to armed conflict.
- In places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, the competition has a human cost measured in child labor, smuggling networks, insurgent financing, and blood — the geopolitical contest and the humanitarian crisis are not separate stories.
- The study's sharpest warning is structural: without local refining capacity and value-added manufacturing, African nations risk remaining raw material exporters, watching their mineral wealth industrialize foreign economies while their own development stalls.
Two researchers — Ron Matthews at Cranfield University and Vlado Vivoda at the University of Queensland — have published a study mapping the contest for Africa's critical minerals, and their findings are both precise and sobering. Africa produces roughly three-quarters of the world's cobalt and platinum, along with significant shares of manganese, chromium, copper, graphite, and rare earth elements. These are not peripheral commodities. They are the physical foundation of electric vehicles, semiconductor manufacturing, renewable energy systems, and advanced military production.
China has pursued the most systematic strategy, using Belt and Road financing, infrastructure investment, and direct ownership in mining operations to embed itself across African mineral economies. More importantly, Chinese firms control substantial global capacity for refining and processing — the step that converts raw ore into usable material. This downstream dominance means that even where African nations hold the mines, the value chain belongs to Beijing. The United States, meanwhile, remains heavily import-dependent for many of these same minerals, a vulnerability that spans both civilian industry and defense.
Russia has taken a different approach — less capital-intensive, more opportunistic. Through security agreements and partnerships with private military contractors, Moscow has traded stability for access in mineral-rich regions, a strategy that tends to deepen instability rather than resolve it. In places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, the mineral trade is already entangled with armed groups, smuggling networks, child labor, and insurgent financing — what the academic literature calls, with good reason, blood minerals.
The study's central argument is that the competition for Africa's minerals is ultimately a competition for power — over the supply chains that will determine technological leadership and industrial resilience in an era no longer governed by cost efficiency alone. Its warning to African states is direct: without building local refining capacity and domestic manufacturing, the continent risks repeating a centuries-old pattern, exporting raw wealth while the industrialization it enables happens elsewhere. The minerals leave. The profit does not stay.
Two academics have mapped out a competition that will shape the next decade of global power. Ron Matthews at Cranfield University and Vlado Vivoda at the University of Queensland published their findings in the European Journal of International Security, and what they found is straightforward: Africa has become the arena where China, Russia, the United States, and Europe are fighting for control of the minerals that run the modern world.
The stakes are concrete. Africa produces roughly three-quarters of the planet's cobalt and platinum—the elements that power electric vehicle batteries, semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence infrastructure, and renewable energy systems. Manganese, chromium, copper, graphite, and rare earth elements flow from African soil in quantities that make the continent indispensable to any nation serious about industrial dominance in the twenty-first century. The authors examined trade patterns, foreign investment flows, military relationships, and diplomatic agreements to understand how four major powers are positioning themselves inside these supply chains.
China's approach has been the most systematic. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, state-backed financing, infrastructure investment, and direct ownership stakes in mining operations, Beijing has woven itself deep into African mineral economies. But China's advantage extends far beyond the mines themselves. Chinese firms control significant portions of the global refining and processing capacity for cobalt, nickel, lithium, and graphite—the crucial step that transforms raw ore into usable material. The United States, by contrast, remains heavily dependent on imports for many of these same minerals, a vulnerability that touches both civilian manufacturing and defense production.
Russia has pursued a different strategy, one that relies less on industrial capital and more on military relationships. Through security agreements, partnerships with private military contractors like Wagner and the Africa Corps, Moscow has gained influence in mineral-rich regions without the massive upfront investment that China has deployed. The approach is leaner, more opportunistic, and in some ways more destabilizing—it ties mineral access directly to armed conflict and political instability rather than to industrial development.
Beneath the geopolitical competition lies a darker reality. The mineral trade in regions like the Democratic Republic of Congo is entangled with armed conflict, smuggling networks, corruption, and child labor. Insurgent groups finance themselves through mineral sales. The term "blood minerals" appears in the academic literature for a reason. The competition for these resources, if left unmanaged, could deepen rather than resolve these pathologies.
The authors issue a warning that cuts to the heart of Africa's future. Without stronger governance, without building local refining capacity, without developing domestic value-added manufacturing, African nations risk remaining what they have been for centuries: exporters of raw materials whose wealth flows elsewhere. The minerals stay in the ground in Africa; the profit and the industrial development happen in Beijing, Moscow, Washington, or Brussels. China's dominance in refining and processing means that even when African nations control the mines, they do not control the value chain. The real bottleneck is not upstream—it is downstream, in the technical complexity of separation chemistry, metallization, and industrial-scale processing ecosystems that remain concentrated in a handful of countries.
What the study reveals is that the competition for Africa's minerals is not really about geology. It is about power. It is about which nations will control the supply chains that determine technological leadership, military capability, and industrial resilience in an era when efficiency and low-cost production no longer drive global economics. Strategic supply chains do. The question now is whether African states will use their mineral wealth to build industrial capacity of their own, or whether they will watch it extracted and processed elsewhere, enriching foreign capitals while their own people remain dependent on external powers for the finished goods their own resources made possible.
Notable Quotes
Without stronger governance, local refining capacity, and domestic value-added manufacturing, African states risk remaining raw material exporters rather than industrialization beneficiaries— Matthews and Vivoda, European Journal of International Security
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter that China controls refining capacity rather than just the mines?
Because mining is only the beginning. You can have all the cobalt in the world, but if you can't turn it into battery-grade material, you can't sell it to anyone who matters. China owns that middle step. That's where the real profit and technical knowledge live.
So Africa is trapped?
Not necessarily trapped, but the path is narrow. If African governments build their own refining infrastructure, they could capture value. But that requires capital, technical expertise, and political will to resist pressure from outside powers who benefit from the current arrangement.
What's Russia actually doing differently from China?
China is building long-term industrial relationships. Russia is using military leverage—security agreements, proxy forces—to gain access without the investment. It's faster, cheaper, and it works in unstable regions where industrial investment would be too risky.
Does the study explain why the US was so slow to notice this?
Not in detail, but the implication is clear: Western governments assumed supply chains would stay open and efficient. They didn't anticipate that critical minerals would become weapons. By the time they noticed, China had already moved in.
What happens to the people in the DRC and other mining regions?
The study mentions blood minerals, child labor, smuggling, conflict financing. The competition between great powers doesn't create those problems, but it certainly doesn't solve them. If anything, it gives armed groups more incentive to control mining areas.
Is there a way out?
The authors say governance is the key. Stronger institutions, transparency, local refining capacity, value-added manufacturing. But that requires African states to have the political space and capital to build those things—which is harder when four major powers are competing for influence.