A chaotic Afghanistan is their ideal environment
Twenty years after American forces first entered Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban and deny sanctuary to those who would strike the wider world, the wheel has turned — and the Taliban stands once again in Kabul. General Mark Milley, the United States' highest-ranking military officer, now warns that the conditions for civil war are probable, and that the ungoverned spaces such conflict creates have historically been where extremism finds its breath. The question before the world is not merely what becomes of Afghanistan, but what Afghanistan, left to fracture, may yet send outward.
- The Taliban's stunning recapture of Afghanistan in weeks — not years — has left a power vacuum that even they appear ill-equipped to fill, with no functioning government yet in place.
- Panjshir province stands as the lone holdout against Taliban control, a fault line that signals the country is not pacified but merely paused on the edge of deeper conflict.
- General Milley has put a clock on the danger: within 12 to 36 months, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and allied extremist groups could reconstitute and project violence beyond Afghanistan's borders.
- Western governments, haunted by the memory of what Afghan ungoverned space produced in 2001, are watching for signs that history is preparing to repeat itself.
- Washington insists it retains the capacity to counter threats from Afghanistan without troops on the ground — a claim that time, and events, will either vindicate or expose.
Two decades after the United States toppled the Taliban in the wake of September 11, the group has reclaimed Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. The swiftness of their return has left the country fractured, and General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has offered a blunt military judgment: the conditions for civil war in Afghanistan are probable.
Speaking on a Saturday morning television appearance, Milley expressed serious doubt about the Taliban's ability to consolidate power and govern effectively. The northern province of Panjshir remains the only significant holdout against their control — a pocket of resistance that points to deeper fractures in the country's political landscape.
What gives Milley's assessment particular weight is what he sees coming next. Civil war would create the kind of ungoverned chaos that terrorist organizations have historically exploited. Al Qaeda could reconstitute. ISIS could expand. Milley placed a timeline on the risk: within twelve to thirty-six months, he predicted, the region would likely see a resurgence of terrorism directed outward, beyond Afghanistan's borders — precisely the threat the original 2001 invasion was meant to extinguish.
Western governments are watching closely, aware that the Taliban's previous rule in the 1990s included sheltering Al Qaeda. Whether the Taliban would do so again — or even be able to prevent it amid the instability Milley foresees — remains an open and urgent question. The United States has stated it retains the capacity to counter threats from Afghanistan without troops on the ground. Whether that confidence holds will likely be tested sooner than anyone hopes.
Two decades after American forces toppled the Taliban in 2001, the group has reclaimed Afghanistan in a matter of weeks. The speed of their return, following the withdrawal of US troops, has left the country fractured and unstable—and one of America's highest-ranking military officers is now warning that the nation faces a probable descent into civil war.
General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered this assessment on a Saturday morning television appearance, speaking with the bluntness that comes from military experience. His military judgment, he said, was that the conditions for civil war in Afghanistan were likely to materialize. The Taliban, despite their swift military victory, have not yet formed a functioning government, and Milley expressed serious doubt about their ability to consolidate power and maintain effective rule across the country. The northern province of Panjshir remains the only significant holdout against Taliban control, a pocket of resistance that signals deeper fractures in the nation's political landscape.
What makes this assessment particularly grave is what Milley sees unfolding in the aftermath. A civil war in Afghanistan would create the kind of chaos and ungoverned space that terrorist organizations have historically exploited. Al Qaeda, the group that orchestrated the September 11 attacks and prompted the original 2001 invasion, could reconstitute itself. The Islamic State, known as ISIS, could expand its foothold. Other extremist groups could flourish. Milley put a timeline on this risk: within twelve to thirty-six months, he predicted, the region would likely see a resurgence of terrorism directed outward, toward targets beyond Afghanistan's borders.
This concern is not new to American policymakers. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the stated purpose was to dismantle Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban government that harbored them. For two decades, the American military presence was justified partly as a counterterrorism operation—a way to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for groups plotting attacks on the West. Now, with American troops gone and the Taliban back in power, that original fear has come roaring back.
Western governments are watching closely. The prospect of Afghanistan becoming a haven for extremists once again is precisely what they hoped to prevent through two decades of military involvement. The Taliban's track record on this question is mixed at best. During their previous rule in the 1990s, they did provide shelter to Al Qaeda. Whether they would do so again, or whether they would even be able to prevent it given the instability Milley foresees, remains an open question.
The United States has stated publicly that it retains the capability to counter any security threat emanating from Afghanistan, even without troops on the ground. Whether that confidence is warranted will likely be tested in the coming months and years. For now, the military's top officer has laid out a stark scenario: a country sliding toward internal conflict, with all the humanitarian catastrophe that entails, and with the added danger that the chaos could become a launching pad for attacks far beyond Afghanistan's borders.
Citas Notables
My military assessment is that conditions for civil war are likely to develop— General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
There is a very strong probability of civil war that could lead to a reconstitution of Al Qaeda or growth of ISIS or other terrorist groups— General Mark Milley
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Milley says civil war is "probable," what does he actually see happening on the ground?
The Taliban won militarily, but they're not a unified government yet. They're trying to form an administration while holding a country that's deeply divided—Panjshir is still fighting them, and there are other pockets of resistance. That fragmentation is the opening.
So it's not that the Taliban will lose power, but that they'll struggle to keep it?
Exactly. They can take a capital, but governing is different. If they can't deliver basic services or hold the country together, you get warlords, regional factions, armed groups competing for control. That's civil war.
And that's when the terrorists move in?
That's the fear. When there's no central authority, no police, no military to stop them, groups like Al Qaeda or ISIS can operate openly. They did it before in the 1990s. A chaotic Afghanistan is their ideal environment.
Milley gave a specific timeline—12 to 36 months. Why that window?
That's how long he thinks it will take for the situation to deteriorate enough that terrorist groups can rebuild their infrastructure and start planning operations. It's not immediate, but it's not distant either.
Does the US actually have the ability to stop this from happening?
That's the question nobody can answer yet. They say they can counter threats remotely, through intelligence and strikes. But if you don't have people on the ground, your visibility is limited. You're always reacting instead of preventing.